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Introduction 
 
This thesis analyzes the decision of becoming blood and living organ donors from 
different perspectives. Theoretical and empirical approaches are provided. The thesis is 
composed of four papers. The following lines are a synthesis of the objectives and main 
results obtained for each of the papers. To situate the reader in the context, I start by 
explaining how is the situation and the problems that I will treat in this thesis. I also 
give some general explanations on the methodology used for regression analysis 
(standard probit, Heckman selection probit and panel data models) in the empirical 
work, for easiness of the reading and interpretation of results. 
 
Summary: The Economics of blood and living organ donations 
 
This thesis is motivated by the fact that only 1% of the world population donates 
blood while 90% of the population would be capable of donating. This small percentage 
of blood donors is attributed in part to the lack of information, fears, availability, and 
other reasons. The waiting lists for organ transplantation do not stop increasing. One of 
the main reasons for this fact is the successful reduction in traffic fatalities in the last 
decade as a result of new traffic laws and campaigns to reduce mortality in traffic 
accidents. In addition, thanks to the health care progresses individuals’ life expectancy 
has increased, thus, the population is ageing. However, the younger generations are not 
enough to compensate the loss of donors due to aging or health problems. Therefore, in 
most of the countries the demand for blood and organs for transplantation is higher than 
its supply. The probability of being recipient of a blood transfusion or an organ increase 
for individuals as the population is ageing and has more health problems associated with 
age.  
There is an ongoing need of increasing the number of blood and organ donors. 
Research has been done exploring attitudes towards blood and organ donations in 
different populations. However, small consensus has been achieved on what leads 
individuals to become or not donors.  
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Methods 
   I. Theoretical Approach 
We begin by proposing a decision model, specific for the case of blood and living 
organ donations, which helps to disentangle the psychology behind such a decision. 
This model assumes that donation is voluntary and altruistic, and that the decision is 
only motivated by individuals’ degree of altruism and self-interest utilities. For a partly 
self-interested and partly altruistic individual, the expected utility of becoming a donor 
is a function of his/her consumption of goods and services, the perceived costs of 
donation, the pleasure of giving, and the recipient’s utility associated with donation. 
Then, the model is extended to the situation in which incentives are offered for donating 
blood and living organs, in order to explore the consequences of introducing incentive 
mechanisms over individuals’ behavior and decision making. We show how altruism 
could be affected by the introduction of incentives and modify individuals’ behavior 
when facing the decision of donating blood and living organs. 
 
    II. Empirical Approach 
 
In the first two papers, we explore, through a questionnaire to a university 
population, the profiles of blood and living organ donors. We start by examining the 
importance of benefits and costs of blood and living organ donations, as well as other 
factors related to individuals’ information and trust, and control variables for the 
different groups of blood and living organ donors. Results show there are differences on 
how the different groups of blood and living organ donors are influenced by the 
expected per-se and other-regarding benefits of donation, and also by information and 
trust factors. The questionnaire also includes some questions about incentives. As a 
proxy for crowding-effects we use the individuals’ attitudes towards incentives, attitude 
being measured by an agreement/disagreement scale. In this paper, the analysis focuses 
on the probability of the different groups of blood and living organ donors to 
agree/disagree with each of the incentives.  
The third paper analyzes the case of blood donations in France. The objective of 
this article is to analyze the determinants of blood donation in the French population in 
age and ability to make this donation distinguishing active donors from potential 
donors. Data from the Health and Social Protection Survey (ESPS) 2012 are used. We 
test the hypothesis that altruism, socioeconomic characteristics, and health, are 
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important determinants of blood donation. Given that the 2012 ESPS survey is the 
primary source of data in the general population to combine socio-economic, 
demographic and health characteristics with questions about blood donation.  
Finally we explore the impact of new advertising campaigns for blood donation that 
the blood donors’ association of Navarra (ADONA) started implementing in 2010. The 
aim is to compare these campaigns that ADONA implemented since 2010 with previous 
ADONA campaigns and other events for encouraging blood donation implemented in 
the past in the same region. To analyze the impact of pro-donation campaigns we 
propose three indicators: 1st. the difference in the days between two consecutive 
donations for each individual, as a measure for variation in the frequency of blood 
donations when there is a campaign active and where no campaign is active; 2
nd
. the 
incremental days between consecutive donations as a measure for variation in regularity 
on blood donation behavior when there is a campaign active; 3
rd
. the proportion of new 
donors with and without campaigns active. Controlling for individuals' characteristics 
and identifying other events than could be taking place at the same time than the 
donation campaigns we reduce the estimation bias, and propose a model to better isolate 
the effect of campaigns.  
 
The probit model 
 
The purpose of the probit model is to estimate the probability that an observation, i, 
with particular characteristics, x, will fall into a specific one of the categories, j; 
moreover, if estimated probabilities are greater than 1/2 they are treated as classifying 
an observation into a predicted category, the probit model is a type of binary 
classification model. It takes the following form:  
 ii xxjY  ]|Pr[  
where Pr denotes the probability, and Φ is the Cumulative Distribution Function 
(CDF) of the standard normal distribution. Thus, the CDF plays the role of 
transformation function in the case of the probit model. The advantage of using the CDF 
is that it is easily evaluated numerically and its first derivative is simply the standard 
normal density function, ϕ(x).In our case, our models will be such that the dependent 
variables of the probit will take only two possible values (j={0, 1}). The 
parameters β are typically estimated by the method of Maximum Likelihood. Because 
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the dependent variable is discrete, the likelihood function cannot be defined as a joint 
density function such as in the case of models with a continuously distributed dependent 
variable. The likelihood function should be defined as the probability that the value j is 
realized, rather than as the probability density at that value. With this redefinition for the 
particular case of discrete dependent variables, the sum of the possible values of the 
likelihood is equal to 1. So we have sums instead of integrals when the dependent 
variable is continuous. The log-likelihood function is: 
     


N
i
iiii xyxyl
1
1ln)1(ln   
For each observation, one of the terms inside the large parethesis is always 0 and 
the other is always negative. The first term is 0 whenever yi=0, and the second term is 
negative because it is equal to the logarithm of a probability, and the probability by 
definition is in the interval [0, 1].  
Maximizing the Maximum likelihood function (applying first order conditions) 
reports the estimates for the coefficients ˆ , which will be consistent, asymptotically 
normal, and efficient, provided that E(XX’) exists and is not singular. The result of a 
probit model is the computation of the probability of occurrence of an event (Y=1) in a 
population, conditioned to a set of individual’s characteristics of that population. The 
probability of Yi=1 conditional to some characteristics of the population X can be 
computed as follows: 
)}exp(exp{1]|1Pr[ ii xXY   
Once the parameter estimates are obtained and also the probabilities of the events 
can be computed, a natural step is to consider the marginal effects of the covariates in 
the conditional distributions.  
Let   be the vector of k regression coefficients in the current model fit, let x be a 
vector of covariate values, and let  ˆ,x  be the scalar valued function (CDF for 
probit) returning the value of the predictions of interest.  
The marginal probability effect of a binary variable xk is a function  ˆ,xh  that is 
expressed and interpreted as follows: 
      ˆˆˆ, 01 iik xxxh   
For x,ij the vector of j regressors included in the model, the marginal probability 
effect of a binary explanatory variable equals: the value of  ˆ,x  when xij =1 and the 
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other regressors equal fixed values, minus the value of  ˆ,x  when xij = 0 and the 
other regressors equal the same fixed values.  
For the case of a binary variable xk, this would be the same than saying that the 
marginal effect is the probability of 1iy  conditional to the values of the k-1 
covariates given that the value for covariate xk is 1, minus the same probability when the 
value for covariate xk is 0. 
     0,|1Pr1,|1Prˆ,  kikik xxyxxyxh   
 
The probit model with sample selection 
 
The probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981) assumes 
that there is an underlying relationship such that: 
iii XY 1*     (1) 
Where (2) is the latent equation so that the outcome Y* is not always observed. 
Instead, the dependent variable for observation "i" is observed if:  
iii ZY 2   > 0   (2) 
Where (2) is the selection equation. The Heckman selection model assumes that the 
errors of the latent and selection equations follow a normal distribution such that u1 ~ N 
(0, 1) and u2 ~ N (0, 1), but also that there is a positive correlation between the two error 
terms, such that corr (u1, u2) = ρ. If the hypothesis of null correlation between the errors 
is rejected (ρ ≠ 0), estimation using a standard probit will lead to biased results.  
In this case, the Maximum Likelihood function is:  
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Where Φ is the standard cumulative normal and wi the optional weight for 
observation i. In the MLE σ and ρ are not directly estimated, but we can directly 
estimate instead ln σ and atanh ρ, where  












1
1
ln
2
1
tanha  
The standard error of λ= σ ρ is approximated through the proportion of error (delta) 
method.  
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Var (λ) ≈ D var{atanh ρ * ln σ}D’ 
Where D is the jacobian of λ with respect to atanh ρ and ln σ. 
The two-step estimates are computed using Heckman’s procedure. Probit estimates 
of the selection equation are obtained as:  
 iii xZobservedY  ]|Pr[  
The obtention of marginal effects having the estimates for the parameters of the 
model is the same than we explained for the probit model. We focus then on explaining 
the selection problem and when estimating a Heckman selection model would be 
preferred to a standard probit. 
From these estimates, the nonselection hazard –what Heckman referred to as the 
Inverse Mills Ratio, mi – for each observation i, is computed as: 
)ˆ(
)ˆ(


i
i
i
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z
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
 
We also define for the Heckman model: 
     δi = mi (mi+γzi) 
Following Heckman, the two-step parameter estimates of β are obtained by 
including the non-selection hazard term (mi) in the regression equation and running the 
estimation. Thus, the regressors become [X m], and we obtain the additional parameter 
estimate βm on the variable containing the non-selection hazard.  
A consistent estimate of the regression disturbance variance is obtained using the 
residuals from the augmented regression. 
The two-step estimate of ρ is then:  



ˆ
ˆ
ˆ m  where 
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  
Heckman derived consistent estimates of the coefficient covariance matrix on the 
basis of the augmented regression.  
Let W = [X m] and R be a square diagonal matrix of dimension N with (1- ˆ 2 δi ) 
as the diagonal elements. The conventional variance-covariance estimate is:  
VTWO-STEP =     
112 '''ˆ

 WWQRWWWW  
Where:  
   DWZVDZWQ p ''ˆ
2  
Where D is the diagonal matrix of dimension N with δi as the diagonal elements; Z 
is the data matrix of selection equation covariates; and Vp is the variance-covariance 
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estimate from the probit estimation of the selection equation.  
The probit Heckman selection provides consistent estimates in the presence of 
positive correlation between the errors of the regression and selection equations, 
asymptotically efficient for all parameters of the model. For the model to be well 
identified, the selection equation must have at least one variable that is not in the 
equation of the standard probit model. Otherwise, the model would be identified only by 
the functional form, and the coefficients will not have the correct structural 
interpretation. 
The Heckman selection model depends strongly on the model being correctly, 
much more than ordinary regression. Running a separate probit for sample inclusion and 
followed this first step by a regression (the two-step model) is an especially attracted 
alternative if the regression part of the model arose because of taking a logarithm of 
zero values. However, when the model is not properly specified or if a specific dataset 
simply does not support the model’s assumptions, the standard Heckman model may not 
be stable. The two-step Heckman selection model is generally more stable when the 
data are problematic (i.e exploring a large dataset), and this is the reason why we will 
use the two-step Heckman selection model in the third article of this thesis, in which 
data from a survey to the population of France are analyzed.  
 
Panel Data Models 
 
A longitudinal or panel dataset is one that follows a given sample of units (we will 
use individuals, but could be regions, countries, or any kind of physical units in general) 
over time, and thus provides multiple observations on each individual in the sample. 
Using panel data sets for economic research has many advantages with respect to cross-
sectional or time-series data. A panel usually gives the researcher a large number of 
observations, increases the degrees of freedom and reduces the collinearity among 
explanatory variables. So estimation using a panel data improves the efficiency of the 
econometric estimates. In addition, longitudinal data allow a researcher to analyze 
important economic questions that with other type of data sets would simply not be 
possible to analyze. In our specific case, we use panel data analysis in the last paper of 
this thesis to follow blood donors along time. Having a longitudinal data set allows us to 
estimate the impact of campaigns looking at behavioral changes in the population of 
blood donors when campaigns are active and when they are not active.  
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Consider fitting models on the form:  
tiitititi zsxy ,321,,    
Where subscript i={1,…N} and t={1,…,T} refers to the level of observation of units 
(i.e individuals, regions, countries,…) and time (i.e days, weeks, months, years,…) 
respectively. xi,t is a set of covariates that change with units and time, si is a variable that 
changes with units but is time-invariant (such as sex or race) and zt is a variable which 
changes with time, such as age. Failure to include heterogeneity quantities in the model 
may introduce serious bias into the model estimators, important variables having been 
omitted from the model. 
The residual that we have little interest in is the sum of tii ,  , that is the error due 
to omitted variables that change with time or with individuals and time at the same time. 
We are interested in the estimation of β1, β2 and β3. 
A longitudinal data design may yield more efficient estimators than other designs, 
such as cross-section or time-series. For example, suppose that the interest is assessing 
the change in a particular outcome y over time: that is 21   yy  is the difference 
between the outcome in two time periods, 1 and 2, for the individual i. In a repeated 
cross-section analysis we would calculate the reliability of this statistic assuming 
independence among cross-sections to get:    2121 var)var(var   yyyy  
However, in a panel data set, the assumption of Independence between cross-
sections cannot be accepted, and in general we have to asume that cov( 1y , 2y )>0, and 
therefore the following expression demonstrates that the variance is smaller than in a 
cross-sectional data set (if and only if the covariance term is positive). 
     212121 ,cov2var)var(var   yyyyyy  
For estimation of the impact of blood donation campaigns on the behavior of the 
blood donors in a given population, we use the Random Effects model. We chose to 
estimate the model using randon effects because the primary variables of interest, in our 
case the dummy variables representing the campaigns being actives, are time constant, 
and therefore in this cases it is suggested to use the random effects model. 
Estimating with random effects implies estimating the model by Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS). This means that the variance-covariance matrix of the OLS method is 
transformed in order to achieve efficiency in the estimation. The calculation of the GLS 
estimator assumes that the variance components 
2
  and 
2
  are known. 
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Attitudes towards altruistic blood and living organ donations 
María Errea, Juan M. Cabasés 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper models the decision of whether to become a blood/living organ donor 
and empirically analyses the factors influencing this decision. For a partly self-
interested and partly altruistic individual, the expected utility of becoming a donor is a 
function of his/her consumption of goods and services, the perceived costs of 
donation, the pleasure of giving, and the recipient’s utility associated with donation. 
The empirical analysis examines, for the different groups of blood and living organ donors, 
the influence of the expected benefits and costs of donation, factors related to individuals’ 
information and trust, and control variables. Results show there are differences on how the 
different groups of blood and living organ donors are influenced by the expected per-se 
and other-regarding benefits of donation, and also by information and trust factors. We 
conclude that policies to increase the number of donors should address the issues of 
encouraging altruism, reducing the perceived costs of donation, increasing the level of 
trust in the Health Care System, and providing more information. 
 
Key words: Altruism; Uncertainty; Decision making; Blood Donations; Living 
Organ Donations 
 
JEL classification: D6, D8, D9, I1 
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1. Introduction 
 
Blood donations in certain countries seem to have peaked donations due to the 
ageing of the donor population (Ditto et al., 2003; Greinacher, Fendrich, and 
Hoffmann, 2010) and difficulties in replacing lost donors. As blood cannot be 
manufactured artificially, maintaining the donor population is critical.  
Meanwhile, organ donations from deceased donors are also decreasing due to a 
reduction in traffic fatalities (Dickert-Conlin, Elder and Moore, 2011; Stuckler et al., 
2011; de Lago, 2011), and as a result the number of people on waiting lists for organ 
transplantation is increasing exponentially (Becker and Elías, 2007). Despite the 
recent changes in the definition of death for cadaveric donation of organs and 
presumed consent legislation (Abadie, Gay, 2006), the shortage of organs for 
transplantation remains high. These circumstances have resulted in growing interest in 
encouraging living organ donations, as an alternative method to fill the gap between 
supply and demand for organs.  
Important research has examined kidney exchange among living donors, 
generating chains of donors using a model based on compatibility criteria proposing 
methods to increase living organ donations (Roth, Sönmez, Unver 2004 and 2005), or 
experimental studies in the laboratory for the evaluation of hypothetical organ 
allocation policies and their impact on donor registration (Kessler and Roth, 2012). 
However, much work remains to be done. During the period 2005-2010, the shares of 
kidney and liver transplants from living donors in European countries remained stable 
at 3% and 18%, respectively. In 2012 the Newsletter Transplant Report registered 
more than 45,000 patients waiting for a kidney and approximately 20,000 for a liver, 
and the death rate among these individuals is high. Thus there is an urgent need to 
encourage donations and increase the supply of blood and organs (Epstein, 2008). 
The donation of blood and organs can be understood as a form of pro-social or 
altruistic behaviour. Adopting the classical definition of altruism given by Auguste 
Comte, “self-sacrifice for the benefit of others”, and the concept of impure altruism 
developed by Andreoni (1990), we develop a model where donors can be considered 
partly altruistic individuals. Individuals who decide to become donors are, in our 
model, willing to make a personal sacrifice to improve the well-being of another 
individual or even society as a whole, provided that they do not expect a loss of total 
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utility (relative to the utility of not donating) by doing so.  
Impure altruism has been understood through the economics of giving (Culyer, 
1971 and 1980; Kolm, 2006; Clotfelter, 2002) as a way of behaviour when donating 
not only blood or organs but also for the general context of charitable giving. First, 
individuals consistently expect an impact on utility, either positive or negative, due to 
the variables associated with donations that define his/her self-interest (as opposed to 
the interests of others). However, individuals may also expect some social benefits 
from giving to others. These benefits can be derived from the mere fact of giving, 
irrespective of the success or failure of donation for the recipients, deriving a benefit 
due to the pride of being considered a good person by other individuals the rest of 
individuals – the warm glow (Andreoni, 1990) –, but also for the empathy or concern 
for another individual or group of individuals (individuals may have other-regarding 
preferences), some individuals being concerned about the improvement in the well-
being of the recipient/s. Improvements are measured as the incremental utility as a 
result of donation, only if the result is  a health improvement for the recipient.  
Behind these arguments are multiple variables that individuals consider important 
for their decision to donate blood and living organs according to the literature. 
Researchers agree, for example, on the influence of a sense of duty (Wildman and 
Hollingsworth, 2009), responsibility, and love, as well as various psychological 
rewards (Thorne, 2006). Other influential variables that have been explored in the 
context of blood and living organ donations include trust in the health-care system 
(Rando, Blanca and Frutos, 2002), solidarity, family tradition (Goette and Stutzer, 
2008), and reciprocity (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Fong, Bowles and Gintis, 2004).  
Lots of empirical works have been done to find the motivations for donating 
blood and organs in different populations. However, the literature on attitudes towards 
donation lacks of a theoretical model that represents the specific decision to donate 
blood or living organs. Thus, our aim in this paper is to provide a behavioral model, to 
represent the individuals’ decision of whether to become or a blood/living organ 
donor.  
We propose a specific and parsimonious model of behavior –assuming linearity 
between self-interested and other-regarding preferences– for the decision of whether 
to become a blood or a living organ donor. The model assumes that the utility from 
donating blood or organs in life is a function of the expected benefits and costs of 
donation, these benefits and costs being different for each type of donation. We 
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suggest that differences between individuals in their attitudes towards donation are 
based on expectations of the benefits and costs of donation. The model is specific to 
this type of in-kind giving and is applicable to both types of donations considered –
blood and living organs– although specificities of each are considered.  
Empirically, we analyze the differences between different groups of donors 
through a questionnaire on attitudes towards blood and living organ donations in a 
selected population. We check for the influence of the expected benefits and costs of 
donating blood or living organs, and also other relevant variables that could be of 
influence for individuals’ decision, such as information and trust factors or the 
importance of having predecessors.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the standard economic approach 
of a utility-maximizing rational individual is considered. Section 3 presents the 
empirical work. The empirical analysis focuses on explaining the differences between 
groups of donors according to control variables (gender, age and education), the 
expected costs and benefits of donating blood or living organs, and other factors that 
could influence the decision of becoming or not a donor related to information and 
trust in the Health Care System. The methods and results of the empirical analysis are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the most significant findings of the paper 
and proposes questions for further research. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
2.1 The decision of becoming or not a donor 
An individual i faces the decision of whether to become a blood/living organ 
donor. The individual’s preferences are represented by a utility function that fulfils all 
of the conditions for numerical representation (asymmetry, negative transitivity and 
continuity) and is additively separable into self-interested and altruistic utilities 
(Becker and Barro, 1986; Levine, 1998). 
Preferences for any individual i are represented by a utility function Ui, that is a 
mapping Ui: 
4
 →  such that: 
    (1)  iiiiii UGCXUU  ,,,
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where Xi is a finite set of goods and services available for consumption by the i-th 
individual, Ci represents the function of expected costs from donating, Gi represents the 
expected benefit from donating per-se (the warm-glow), and U−i the utility associated 
with the donation experienced by recipient -i. 
     Preferences are assumed to be monotonic in Xi, in Gi, and U-i, but not in Ci,, and 
the marginal effects are expected to be: 
(2) 
That is, the utility of the individual i increases in consumption (Xi), the expected 
benefit associated with donation per-se (Gi), and the expected gain in utility for the 
recipient (U-i), and decreases in the expected costs of donation (Ci). 
 We assume linearity and additive separability: the self-interested and altruistic 
components of utility are independent, such that the weights an individual assigns to 
them are complementary. However, each function (we will use πi for the function 
representing self-interest and νi for the function representing altruism) is additive in its 
arguments. Self-interest is a function of own consumption of a set of goods and the 
expected costs of donation. The additive assumption implies that changes in one of the 
arguments do not affect the other, but directly affect to the final utility. The same 
assumption is made for altruistic preferences, which are a function of the very pleasure 
of donating (the warm-glow or per-se benefit) and the expected benefits that the 
recipient would derive from the donation (the other-regarding benefit). 
 The individual decides whether to become a donor at any point in time during 
his/her lifetime, considering t = a,..., a + Li as the finite time horizon for any individual, 
where Li represents the life expectancy of an individual of age a. Therefore, the decision 
at time t depends on expectations regarding total future utility. Utility is discounted at a 
rate r. For simplicity in the algebra, the discount rates for the donor and the recipient are 
considered to be the same. 
Therefore, the decision of becoming or not a donor for any individual i at time t is 
represented by the following function: 
  (3) 
Where: δi,t and (1-δi,t) represent the degree of self-interest and the degree of altruism, 
respectively, of individual i. The parameter δi,t can take any value in the (0,1) interval, 
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such that the individual is defined on a continuum from very self-interested to very 
altruistic, excluding the possibility of pure selfishness and pure altruism. We assume that 
an individual’s degree of altruism can change over time. πi and represent the self-
interested (4) and altruistic (5) components of the utility function, respectively, of 
individual i at time t, according to the assumption of additive separability: 
      (4) 
   (5) 
Where  is the utility that individual i derives from the consumption of a set of n 
goods  Xi.  At time t, each of the goods/services is associated with a different utility. Let the 
set of utilities be xi,t = {x1,t, x2,t..., xn,t}i and the function representing the utility from 
consumption associated with donation . It is assumed that an individual’s 
expected utility of consumption derived from deciding to become a donor may be 
different from the expected utility of consumption derived from deciding not to 
become a donor, , where X
0
i,t represents the set of goods available for 
consumption when an individual decides not to become a donor. Throughout his/her 
lifetime, 
 
is considered the discounted sum of the expected utility of 
consumption at each time period over the whole time frame: 
(6) 
 πi,t(Ci,t) represents the disutility derived from the expected losses associated with 
donation. In general, Ci,t represents all of the costs that an individual associates with 
donation, with cit ={c1t , c2t ,..., cnt}i representing the set of disutilties that an individual 
expects if deciding to donate at time t  over the utility at any time greater or equal than t. 
The disutility over the whole time-frame can be expressed as:
 
(7) 
 represents the individual’s expected utility derived from the mere fact of 
donating at time t (the per-se utility). The main difference between this term and the 
warm-glow effect is that the per-se benefit is irrespective from the social perception of 
the individual who donates as a good person. The per-se benefit is assumed to be non-
negative and is expressed as follows: 
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   (8) 
  titititi HqU ,,,, ,   represents the utility that individual i obtains when the recipient 
derives positive utility as a result of donation. It not only depends on the expected 
increases in the recipient’s well-being due to the donation, H-i,t, but also on the 
probability of success of the donation, q-i,t.  
The expected value of the donation for the recipient is the total utility over time 
multiplied by the probability of the donation’s success. It is assumed that this utility is 
only positive when the donation is expected to be successful,  q-i,t ϵ (0, 1] and the 
recipient’s well-being improves with donation, h-i,t > 0. On the contrary, when the 
probability of success is null, then U-i,t (qi,t=0)=0. The expression for the other-
regarding preferences depends on the expected utility of the recipient, as follows: 
  (9) 
where the utility of the donor derived from the utility of the recipient (9) will be higher 
or lower depending on the sensitivity of the donor to variations in the utility of the 
recipient, measured by a parameter . This term represents the elasticity of individual i 
to the recipient’s expected utility from donation. This elasticity will be more relevant in 
the organ donation case. Thus, for organ donations, it is assumed that an individual, 
who is impurely altruistic, will not assign more importance to the utility of the recipient 
than to his/her own utility, and thus  will never be greater than 1 ( ≤ 1). This 
means that an increase in the recipient’s utility results in diminishing (or proportional) 
increases in the utility of individual i. For the specific case of blood donations, we 
assume proportionality, and therefore state that =1.  
By linking equations 3 to 9, we arrive at the following expression for the expected 
utility of becoming a blood or a living organ donor (10): 
 (10) 
The individual, who is a priori neither purely self-interested nor purely altruistic, 
decides whether to become a donor depending on the expected gains and losses 
associated with the donation. Being a rational individual, he/she decides to become a 
donor when the expected utility of deciding to become a donor is higher than the 
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expected utility of deciding not to become a donor. The utility of deciding not to 
become a donor ( ) is simplified as the expected utility from own consumption of 
goods and services: 
    (11) 
From this expression, two solutions to the individual’s utility maximisation problem 
emerge. The individual decides to become a donor if . Therefore there are 
two main possible scenarios in which the individual would decide to become a donor at 
time t, depending on value of the self-interested utility:  
     (12)
 
       (13) 
Equation (12) represents the necessary condition for the individual to decide to 
become a donor for positive expected values of self-interested utility (that is, when 
costs are sufficiently low). Equation (13) represents the condition under which an 
individual decides to become a donor even for negative expected values of self-
interested utility. A peculiarity of the second solution (13) is that an individual decides 
to become a donor and sacrifice his/her self-interested utility if and only if the gains in 
terms of indirect utility, such as per-se and other-regarding benefits, are sufficiently 
high to compensate for the disutility of the costs of donation. 
Deciding to become a blood donor or a living organ donor has very different 
implications. The expected costs may be higher in the case of facing the decision to 
become a living organ donor, but the expected benefits may also differ in the two 
cases.  
Let us assume that ci,t
LOD  
> ci,t
BD  
, where LOD refers to Living Organ Donation 
and BD to Blood Donation. The rest of variables are equal for both donations, two 
propositions arise (note that analogous propositions to proposition 1 could be 
developed by holding the costs equal for both types of donations and considering 
benefits as the comparison variable):  
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Proposition 1: If the expected costs of becoming a living organ donor (ci,t
LOD 
) 
are strictly higher than the expected cost of becoming a blood donor (ci,t
BD
), provided 
equal expected benefits from both types of donations, the degree of altruism for 
individuals who decide to become living organ donors must be higher than the degree 
of altruism for individuals who decide to become blood donors.  
 
Proof of proposition 1: If  ci,t
LOD 
> ci,t
BD 
, this implies that, for equal values of 
expected benefits from both types of donations, the value of the self-interested utility 
from a living organ donation is lower than the value of the self-interested utility from 
a blood donation. Mathematically, from the model solutions (12) or (13), this is 
.  
As solutions (12) and (13) show, the ratio of relative altruism optimal for becoming 
a donor,  , is calculated as the ratio between the expected benefits (nominator) 
and costs (denominator). If the expected costs are higher and the expected benefits are 
equal in both donations, the degree of self-interest must be lower when an individual 
decides to become a living organ donor. Under the assumption of self-interest and 
altruism being complementary, a lower degree of self-interest implies a higher degree of 
altruism. Then, we have demonstrated that under the proposed hypotheses, higher 
expected costs of LOD imply that the degree of altruism necessary for an individual to 
decide to become a living organ donor must be higher than that for the decision to 
become a blood donor.                                         
 
Proposition 2: When expected self-interested utility is negative, irrespective of 
the type of donation, the degree of altruism necessary for an individual to decide to 
become a donor is higher than when the expected self-interested utility is positive. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: If the individual has decided to become a living organ 
donor knowing that the expected value for the self-interested utility is negative 
(solution 2, equation 13), the degree of altruism necessary to become a donor must be 
higher than when the expected self-interested utility is positive. Otherwise, utility 
would be negative, and the decision would be to not become a donor.                     
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2.2 Heterogeneity in donors’ behavior 
 
We have proposed a utility function that represents the decision of becoming or 
not a donor. Blood donation can be performed more than once in life, while a kidney 
or a liver can be donated only once in life. In both, blood and living organ donations, 
individuals should be classified into different groups according to their decision and 
final behavior.  
An individual who has decided to donate blood may go once and not donate in the 
end (being refused for health reasons) or donate once and never donate anymore 
(having a bad experience or just for a strong change in life that suddenly happened); 
he/she can go for the first time and become a regular donor after a certain number of 
donations; he/she may donate blood not regularly, but only in reaction of a blood 
donation campaign for example. These examples illustrate the different types of blood 
donors that emerge from the same decision, which was becoming a donor.  
We can therefore say that blood donors can be classified into: Regular Donors, 
Non-Regular Donors, Past Donors (stopped donating whatever the reason), and 
Refused Donors (went to the transfusion center but was refused to be donor for age or 
health reasons).  
An individual who has decided not to donate blood may be due to a health reason, 
such that he/she would never be accepted as a blood donor, or he/she has no health 
problems to become a donor. There are two possible groups among the non-donors: 
The Refused for health reasons, and the Potential donors, who are perfectly healthy 
for being a blood donor but who have never thought about donating before, or who 
have never donated for other reasons different than health problems. The case of 
living organ donations is similar. An individual who decides donating a kidney or a 
liver to a relative may be accepted or rejected as a donor.  
 
In the following section we present a questionnaire which aims to explore the 
differences between groups of blood donors and also between individuals according to 
the willingness to donate a living organ to a relative.  
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3. Empirical work 
3.1 Methods: A questionnaire on blood and living organ donations 
A questionnaire was designed and delivered to the staff of the Public University of 
Navarre, Pamplona, Spain, and to a list of blood donors from the same region in May 
2010. Two different modalities of the questionnaire were delivered: an online 
questionnaire for the university population, and a paper version of the same questionnaire 
adapted for the population of blood donors contacted by the regional blood donors’ 
association (ADONA). The questionnaire for the university staff was e-mailed to all 
potential respondents, 1414 employees at the Public University of Navarre (932 teaching 
staff and 482 other staff), and reminders were sent after 1 week, 2 weeks and 1 month. To 
increase the proportion of blood donors in our sample, the questionnaire was also sent by 
post to a population of 500 blood donors, once and without reminders. Our margin of error 
is less than 5%, yielding a 95% confidence level, which is considered acceptable for 
survey research (Bartlett, Kotrlick and Higgins, 2001).  
The questionnaire addresses blood and living organ donations separately. It is based in 
other questionnaires and published studies. We consider the most significant reasons for 
donating and expected effects referred to by Titmuss (1970), Andreoni (2006), Goette and 
Stutzer (2008), and Fehr and Schmidt (2006), in the case of blood donations, and Rosel et 
al. (1995), Rando et al. (1995, 2005 and 2007), Hilhorst M. (2004) and Morgan S. et al. 
(2008), in the case of organ donations. The questions referring to blood donation are 
different for Blood Donors and Non-Blood Donors. Concerning living organ donations, 
the questions are identical for all respondents. Blood donors were asked questions 
regarding their decision to become donors, and Non-Blood donors were asked about their 
reasons for not becoming donors. To determine how the perceptions of benefits and costs 
differ between groups, all respondents were asked to express their perceptions of the 
benefits and costs of donating blood and living organs. The questionnaire concluded with 
socio-demographic questions related to gender, age and level of education. 
Information concerning the reasons for and against donating and the expected effects 
of donation may be helpful for a better understanding of individual decision making in the 
context of blood and living organ donations; it could also help to identify neglected issues 
entailed by each type of donation—areas where more intervention is needed—and thus 
orient the design of policies to better attract potential donors. 
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3.2 Description of the Sample: Classification of Donors and dependent variables 
The questionnaire allows distinguishing five groups of blood donors according to 
their response to the following questions:  
1. “Are you a blood donor/have you ever donated blood?” The possible answers to 
that question are: No, I have never donated my blood / Yes, I donate my blood regularly / 
Yes, I donate my blood, but not regularly / Yes, I have donated my blood in the past, but I 
stopped / Does not Answer. 
2. We need to distinguish those individuals who do not donate blood because they 
cannot do it due to health reasons from those who do not donate for a reason which is not 
health. To this end, we ask individuals about their reasons for not donating blood. Only the 
non-blood donors answered to this question, and the list of reason was the following: Does 
not trust the Health Care System, Fear, Has never thought about it, There is no reward or 
compensation for the donor, Lack of awareness concerning the needs for blood, Other 
people donate, Health Reasons, and Other reasons (open question).  
We observe that among our respondents (N=654), the 44.65% has never donated 
blood, while the other 55.45% has donated at least once in life, 8.56% has stopped 
donating, 10.55% donates blood but not regularly and the 35.78% donate blood 
regularly.   
Table 1. Response rates and percentage for the main question on blood donation 
Responses to the question on blood donation behaviour N % % Cum. 
Has never donated blood 292 44.65 44.65 
Has donated blood in the past 56 8.56 53.21 
Donates blood but not regularly 69 10.55 63.76 
Donates blood regularly 234 35.78 99.54 
Does not answer to the question (Missing) 3 0.46 100 
Total 654 100.00 
 
 
The analysis of the open question completes the list of reasons for not donating. As a 
result, we observe that 29% of the non-blood donors do not donate because of health 
reasons. Fear (14.73%) and have not thought about it (9.59%) are also important reasons 
according to our subsample of non-blood donors. The open question emerges some 
important reasons that our initial list of reasons did not consider. Some individuals report 
having a temporary health problem (5.48%), or not being motivated enough for donating 
(6.51%).  
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Table 2. Reasons for not donating for the Non-Blood Donors 
Reasons for not donating Freq. Percent Cum. 
Does not trust the Health Care System 6 2.05 2.05 
Fear 43 14.73 16.78 
Has not thought about it 28 9.59 26.37 
Lack of awareness of the need 18 6.16 32.53 
Other people donate 5 1.71 34.25 
Health reasons 87 29.79 64.04 
Lack of motivation 19 6.51 70.55 
Temporary Health problem 16 5.48 76.03 
Feeling dizzy  3 1.03 77.05 
Lack of information 6 2.05 79.11 
Does not Answer 61 20.89 100.00 
Total 292 100 
 
 
With the responses to these three questions we distinguish the following groups of 
blood donors:  
 Regular Blood donors: those who report to donate blood regularly in the first 
question 
 Non-Regular Blood Donors: those who state to donate blood, but not regularly 
 Potential Donors: those who have never donated blood but do not choose “health 
reasons” as the main reason for it 
 Refused donors: individuals who have never donated because of health reasons 
 Past donors: they have donated blood in the past but stopped) 
 Non-Donors who are not identifiable because information about the reason for not 
donating is missing (they did not answer to that question).  
Table 3. Classification of Blood Donors in the working sample 
Blood Donors’ classification  N % % Cum. 
Regular donors 234 35.78 35.78 
Non –Regular donors 69 10.55 46.33 
Potential  144 22.02 68.35 
Refused 87 13.30 81.65 
Past 56 8.56 90.21 
Non Donor by unknown reason 61 9.33 99.54 
Missing 3 0.46 100.00 
Total 654 100.00 
 
 
Concerning living organ donations module of the questionnaire, donor groups are 
33 
 
identified depending on the answer to the following question: “Would you be willing to 
donate a liver/kidney to a relative if you faced such a decision?”  
The following table shows that the 54.59% of the respondents would be completely 
agree on donating an organ in life to a relative. We also observe that only a few individuals 
disagree with this question, but the percentage of no answer is quite high (18.35%). 
Table 4. Willingess to Donate an Organ in life (WTD) 
WTD N % %  Cum. 
Completely Agree 357 54.59 54.59 
Somewhat Agree 140 21.41 75.99 
Somewhat Disagree 4 0.61 76.61 
Completely Disagree 2 0.31 76.91 
Does not know 31 4.74 81.65 
Missing 120 18.35 100.00 
Total 654 100.00 
 
  
The dependent variables for the regression models are created using this 
classification. For the case of blood donations we aim to compare the different groups 
of donors, therefore we will estimate three probit models: 
 Model 1: Comparison between Blood Donors and Potential Donors. The dependent 
variable of this model is a dummy which takes value 1 if the individual is or has been 
a blood donor at least once in life, and 0 if the individual is a Potential Blood Donor 
(has chosen a reason for not donating different from health reasons) 
 Model 2: Comparison between Active Donors (regular or not, but excluding the 
past donors) and potential donors (excluding the individuals who are not donors 
because of permanent exclusion due to health reasons) 
 Model 3: Compares Regular Donors with Non-Regular Donors, excluding 
therefore all the individuals who are not blood donors. 
 
For the analysis of living organ donations, we estimate a probit model in which 
the dependent variable is the willingness to donate an organ in life to a relative. We 
aggregate levels of disagreement with those who do not know what to answer to this 
question, interpreting these three answers as a “low willingness to donate”. For the 
regression model the dependent variable will take value 1 if the individual completely 
agrees with donating an organ in life, and 0 otherwise (if he is not completely willing 
to donate). As independent variables we include age, gender and education as control 
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variables, the expected effects (benefits and costs) of donation, and other aspects 
related to donation such as having donor predecessors, information and trust in the 
Health Care System. Concerning the control variables, in the questionnaire we asked 
individuals about their gender and age in years. For the descriptive and regression 
analyses we create dummy variables for gender (men/female) and age ranges [18-29], 
[30-39], [40-49], [50-59], [60-67] such that each individual is allocated in one of the 
age ranges according to his/her age. The oldest individual in our sample is 67 years 
old and there is nobody under 18.  All individuals considered in our sample are 
therefore in age of donating. The question concerning the level of education 
considered four categories: Without Education, Primary School Studies, Secondary 
School Studies, and Superior Studies (College and University or similar). 
 
The expected benefits and costs of donating blood and living organs  
For each of these questions on the expected benefits and costs, individuals 
selected their level of the agreement on a 5-leveled Likert scale: 1-Completely 
Disagree, 2-Somewhat Disagree, 3-Somewhat Agree, 4-Completely Agree, and 5-Do 
not Answer.  
 The expected costs of donating blood or living organs, material or non-
material. The questions, respectively for blood and living organs are “Do you 
think that donating blood has some costs, material or non-material?”, and 
“Concerning the expected costs of donating an organ in life, do you think there 
might be consequences on your future health if donating an organ in life?” 
 The perceived benefit from the mere fact of donating (the per-se benefit for 
donating blood and living organs). “Do you think that there should be some 
benefit from the mere fact of donating, which is independent from the success of 
donation, when donating blood?” and “The very fact of donating an organ in life 
should provide personal satisfaction”. 
 The perceived benefit due to the improvement of someone else’s welfare as a 
consequence of donation. “Do you think that there should be some benefit 
associated with the success of donation in the sense that the benefits from the 
donation for the recipient make you happier when donating blood/a living 
organ?” and Donating an organ in life is contributing somehow to improve the 
well-being of the whole society. 
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 We hypothesize that there is an influence of the expected benefits and costs on 
the decision of donating blood and living organs. We will check not only for the 
importance of this benefits and costs, but also for the differences between groups and 
type of donations.  
 
Information and trust factors 
We include questions to know how much individuals are informed about 
donations, if they think there is enough information about blood donations in the 
media or from the health care system, if they think they have enough information 
about the complexity of the procedure of donating an organ in life, or how much they 
trust in the Health Care System, specifically in the field in charge of blood collection 
and transplantation. 
We hypothesize that information concerning blood and living organ donations 
reduces uncertainty about the donation process and therefore increases the probability 
of being a donor. 
 
The influence of having donor predecessors 
We also include a variable in the regression models that indicates if the individual 
knows the existence of blood or organ donor predecessors among relatives.  
The hypothesis to be tested is if those individuals who report having blood and 
organ predecessors are more likely to donate blood or to be more strongly willing to 
donate an organ in life than those who do not know the existence of predecessors 
among their relatives. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Descriptive Results 
The following results from the questionnaire are analyzed here: i) descriptive 
statistics by groups blood and living organ donors, and ii) regression results for the 
analysis of the determinants of blood and living organ donations for a given 
population and by groups of donors.  
The final sample size is N=654 respondents, with 453 responses (the 69.27%) 
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collected from the staff of the university community and 201 (the 30.73%) from the blood 
donors’ association. There are only three individuals who did not answer to the main 
question to know if they are or not blood donors. These individuals will be removed for the 
analysis. We also remove all the individuals who did not answer to the questions 
concerning age and gender, leaving a final working sample of N= 529 individuals for the 
analysis. The table below shows the distribution of respondents among the different 
groups of blood donors according to their responses to all the variables of interest. 
We observe that comparing by gender, women responding to our questionnaire 
are much more refused for health reasons than men, and also donate less regularly. 
The distribution by age shows that in our sample, the youngest respondents, those aged 
18-29, are, in a higher proportion, regular and potential blood donors. There is an 
important rate of no response to that question, but most of the individuals not 
responding to that information are non-blood donors who have neither responded to 
the reason why they are not blood donors. Among our respondents answering to 
information concerning their educational level, we observe that the majority has 
reached the University level or secondary studies. There are only a few individuals 
who report having reached Primary School. For those who have reached Secondary 
and University levels, results show that the percentage of regular donors is higher than 
other groups. However, those reporting university are less likely to be regular donors 
than those with a level of secondary studies. Concerning the expected benefits and 
costs of donating blood, most respondents disagree completely on the perception of 
costs of blood donation, especially visible for regular blood donors. Potential blood 
donors in general do not know what to answer to that question. Most individuals agree 
on the perception of per-se and other-regarding benefits. For those who agree 
completely there seem not to be significant differences among groups of blood donors, 
while for those who only agree (but not completely) regular blood donors gain weight 
with respect to the other groups. There are differences between groups of donors 
according to information and trust factors. The lower the agreement on that there is 
enough information, either general information, or from the media or Health Care 
System, the lower is the weight of regular donors, indicating that for this group 
information is perceived as enough, while especially for the group of potential donors 
or the refused report the contrary, showing disagreement on these questions. Similar 
results are found when we ask about how much they trust in the health care system. 
Finally, among those who report having blood and organ predecessors among their 
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relatives, the 44.74% are regular blood donors.  
Table 5. Distribution of responses (N and %) to the explanatory variables by groups of blood donors 
Variables 
Categories of 
response 
N 
% 
Regular 
% Non-
Regular 
% Past 
Donor 
% Potential 
% 
Refused 
% Non-donor  
(unknown 
reasons) 
Gender 
Women 284 27.11 15.14 8.80 26.76 20.07 2.11 
Men 257 57.59 5.84 8.17 18.68 7.78 1.95 
Missing 110 8.18 10.00 9.09 18.18 9.09 45.45 
Age 
[18-29] 242 36.36 14.05 7.02 31.40 9.50 1.65 
[30-39] 191 37.17 8.90 9.95 19.90 20.94 3.14 
[40-49] 78 56.41 6.41 10.26 11.54 14.10 1.28 
[50-59] 3 66.67 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 0.00 
[60-70] 16 68.75 0.00 12.50 0.00 18.75 0.00 
Missing 121 14.88 10.74 8.26 16.53 8.26 41.32 
Maximum level 
of Education 
achieved 
Primary School 42 83.33 9.52 4.76 2.38 0.00 0.00 
Secondary School 106 65.09 14.15 1.89 8.49 8.49 1.89 
University 175 44.00 12.00 6.29 19.43 16.00 2.29 
Without Studies 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Missing 327 15.90 8.87 12.54 30.58 15.29 16.82 
There is a cost, 
material or not, 
from donating 
blood 
Completely Agree 58 20.69 3.45 8.62 41.38 24.14 1.72 
Somewhat Agree 120 24.17 13.33 10.83 35.83 15.00 0.83 
Somewhat Disagree 66 48.48 7.58 1.52 25.76 15.15 1.52 
Completely Disagree 280 49.29 11.43 8.21 16.07 13.93 1.07 
Does not know 22 9.09 9.09 4.55 59.09 18.18 0.00 
Missing 105 20.00 11.43 12.38 1.90 1.90 52.38 
There is a 
benefit for the 
very fact of 
donating (per-se) 
Completely Agree 407 39.07 10.07 7.62 24.32 17.69 1.23 
Somewhat Agree 129 37.98 13.18 9.30 28.68 10.08 0.78 
Somewhat Disagree 12 50.00 0.00 8.33 33.33 0.00 8.33 
Completely Disagree 4 75.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 
Does not know 3 33.33 0.00 0.00 66.67 0.00 0.00 
Missing 96 16.67 11.46 12.50 2.08 1.04 56.25 
There is a 
benefit due to 
health 
improvement of 
the recipient 
with 
donation (other-
regarding) 
Completely Agree 435 38.85 10.11 8.05 25.29 16.55 1.15 
Somewhat Agree 100 46.00 9.00 9.00 24.00 11.00 1.00 
Somewhat Disagree 15 26.67 13.33 13.33 46.67 0.00 0.00 
Completely Disagree 3 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 0.00 
Does not know 5 40.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 
Missing 93 12.90 13.98 10.75 2.15 2.15 58.06 
Enough 
Information 
Concerning 
blood donations 
Completely Agree 95 64.21 14.74 5.26 10.53 5.26 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 206 43.20 12.14 9.22 19.42 15.33 0.49 
Somewhat Disagree 171 28.65 8.19 9.94 31.58 20.47 1.17 
Completely Disagree 44 22.73 6.82 4.55 43.18 20.45 2.27 
Does not know 27 33.33 7.41 7.41 40.74 11.11 0.00 
Missing 108 14.81 10.19 10.19 9.26 2.78 52.78 
Trust in the 
Health Care 
System 
Completely Agree 345 51.30 10.72 8.41 15.65 13.33 0.58 
Somewhat Agree 135 25.19 12.59 8.89 30.37 21.48 1.48 
Somewhat Disagree 40 10.00 5.00 5.00 60.00 20.00 0.00 
Completely Disagree 9 33.33 0.00 0.00 55.56 11.11 0.00 
Does not know 16 6.25 6.25 18.75 62.50 6.25 0.00 
Missing 106 14.15 11.32 9.43 9.43 1.89 53.77 
Enough 
Information 
from the media 
Completely Agree 43 41.86 9.30 9.30 25.58 13.95 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 161 49.07 9.32 11.18 13.66 16.15 0.62 
Somewhat Disagree 216 36.11 12.96 7.87 26.39 16.20 0.46 
Completely Disagree 91 34.07 7.69 4.40 35.16 16.48 2.20 
Does not know 31 38.71 9.68 6.45 35.48 9.68 0.00 
Missing 109 14.68 11.01 10.09 10.09 1.83 52.29 
Enough 
Information 
from 
The Health Care 
System 
Completely Agree 84 54.76 13.10 8.33 15.48 8.33 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 199 45.23 11.06 11.06 15.08 16.58 1.01 
Somewhat Disagree 160 31.88 8.13 8.13 36.25 15.63 0.00 
Completely Disagree 51 31.37 11.76 3.92 31.37 19.61 1.96 
Does not know 48 33.33 10.42 4.17 33.33 16.67 2.08 
Missing 109 13.76 11.01 9.17 10.09 3.67 52.29 
Has 
predecessors 
Blood Predecessors 219 37.44 14.16 7.76 19.63 10.96 10.05 
Organ Predecessors 40 32.50 5.00 7.50 27.50 22.50 5.00 
Both predecessors 114 44.74 11.40 7.02 17.54 8.77 10.53 
No predecessors 246 33.47 8.57 10.20 23.67 15.92 8.16 
Does not know 33 18.18 6.06 9.09 36.36 15.15 15.15 
 Total 651 35.94 10.6 8.6 22.12 13.36 9.37 
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Table 6 below shows the distribution of individuals among groups of Willingness 
to donate according to the different responses to each of the explanatory variables 
considered. 
We do not observe differences between men and women distributions according 
to their willingness to donate living organs. There are some differences by age 
categories: we show that willingness to donate decreases with age.  
The percentage of individuals who would agree completely on donating an organ 
in life to a relative is not very different depending on individuals’ level of education. 
However, for those who agree, but not completely, it seems that the proportion of 
individuals being willing to donate increases with education. Those who declare a low 
willingness to donate are those who achieved primary studies.  
Concerning the expected benefits and costs, most individuals agree on that there 
must be a cost from donating living organs, and this perception decreases their 
willingness to donate. However, there is also a perception of per-se and other-
regarding benefits, such that those individuals agreeing on the existence of these 
benefits are those declaring maximum willingness to donate living organs.  
There is a perception of incomplete information, especially among individuals 
who are more strongly willing to donate. Results indicate that these individuals trust 
in the Health Care System and are also informed about the complexity of the 
procedure of donating a living organ. On the contrary, those who declare lower levels 
of WTD do not trust the Health Care System and are not concerned about the success 
of donation neither are informed about the complexity of the procedure of donating a 
living organ.  
Finally, willingness to donate seems to be higher for those individuals having 
predecessors of blood and organ donors among their relatives.  
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Table 6. Distribution of responses to explanatory variables (N and %), by groups of living organ donors 
Variable   N % Max WTD % Mid WTD % Low WTD % NA 
Gender 
Women 284 67.02 24.91 5.96 2.11 
Men 257 63.81 26.85 7.39 1.95 
Missing 110 1.79 0.00 0.89 97.32 
Age 
[18-29] 242 67.08 24.28 7.41 1.23 
[30-39] 191 60.73 30.37 5.76 3.14 
[40-49] 78 66.67 21.79 8.97 2.56 
[50-59] 3 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[60-70] 16 68.75 31.25 0.00 0.00 
 
Missing 121 9.76 0.81 0.81 88.62 
Maximum level of education 
achieved 
Primary School 42 69.05 19.05 9.52 2.38 
Secondary School 106 65.42 27.10 5.61 1.87 
University 175 63.43 28.00 5.14 3.43 
Without Studies 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Missing 327 44.38 16.41 5.47 33.74 
There is an expected cost of 
donating an organ 
Completely Agree 240 59.17 31.25 8.33 1.25 
Somewhat Agree 170 68.82 25.29 5.29 0.59 
Somewhat Disagree 48 70.83 22.92 6.25 0.00 
Completely Disagree 58 77.59 13.79 8.62 0.00 
Does not know 7 85.71 14.29 0.00 0.00 
Missing 131 9.92 1.53 0.00 88.55 
There is a personal benefit of 
donating a living organ 
Completely Agree 311 72.99 21.54 5.14 0.32 
Somewhat Agree 162 58.64 37.04 4.32 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 22 59.09 36.36 4.55 0.00 
Completely Disagree 7 85.71 0.00 14.29 0.00 
Does not know 26 38.46 19.23 38.46 3.85 
Missing 126 4.76 0.00 1.59 93.65 
 
Completely Agree 166 81.93 12.05 6.02 0.00 
There is a social benefit from 
donating a living organ 
Somewhat Agree 192 64.06 32.81 3.13 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 79 54.43 34.18 10.13 1.27 
Completely Disagree 47 51.06 38.30 10.64 0.00 
Does not know 37 51.35 27.03 18.92 2.70 
Missing 133 9.02 1.50 0.75 88.72 
Information concerning LOD is 
incomplete 
Completely Agree 180 66.67 25.56 7.22 0.56 
Somewhat Agree 176 61.93 28.41 8.52 1.14 
Somewhat Disagree 92 66.30 28.26 5.43 0.00 
Completely Disagree 53 81.13 15.09 3.77 0.00 
Does not know 23 56.52 34.78 8.70 0.00 
Missing 130 8.46 1.54 0.00 90.00 
Trust in the Health Care System 
Completely Agree 291 72.85 19.93 5.50 1.72 
Somewhat Agree 162 58.64 35.19 6.17 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 35 57.14 37.14 5.71 0.00 
Completely Disagree 9 33.33 44.44 22.22 0.00 
Does not know 29 62.07 20.69 17.24 0.00 
Missing 128 7.03 1.56 1.56 89.84 
Concerned about the success of 
donation 
Completely Agree 151 70.20 22.52 7.28 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 163 67.48 27.61 4.91 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 96 64.58 28.13 7.29 0.00 
Completely Disagree 96 65.63 27.08 5.21 2.08 
Does not know 20 35.00 35.00 30.00 0.00 
Missing 128 7.03 0.78 0.00 92.19 
Informed about the procedure and 
its complexities 
Completely Agree 256 71.88 21.48 5.08 1.56 
Somewhat Agree 150 63.33 31.33 5.33 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 38 65.79 31.58 2.63 0.00 
Completely Disagree 11 63.64 27.27 0.00 9.09 
Does not know 71 53.52 28.17 18.31 0.00 
Missing 128 6.25 2.34 1.56 89.84 
Has Predecessors 
Blood 219 55.25 22.83 6.39 15.53 
Organs 40 47.50 15.00 15.00 22.50 
Blood and Organs 114 60.53 23.68 0.88 14.91 
No predecessors 246 52.44 20.33 6.10 21.14 
Does not know 33 54.55 21.21 3.03 21.21 
 
Total 654 54.59 21.41 5.66 18.35 
 
To validate our analysis we need to check that our sample is similar to the real 
population in some background characteristics. As we have population data of the general 
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population, we are going to compare the population of blood and non-blood donors that 
were registered in the region of Navarra in the census at the same time the data were 
collected (May-June 2010). We use the published data from the National Institute of 
Statistics in Spain (INE) and recruit information on the population by gender and age 
ranges in Navarra to be compared with the proportions by age and gender in our sample in 
the same period.  
We observe that the proportion of men and women in the population of Navarra 
during the period of May-June 2010 (0.510 and 0.490 respectively) was not so different 
from the proportion of men and women from the data collected (0.464 and 0.536 
respectively). If we look at the proportion of men and women by age ranges we have some 
important differences, due to the small number of observations in some age categories, 
such as the individuals over 60 years old who are under-represented among our 
respondents. However, we can say that our sample is very similar to the real population at 
the moment of the data collection in terms of gender and for the people aged 18-67.  
 
Table 7: Population and Sample by age ranges and gender. Period: May-June 2010 
 
 
4.3 Regression Methods and Results 
We estimate four probit models: three models for the case of blood donations, each 
of them differs on the dependent variable, in order to analyze how the same 
determinants of blood donation (independent variables are the same for all the models) 
influence the different groups of blood donors, analyzing these differences between 
groups; and one model for the case of living organ donations, to analyze the difference 
between the two groups of living organ donors according their willingness to donate: 
 
Population (Source: Census data May 2010) Sample (Source: Questionnaire May 2010) 
 
Men Women Total Men Women Total 
 
N Prop N Prop N Prop N Prop N Prop N Prop 
18-29 42939 0.512 40938 0.488 83877 1 37 0.370 63 0.630 100 1 
30-39 54735 0.521 50272 0.479 105007 1 61 0.427 82 0.573 143 1 
40-49 50216 0.515 47381 0.485 97597 1 78 0.411 112 0.589 190 1 
50-59 39287 0.503 38866 0.497 78153 1 54 0.692 24 0.308 78 1 
60-67 25541 0.491 26515 0.509 52056 1 16 0.842 3 0.536 19 1 
Total 212718 0.510 203972 0.490 416690 1 246 0.464 284 0.536 530 1 
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high or mid-low (these two are aggregated due to the small number of individuals in the 
lowest level of willingness to donate).  
 
The probit model is expressed as:  
  iji xxy  )|0Pr(  
where ϕ is the standard cumulative normal, yi is a discrete dependent variable that 
we want to explain, and xi are the independent variables. In our case, our dependent 
variables are binary, representing each of the groups of donors, so that yi=1 if the 
individual belongs to the group of interest and 0 otherwise. For each of the regression 
models we exclude all the missing values of the independent variables except for 
education. For this variable we consider the non-response (missing) as an additional 
category of response, given that half of the sample did not answer to this question.  
 
Results from the regression models on attitudes towards blood donations are shown 
in table 8. We observe the following results (marginal effects for each factor are 
provided, dy/dx representing the variation of the probability of y=1 associated to the 
factor x).  
We do not find differences by gender and age between active and potential blood 
donors. However, men are more likely than women to be regular donors (+0.281), and 
also individuals aged 40 to 50 years old are more likely than the youngest donors (aged 
18-29) to be regular donors (+0.210).  
Concerning the expected benefits and costs, those who disagree with the perception 
of costs are more likely to be active donors than potential donors (+0.222), while there 
are no differences found between active and potential donors in the perception of per-se 
and other-regarding benefits (descriptive results have shown that both groups agree on 
the existence of such benefits from blood donation) neither between regular and non-
regular donors in the perception of costs.  
Not agreeing completely on that information on blood donations is enough, or not 
trusting completely the Health Care System increases the probability of being a 
potential donor while not agreeing completely on that information from the media is 
enough increases the probability of being an active donor.  
Comparing regular and non-regular donors, this fact increases the probability of 
being a non-regular donor (-0.144). 
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Table 8. Regression results of probit models: Blood Donations. Marginal effects are shown (dy/dx) 
Variable Category 
Active (1)  
vs Potential (0) 
All Blood Donors (1) 
vs Potential (0) 
Regular (1)  
vs Non-Regular (0) 
 
Gender men 0.072 0.072 0.281***  
Age 30-39 -0.016 -0.015 0.084  
40-49 0.057 0.090 0.210***  
50-59 -1.469 -0.204 (empty)  
60-70 (empty) (empty) (empty)  
Education Secondary Studies -0.015 -0.028 0.016  
 
University -0.149 -0.135 0.080  
 
Without studies (empty) (empty) (empty)  
 
Missing -0.349*** -0.282*** 0.032  
Cost Somewhat Agree 0.097 0.079 -0.202  
 
Somewhat Disagree 0.199** 0.132 0.035  
 
Completely Disagree 0.222*** 0.203*** 0.000  
 
Does not know -0.113 -0.088 -0.402  
Per-se benefit Somewhat Agree 0.033 0.019 -0.086  
 
Somewhat Disagree 0.046 0.008 (empty)  
 
Completely Disagree (empty) (empty) (empty)  
 
Does not know -0.259 -0.297 (empty)  
Other-regarding benefit Somewhat Agree 0.044 0.041 0.041  
 
Somewhat Disagree 0.026 0.050 0.152  
 
Completely Disagree (empty) (empty) (empty)  
 
Does not know (empty) (empty) -0.279  
Information is enough Somewhat Agree -0.156** -0.131** 0.039  
 
Somewhat Disagree -0.227*** -0.191*** 0.088  
 
Completely Disagree -0.388*** -0.402*** 0.175  
 
Does not know -0.290** -0.220 0.106  
Trust in the Health Care System Somewhat Agree -0.145*** -0.141*** -0.144**  
 
Somewhat Disagree -0.350*** -0.323*** -0.423  
 
Completely Disagree -0.372** -0.403*** (empty)  
 
Does not know -0.529*** -0.259* -0.094  
Enough Information from media Somewhat Agree 0.396*** 0.364*** -0.113  
 
Somewhat Disagree 0.387*** 0.358*** -0.227***  
 
Completely Disagree 0.403*** 0.338*** -0.052  
 
Does not know 0.382*** 0.37** -0.041  
Enough Information from HCS Somewhat Agree -0.069 -0.067 -0.056  
 
Somewhat Disagree -0.158 -0.139 0.013  
 
Completely Disagree 0.042 0.025 -0.200  
 
Does not know -0.101 -0.153 -0.173  
Has predecessors Organs -0.096 -0.064 0.145  
 
Blood and Organs 0.020 0.041 0.015  
 
No predecessors -0.010 -0.003 0.011  
 
Does not know -0.153 -0.080 -0.194  
N 
 
355 394 226  
Log likelihood ratio  
 
183.15 154.24 69.61  
Pseudo R2 
 
0.402 0.317 0.288  
Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level. 
 
We estimate now the regression model on attitudes towards living organ donations 
(Table 9). We observe the differences between individuals according to their 
willingness to donate an organ in life to a relative. 
We do not observe differences between men and women, neither by ages or 
education. However, not agreeing completely and not being sure of the existence of 
costs increases the probability of being more willing to donate. Disagreeing completely 
with the existence of a per-se benefit and not agreeing completely with the existence of 
other-regarding benefit from living organ donations increase the probability of being 
willing to donate (both results with respect to complete agreement which is the base 
level). Other significant factors are trust in the Health Care System and being concerned 
about the donation success. On the one hand, we observe that individuals who 
completely disagree (in other words, who do not trust the Health Care System), in 
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comparison with those who trust the Health Care System, are more likely to have a 
lower willingness to donate living organs. On the other hand, those who are not sure 
about being concerned on the success of donation are more likely to not being willing to 
donate an organ in life. 
 
Table 9. Regression Results of probit model: Living Organ Donations. Marginal Effects are dy/dx 
Variable Variable 
Max WTD (1)  
vs Other WTD (0) 
Gender Men -0.018 
Age 30-39 -0.028 
40-49 0.028 
50-59 (empty) 
60-70 -0.046 
Education Secondary Studies 0.056 
University 0.048 
Missing 0.094 
Cost Somewhat Agree 0.134*** 
Somewhat Disagree 0.106 
Completely Disagree 0.095 
Does not know 0.377*** 
Per-se benefit Somewhat Agree -0.059 
Somewhat Disagree 0.020 
Completely Disagree 0.274*** 
Does not know -0.182 
Other-regarding benefit Somewhat Agree -0.153*** 
Somewhat Disagree -0.216*** 
Completely Disagree -0.277*** 
Does not know -0.114 
Information is Incomplete Somewhat Agree -0.071 
Somewhat Disagree -0.075 
Completely Disagree 0.061 
Does not know -0.077 
Trust in the Health Care 
System 
Somewhat Agree -0.086 
Somewhat Disagree -0.067 
Completely Disagree -0.418** 
Does not know -0.022 
Concerned about 
the success of donation 
Somewhat Agree -0.007 
Somewhat Disagree -0.023 
Completely Disagree -0.048 
Does not know -0.398*** 
Informed about the 
complexity of the 
living organ donation  
process 
Somewhat Agree -0.050 
Somewhat Disagree -0.051 
Completely Disagree -0.160 
Does not know -0.088 
Has predecessors Organs -0.083 
Blood and Organs -0.008 
No predecessors 0.008 
Does not know 0.070 
N 
 
495 
Log Likelihood 
 
80.41 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.126 
 
5. Discussion 
The theoretical model we proposed could be extended to a non-linear context, 
considering the case of interactions between self-interest and altruism. However, we 
consider that this model is enough for describing the decision of becoming or not a donor 
even under the assumption of complementary self-interested and altruistic preferences. 
This assumption helped to simplify the results of the model and to analyze separately the 
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influence of the expected benefits and costs of donating blood or living organs. 
The empirical work provides a description of the different types of blood and living 
organ donors, even if the sample of study is not representative of the general population. If 
we look at the proportion of blood and non-blood donors in our sample and compare it 
with the proportion of blood and non-blood donors in the population at that period, we 
observe that we have an over-represented population of blood donors, with a 55.1% of 
respondents who declare to have donated blood at least once in their live, while the real 
percentage of blood donors in the population was 7.3%. However, given that our aim was 
to compare the different types of blood and living organ donors, we consider that 
representativeness is not a strong limitation of the work. A stronger limitation could the 
fact that our sample is restricted to the university population (we have a problem of sample 
selection). However the high proportion of blood donors among respondents was not a 
surprise. We consider that our study provides information that could be interesting for 
policy makers in the context of blood and living organ donations. Including some 
questions in the National Health Survey would be however more than desirable. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The behavioral model developed in this paper examines the decisions of individuals 
for and against blood or living organ donation. Specifically, it applies to an individual 
who is considering donating blood or an organ. The ultimate decision depends on the 
expected future benefits and costs incurred because of donation and how these factors 
are weighted by the individual’s degree of altruism. Perceptions of the donation costs 
are significantly different for blood donors than for non-blood donors. Regarding the 
benefits and costs of individuals who would be willing to donate an organ versus 
individuals who would not, the differences in costs and per-se and other-regarding 
benefits are significant.  
The empirical analysis explores and identifies, for our sample, the differences 
between groups of donors, according to control variables, expected benefits and costs of 
donation, and other factors related to information provided about both kind of donations 
and trust in the Health Care System. 
Our results show how these factors affect to the different groups of blood and living 
organ donors. We confirm the importance of the expected costs and per-se and other 
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regarding benefits, and show not only that there are differences on how the different 
groups of donors perceive such effects, but also that there are differences between blood 
and living organ donations. Information and trust in the Health Care System are also 
significant factors that should be taken into account when designing policies to attract 
potential donors. In general, we give response to our hypothesis and we are able to give 
a description of the different groups of blood and living organ donors that could be 
useful for policy makers in the context of blood and living organ donations. 
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Incentives when altruism is impure:  
The case of blood and living organ donations 
María Errea, Juan M. Cabasés 
 
Abstract 
The decision to donate blood and living organs is considered voluntary and 
altruistic. However, the shortage of donors has opened an interesting debate in recent 
years, considering offering economic incentives to donors. This paper analyzes 
theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives over individuals when facing the 
decision of becoming donors. Theoretically we show how altruism could be affected by 
the introduction of incentives and modify individuals’ behaviour when facing the 
decision of donating blood and living organs. Empirically, we include some questions 
on incentives in a broad questionnaire on blood and living organ donations in a 
university population. As a proxy for crowding-effects we use the individuals’ attitudes 
towards incentives, attitude being measured by an agreement/disagreement scale. 
Results show that crowding-in of blood donors would be more likely by offering 
“Information concerning blood donations” or “Blood Tests”. In both, blood and living 
organ donations, “Money” would be very likely to crowd-out individuals from donating. 
Concerning living organs, we do not find good evidence for crowding-in. We conclude 
donation policies, properly designed, could help to increase the number of donors, and 
more specifically suggest implementing non-monetary incentives. 
 
Keywords: Social preferences, Incentives, Altruism, Blood and Living Organ 
Donations 
 
  
53 
 
1. Introduction 
Blood and living organ donations are voluntary and altruistic. Donation in these 
cases is somehow particular, as individuals who donate are not expecting a 
compensation for donating (Fortin et al., 2010), but donate for altruistic reasons. This 
means that individuals are not only self-interested but are also concerned about the 
others’ payoffs (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Andreoni, 1990). 
Blood cannot be artificially created and there is an increasing need of organs for 
transplantation. Evidence shows that even if all the deceased donors actually donate, 
unfortunately this would not be enough to cover the growing demand for organs (Israni 
et al., 2005) and, as a consequence, the waiting lists do not stop increasing. Encouraging 
blood and living organ donations is therefore necessary.  
The effect of introducing incentives for pro-social activities has been analyzed not 
only in the field of economics but is also popular in psychology, sociology and other 
fields. Recent research concludes that incentives do influence social values, and also 
that social preferences are important influences on individuals’ behavior (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006; Bowles and Polanía, 2012). The question of how incentives affect 
individuals’ behaviour for the specific case of blood and living organ donations is 
addressed in this paper. 
Behind this question is the Motivation Crowding Theory (Deci and Ryan, 1985; 
Frey and Jegen, 2001). This theory of crowding-effects stipulates a systematic 
interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, both influencing human behavior. 
For instance, it predicts that external interventions, via economic incentives or 
punishments, may undermine intrinsic motivation. However, experimental studies have 
demonstrated that it cannot be said that incentives always discourage pro-social 
activities (Lacetera, Macis, 2010).  
The debate of crowding-effects in blood donations was introduced by Richard 
Titmuss (1970), who analyzed the effect of introducing economic incentives for 
donating blood. He concluded that economic incentives crowd-out (expel) more blood 
donors than they crowd-in (attract). According to this author, this may be due to the 
partial destruction of intrinsic motivation when price mechanisms are introduced. But 
some researchers (Solow, 1971; Arrow, 1972; Bliss, 1972), attracted by these findings, 
reviewed Titmuss work and criticize it, arguing that results were not sufficient to 
conclude that incentives crowd-out blood donors. 
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The Motivation Crowding Theory suggests that economic incentives sometimes 
may reduce the total supply of certain goods when individuals have social-preferences 
towards those goods (Frey and Oberholzer, 1997). For some individuals, incentives may 
be perceived as signals of permissible behavior (Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008), 
provide information about the policy makers or in general about the person who 
implements the incentive (Fehr et al., 2007; Irlenbusch and Ruchala, 2008; Ariely, 
Bracha and Meier, 2009). But there is also evidence of crowding-in when using 
incentives, some individuals being attracted by the incentive (Falk, Gächter and Kovacs, 
1999; Gächter and Falk, 2002; Lacetera and Macis, 2010) while some others could 
adapt their preferences to incentives (Bowles and Polanía, 2012) or react positively to 
incentives accepting them as a compensation of a socially beneficial action. 
Some research studies have analyzed the introduction of incentives in the market 
for live and cadaveric organ donations (Becker and Elías, 2007) demonstrating that 
monetary incentives could increase the supply of organs for transplantation and even 
reduce the waiting lists for an organ. In the context of blood donations, Lacetera and 
Macis (2010) showed that some individuals, especially those who recently became 
donors, did not show aversion to direct cash incentives, while women -especially among 
active or regular donors- reported a stronger aversion to cash incentives. They 
concluded that offering monetary payments, a high proportion of active donors would 
stop donating. However, other kind of incentives, like vouchers (indirect cash of the 
same nominal value than the monetary incentive) were better supported. The same 
authors, in another experiment showed that symbolic incentives such as medals or 
publishing the name of donors in a local journal where better blood donation motivators 
than monetary compensations (Lacetera and Macis, 2008). In addition, other authors, in 
a field experiment, compare the effect of lottery tickets versus a free cholesterol test, 
showing that offering lottery tickets in compensation to blood donors significantly 
increased blood donations (Goette and Stutzer, 2009). 
The risk of existence of crowding-out suggests that, in some circumstances, it is 
advisable not to use the market model to elicit a higher supply as sometimes incentives 
can have an effect which is the contrary to the one predicted by the conventional 
economic theory, according to which incentives increase supply. In such cases, and this 
could be the case of blood and living organ donations, it is recommended not to rely on 
monetary payments but on a different type of incentive (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Certain 
incentives could attract some self-regarding individuals who suddenly will be willing to 
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become donors. For example, mechanisms based on information –called exhortation 
mechanisms– could be effective increasing individuals’ willingness to donate (Thorne, 
1998). The final result, net crowding-in or crowding-out, depends on the type of 
incentive (monetary or non-monetary), the nature of the task to perform 
(individual/private versus social/public decisions), and on characteristics of the 
population involved (altruistic or self-interested). 
This paper addresses the question of how incentives influence behavior and 
decision making, specifically for individuals who have latent social preferences. We 
center this question, and focus on the specific context of blood and living organ 
donations. We analyze how individuals’ behavior may be influenced by incentives, 
monetary and non-monetary, using theoretical approach and empirical research. From a 
policy making perspective, we look for the best incentive in case of being implemented 
would maximize the gap between attracted and dissuaded individuals. The aim is to 
suggest, according to our results, an incentive mechanism for attracting new donors at 
the same time that minimizes the crowding-out of active donors. 
We develop a theoretical model that analyzes how individuals’ decision of donating 
blood and living organs could be different when incentives are offered with respect to 
the status-quo where no incentive is offered. We measure crowding-effects of incentives 
looking at the changes in individuals’ utility when incentives are introduced in the set of 
variables that influence individuals’ decision making. The model is general for both 
kinds of donations. We assume that behind the decision of becoming or not a blood or 
living organs are social preferences.  
Empirically, we analyze individuals’ responses of individuals from a selected 
population to a broad questionnaire on attitudes towards blood and living organ 
donations where we included some questions on incentives. We explore the individuals’ 
levels of agreement/disagreement with different incentive mechanisms in a population 
of blood donors and staff from a university population. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we study, through a model of 
expected utility, how incentives could affect individuals’ behavior. We analyze the 
motivation crowding effects and provide the model results. In section 3 we present the 
questionnaire on attitudes towards blood and living organ donations, and analyze, 
through descriptive statistics and regression models, the relationship between incentives 
and individuals’ willingness to donate blood or living organs. Section 4 opens a 
discussion and the paper concludes in section 5 where we comment the most relevant 
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aspects and results of this study, and mention the implications for future research or 
public policies. 
 
2. The Model 
 
Denote by I={1,…,n} the set of individuals who face the decision of becoming or 
not blood/living organ donors, and J ={1,…,m} the set of potential recipients (that is, the 
total number of individuals waiting for a transfusion or an organ transplantation of a 
kidney or a liver in a population of size P).  
Suppose there is a society S that experiences the following problem: the number of 
individuals waiting for a transfusion or in waiting list for organ transplantation is strictly 
higher than the number of donors (which is a partition of I). Therefore, in this society, 
the government or similar decision maker is evaluating the possibility of offering some 
incentive in order to reduce the gap between supply and demand.  Note that, if the 
demand is fully covered, incentives will not be necessary. The decision maker however 
needs to know how potential donors would react to incentives. To help the decision 
maker to take a decision on incentives, an effort to disentangle the psychology behind 
the decision of donating blood and living organs is needed.   
 
The model we develop assumes that individuals face the decision to donate or not 
more than once. We will call t to the individuals’ time horizon, for t= A,…,A+Li. The 
time horizon goes from the first time the individual decides if he/she is willing to 
become or not a donor (t=A, where A is the age of the individual at that time) until the 
last time the individual makes such a decision. The individual may stop to be willing to 
donate anymore or may be asked to stop donating because of age or health reasons, 
either permanently or temporarily. However, whatever the reason is, this does not have 
implications on the model results. 
We propose a utility function for any individual i ϵ I who faces the decision of 
becoming or not a donor at time t. The expected utility of becoming a donor is a 
function of the following arguments: the consumption of goods and services, the 
expected costs and benefits for donating, and the external intervention (the incentive).  
 
tjtittitititi UGSCXUU ,,,,,, ,,,,:   (1) 
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The first argument, Xi, represents the classical set of goods and services which 
consumption provides a certain level of utility to individuals. Ci  represents the expected 
costs of donation; S represents the incentive, Gi represents the very pleasure of giving, 
that is, the “warm-glow” (Andreoni, 1990) and reflects the individual pleasure for the 
very fact of giving which is independent of whether the donation is successful or not for 
the recipient, and Uj the expected utility for the recipient j ϵ J. We assume j is unknown 
in the case of blood donations, and known in the case of living organ donations, focused 
the later on donation between relatives only. The individual observes the realization of 
each variable (measured by utility units) at each time t in the decision time horizon.  
We assume that individuals are in part self-interested so that they donate in part by 
egotistic reasons such as pride or social acceptation, but also that in part they donate 
because of altruistic reasons, such as the pleasure of the very fact of giving and the 
expected health improvements for the recipient when receiving the donation. In other 
words, individuals are defined by "other-regarding preferences". These models, 
considering altruistic individuals, other-regarding behavior and social values, have been 
analyzed previously in the literature (Becker, 1976, Simon, 1993, Bowles and Polanía, 
2012).  
The model considers that an individual, when making a decision at a certain time 
point, considers not only the benefits and costs at that time but also makes expectations 
about the future benefits and costs, and these expectations also account for the decision 
of donating blood or living organs. The standard assumption of positive temporal 
preferences is made, so that the expected utility for donating at time t for the individual i 
is the discounted sum (the sum is represented by the integral and is the discount factor) 
of the expected utility along the time horizon. The following expression represents the 
expected utility of the decision of becoming a donor at any time point on the time 
horizon that goes from t=A to t=A+Li : 
 
   AtdtsugSascxeU iii ttitjtitittiti
Lt
t
t
ti  

 ,)( ,,,,,,,
          (2) 
 
where A represents the age of the individual at the first time facing such a decision and 
Li is the last time and individual faces that decision (either voluntarily or compulsorily 
for reasons of health or age); tia ,  is the degree of altruism ( tia , ϵ R
+
) which is a function 
of incentives, and λi,t the propensity (λi,t > 0) or aversion (λi,t < 0) to accept incentives for 
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that individual at that time, αi and βi are the elasticities of the utility of the i-individual 
from incentives and from the utility of the recipient, respectively, and the discount 
factor ρ indicates a positive depreciation of the total utility over the time. 
Similar to other models in the literature (Bowles and Polanía, 2012), we assume 
altruism is a function of incentives. The difference is that we propose a non-linear 
function, assuming that not all the units of the incentive S affect equally to the degree of 
altruism. The function of altruism proposed is the following: 
 
 ti
ttititi
sbaa ,,,,0,

      (3) 
 
We assume that ∂ a /∂s |t ≤ 0, so that receiving positive quantities of an incentive S 
reduces the individuals’ degree of altruism from the initial degree of altruism.  
Only for simplicity, lets’ give a value to parameters alpha and omega αi = Ωi =2, 
such that each unit of incentive S provokes a reduction of the degree of altruism equal to 
∂ a /∂s = -2bs, for b taking strictly positive values and with a random distribution in the 
support b ϵ [b,b ]. The function for the degree of altruism and the marginal effects of 
incentive over that function is represented in figure 1 below. A result that is clear in that 
figure is that the lower (higher) the value of parameters b and Ω, the higher (lower) is 
the incentive that the individual would be willing to accept before the degree of altruism 
is zero. 
 
Including the function proposed for the degree of altruism in the utility function, it 
can be rewritten as follows: 
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t
t
ti 



 ,,,,,,,,0,,,,
     (4) 
 
Under the standard assumption that individuals are utility maximisers, they will 
decide to become donors if and only if the expected utility of becoming a donor is 
positive higher than the utility of deciding not to become a donor (U
0
i,t). For simplicity, 
we assume that this utility is zero, U
0
i,t = 0. 
We will focus first on analyzing all possible crowding-effects of incentives as 
variations in the individual's marginal and total utilities when incentives are offered. 
The Motivation Crowding Effects are analyzed through the variations in the utility 
for each additional unit of incentive. By offering an incentive S three different effects on 
the marginal utility are possible:  
1. Crowding-in: for each additional unit of the incentive, utility increases in a 
higher proportion. That is Us > 0 and Uss > 0. 
2. Weak Crowding-Out: for each additional unit of the incentive, utility increases in 
a lower proportion. That is Us > 0  and Uss < 0. 
3. Strong Crowding-Out: The utility of becoming a donor decreases when 
incentives are introduced into the utility function with respect to the status-quo, 
whatever the quantity of incentive is (Us < 0). 
 
A sensitivity analysis easily shows how depending on the values of the parameters 
of the model (we simplify the expression (4) by assuming αi = Ωi =2), the individual 
would be crowded-in or crowded-out for the same quantity of incentive offered si. Our 
interest, however, is to derive a general expression, from the model, to describe 
individuals’ reaction to incentives in which all the possibilities of behavior are 
identified. We will therefore be able to determine the incentive threshold that would 
lead individuals to adopt different behaviors. The first thing we need is to derive the 
expression for the marginal utility from the incentive for any individual, which is: 
 
  
i
i
Lt
tititjtititi
t
s sugsbeU

  ,,,,,, 221 
       (5) 
Making that expression equal to zero we find the threshold incentive, s*, for any 
individual, that is to say the incentive that would leave individuals indifferent between 
receiving and not receiving a quantity s* of incentive in compensation for donation. 
This threshold incentive is represented by the following expression: 
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  titjtiti iugb
s
,,,,2
1
*
 
    (6) 
It can be deduced from this result that, the rest of the parameters being equal for 
both individuals, the optimal incentive for individuals who are averse to incentives ( ti ,
<0) would be lower than for individuals who are more prone to incentives. 
   0*0* ,,  titi ss        (7) 
This result can be generalized as it is done in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: For any pair of individuals {1,2} ϵ I with the same values of b, g, and 
u
β
j,: 
 If individuals have propensity to incentives, so that 0, ti , it is true that those 
individuals with higher propensity would accept higher quantities of the 
incentive: s*( t,1 ) ≥ s*( t,2 )  ↔ t,1  ≥ t,2  
 If individual 1 has propensity to incentives and individual 2 is averse, it is true 
that the first will accept a higher quantity of the incentive than the second. 
 If both individuals have aversion to incentives, and for the individual 1 more 
averse than the individual 2, the first individual would accept lower quantities of 
the incentive: s*( t,1 ) ≤  s*( t,2 )  ↔ t,1  ≤ t,2  
Also, according equation 6, the higher the value of b, the lower the incentive that 
would be accepted. This result leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: For any pair of individuals {1, 2} ϵ I  with the same values of  , g, and 
u
β
j,: if individual 1 has a higher value of b than individual 2, being stronger the negative 
effect of incentives over the degree of altruism, the maximum incentive that individual 1 
would be willing to accept is smaller than the incentive that individual 2 would be 
willing to accept. 
 
Proof for propositions 1 and 2: We can write the expressions for the disutility of an 
individual who is prone (equation 8) or averse (equation 9) to incentives as follows: 
   0,| 0  




 
 dtugsbeU j
LA
t
t
Si
i
  (8) 
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 (9) 
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As the disutility for the individual who has aversion to incentives is higher than the 
disutility of incentives for the individual who has propensity to incentives, for the same 
quantity of incentive the individual who is averse has a stronger disutility. Therefore, 
the incentive that makes total utility equal to zero is smaller for the individual who has 
aversion to incentives. The same proof can be made for both individuals being averse to 
incentive, and for both individuals who are prone, in this case by showing the utility 
gains instead of disutility.  
Proposition 2 is demonstrated as follows: the higher the value of b the higher the 
disutility of the incentive. For two individuals who show propensity or aversion to 
incentives, the disutility of the individual who has a higher value of b is higher, and 
therefore, the incentive that is going to tolerate as maximum will be smaller. 
 
3. Empirical Work 
 
3.1 The Questionnaire and Data collection 
 
In a broader questionnaire on attitudes towards blood and living organ donations 
(see Cabasés, Errea; Working Paper, 2011) we include some questions on incentives for 
blood and living organ donations. The aim is to find the different perception that 
different groups of blood and living organ donors have concerning a list of incentives, 
monetary and non-monetary. 
Data were collected in May-June 2010. Two different formats of the same 
questionnaire were distributed: a pen and pencil questionnaire to a selected population 
of 500 blood donors, (n1=201 is the number of questionnaires finally recruited, 
representing the 40.2% of the initially contacted), and an online questionnaire to the 
population of 2000 members of the staff community at the Public University of Navarre 
(n2=453) questionnaires finally recruited from the university population, around the 
22%). We finally have a total of N=654 questionnaires recruited. 
We mix monetary, non-monetary and monetary incentives in order to compare 
individuals’ preferences for the different kinds of incentives. The aim is to explore the 
preferences over incentives for the different groups of blood living organ donors. All 
the individuals who participated in the questionnaire are asked to choose their 
agreement with the following incentives:  
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 Incentives for blood donations: Some Reward, Fiscal Deductions, 
University Credits for students, Monetary Payment, Priority in Health Care 
(HC), Social Recognition, Information on blood donations, and Blood Tests.  
 Incentives for living organ donations: Some Reward, Money, Fiscal 
Deductions, Preference in Health Care, and Priority in the Waiting Lists 
(WL) for an organ in the future. 
Individuals are asked to choose their level of agreement/disagreement with each of 
the incentives listed. Responses are recorded in a likert scale of 5 levels, for each of the 
incentives, that goes from “Completely Agree” to “Completely disagree”. Individuals 
have also a NA (not answer) fifth choice. 
 
3.2 Identification of Donor Groups 
 
The questionnaire begins asking about personal information and health 
characteristics that allow us to classify individuals among groups of blood donors and 
living donors (according to their willingness to donate) and other socio-demographic 
characteristics such as age, education and other.  
According to their responses to certain questions of the questionnaire, individuals 
are classified among the following groups of blood donors: 
1.  Regular blood donors: Individuals who declare donating blood regularly 
2. Non-regular blood donors: Individuals who declare donating blood but not 
regularly.  
3. Past donors: Individuals who declare having donated in the past, but who quitted 
donation 
4. Refused donors: Individuals who declare never having donated blood before, 
because of health reasons 
5. Potential donors: Individuals who declare never having donated blood, but for a 
reason which is different from health 
6. Non-donors non-classifiable: Some individuals declare themselves to be non-
donors, but did not specify their reason for not donating. These individuals we have no 
information to know if they should be considered potential or refused donors, and 
therefore they will be removed for the analysis. 
Concerning living organ donations, a question on willingness to donate an organ in 
life to a relative helps to classify individuals in this aspect. We distinguish four groups 
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of individuals, according their willingness to donate an organ in life to a relative: those 
who report to agree completely on being willing to donate (Maximum Willingness to 
donate or Max WTD), those who agree but not completely on being willing to donate 
(Mid WTD), those who disagree somewhat or completely on being willing to donate 
(Low WTD), and those who do not answer to that question (NA) 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
Among the five groups of blood donors identified we observe the following 
distribution: Regular (35.94%), Non-Regular (10.6%), Past donors (8.6%), Potential 
(22.12%), and Refused (13.36%). There are also some individuals (9.37%) who are not 
possible to classify among one of these groups. 
Concerning living organ donations, the respective percentage that each group 
represents in the sample is 54.59% for Max WTD, 21.41% Mid WTD, 5.66% for Low 
WTD and 18.35% for those who do not answer.  
The table below (Table 1) shows the distribution of responses for each of the 
incentives by groups of blood donors. We observe that, in general, individuals disagree 
on receiving some reward as a compensation for blood donations. However, there are 
some differences between the distributions of responses depending on the kind of 
incentive proposed. It can be said, according to the results observed, that non-monetary 
incentives are better accepted than monetary incentives.  
Analyzing the responses of each group of blood donors we observe that: Regular 
donors disagree more than they agree in proportion on fiscal deductions, money, social 
recognition and statistics on blood donations, while they agree on the idea of offering 
priority in health care to blood donors and free blood tests. Non-Regular donors agree 
more than they disagree on the idea of offering fiscal deductions, but for the rest of 
incentives they are more in disagreement than they are in agreement. Past donors 
disagree more than they agree on the idea of offering any kind of reward, but in this 
case, past donors disagree somewhat and not completely. Potential donors do not know 
what to answer concerning fiscal deductions, social recognition. They agree more than 
disagree on the idea of offering priority in health care to blood donors, and disagree 
more than they agree on the idea of offering social recognition, statistics on blood 
donations and blood tests. Refused donors disagree more than they agree on the idea of 
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offering fiscal deductions, but agree more than disagree on rewarding blood donors with 
money, priority in health care, statistics on blood donations and blood tests. 
 
Table 1. Responses to questions on Incentives by groups of blood donors 
Incentive N % Regular % Non-Regular % Past % Potential % Refused 
% Non-Donor 
(unclassifiable) 
Some Reward 
       Completely Agree 74 29.73 9.46 6.76 36.49 17.57 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 148 40.14 6.80 6.80 29.25 16.33 0.68 
Somewhat Disagree 98 36.08 13.40 10.31 24.74 14.43 1.03 
Completely Disagree 215 45.58 13.02 8.84 14.88 15.81 1.86 
Does not know 18 27.78 0.00 11.11 55.56 5.56 0.00 
Missing 101 15.00 11.00 10.00 8.00 1.00 55.00 
Fiscal Deductions 
       Completely Agree 61 39.34 11.48 8.20 29.51 9.84 1.64 
Somewhat Agree 99 34.34 14.14 8.08 26.26 17.17 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 98 45.36 9.28 5.15 29.90 10.31 0.00 
Completely Disagree 269 39.18 10.07 10.07 20.52 18.28 1.87 
Does not know 22 40.91 4.55 4.55 31.82 18.18 0.00 
Missing 105 17.31 10.58 9.62 8.65 0.96 52.88 
Money 
       Completely Agree 35 8.57 2.86 2.86 57.14 28.57 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 67 11.94 2.99 1.49 55.22 28.36 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 57 31.58 8.77 5.26 40.35 14.04 0.00 
Completely Disagree 377 49.07 13.07 10.67 13.07 12.80 1.33 
Does not know 10 30.00 10.00 10.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 
Missing 108 16.82 10.28 9.35 9.35 1.87 52.34 
Priority in Health 
Care        
Completely Agree 117 35.90 6.84 6.84 33.33 17.09 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 142 43.66 11.27 5.63 25.35 14.08 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 66 39.39 13.64 7.58 24.24 15.15 0.00 
Completely Disagree 209 39.13 11.11 11.59 19.81 15.94 2.42 
Does not know 12 33.33 16.67 0.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 
Missing 108 17.76 10.28 10.28 8.41 0.93 52.34 
Social Recognition 
       Completely Agree 141 40.00 7.14 5.71 27.86 17.86 1.43 
Somewhat Agree 168 35.93 12.57 8.98 23.95 17.96 0.60 
Somewhat Disagree 81 28.75 15.00 10.00 25.00 18.75 2.50 
Completely Disagree 140 48.57 10.71 7.86 21.43 11.43 0.00 
Does not know 18 44.44 0.00 16.67 38.89 0.00 0.00 
Missing 106 17.92 10.38 10.38 7.55 0.94 52.83 
Statistic on Blood 
donations       
Completely Agree 317 38.29 8.86 9.49 24.05 18.35 0.95 
Somewhat Agree 172 39.18 12.28 7.60 25.15 15.20 0.58 
Somewhat Disagree 19 31.58 21.05 10.53 36.84 0.00 0.00 
Completely Disagree 21 42.86 19.05 4.76 28.57 4.76 0.00 
Does not know 18 61.11 5.56 0.00 22.22 5.56 5.56 
Missing 107 18.87 10.38 9.43 7.55 0.94 52.83 
Free Blood tests 
       Completely Agree 317 46.68 10.71 7.65 20.41 13.78 0.77 
Somewhat Agree 172 26.45 7.44 9.92 33.88 22.31 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 19 20.00 30.00 10.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 
Completely Disagree 21 16.67 16.67 5.56 44.44 5.56 11.11 
Does not know 18 16.67 8.33 16.67 25.00 33.33 0.00 
Missing 107 12.24 11.22 10.20 8.16 1.02 57.14 
Total 654 35.94 10.6 8.6 22.12 13.36 9.37 
 
Looking at the preferences towards incentives for living organ donations (Table 2) 
we observe the following results: Individuals reporting Maximum WTD agree more 
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than they disagree on the idea of rewarding living organ donors with  money and 
priority in health care, while disagree more than agree on the idea of offering preference 
in the waiting lists to living organ donors. Individuals with weak WTD disagree more 
than agree on the idea of rewarding living organ donors with monetary incentives such 
as money and fiscal deductions, and also disagree on the idea of offering priority in 
health care to living organ donors, but agree more than disagree on the idea of offering 
preference in the waiting lists. Individuals with low WTD do not show their preferences 
with each kind of incentive, choosing in general the “does not know” response.  
 
Table 2. Responses to questions on Incentives by groups of living organ donors 
Incentive N Max WTD Mid WTD Low WTD NA 
Some Reward 
    
 
Completely Agree 163 63.19 27.61 8.59 0.61 
Somewhat Agree 144 65.97 28.47 4.86 0.69 
Somewhat Disagree 73 67.12 28.77 4.11 0.00 
Completely Disagree 131 70.23 22.14 5.34 2.29 
Does not know 14 50.00 21.43 28.57 0.00 
Missing 129 8.53 0.78 1.55 89.15 
Fiscal Deductions 
    
 
Completely Agree 75 68.00 25.33 5.33 1.33 
Somewhat Agree 90 70.00 25.56 4.44 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 84 66.67 30.95 2.38 0.00 
Completely Disagree 247 66.40 24.29 8.10 1.21 
Does not know 26 50.00 26.92 19.23 3.85 
Missing 132 7.58 3.79 1.52 87.12 
Money 
    
 
Completely Agree 30 60.00 33.33 6.67 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 49 71.43 20.41 8.16 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 88 67.77 31.82 2.27 1.14 
Completely Disagree 335 67.16 24.78 7.16 0.90 
Does not know 20 55.00 25.00 15.00 5.00 
Missing 132 8.33 3.03 1.52 87.12 
Preference WL 
    
 
Completely Agree 178 59.55 32.02 7.30 1.12 
Somewhat Agree 140 68.57 25.00 6.43 0.00 
Somewhat Disagree 56 73.21 25.00 0.00 1.79 
Completely Disagree 138 71.01 20.29 6.52 2.17 
Does not know 16 62.50 12.80 25.00 0.00 
Missing 126 4.76 3.17 1.59 90.49 
Priority in Health 
Care     
 
Completely Agree 67 73.13 25.37 1.49 0.00 
Somewhat Agree 94 65.96 26.60 6.38 1.06 
Somewhat Disagree 108 59.26 37.04 3.70 0.00 
Completely Disagree 227 68.28 22.03 7.93 1.76 
Does not know 26 65.38 15.38 19.23 0.00 
Missing 132 7.58 3.03 2.27 87.12 
Total 654 54.59 21.41 5.66 18.35 
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4.2 Regression Results 
  
 We estimate probit models. The probit model is expressed as:  
  iji xxy  )|0Pr(  
 
where ϕ is the standard cumulative normal, yi is a discrete dependent variable that 
we want to explain, and xi  are the independent variables. In our case, our dependent 
variables are binary, representing each of the groups of donors, so that yi=1 if the 
individual belongs to the group of interest and 0 otherwise. Our independent variables 
are the levels of agreement/disagreement with each of the incentives. 
We therefore estimate the variations on the probability of being of a certain group 
associated to each level of agreement for each of the incentives proposed (that is, the 
marginal effect).  
The results are shown in tables 3 and 4 below, Table 3 showing the results for each 
of the blood donors’ groups, and Table 4 showing the results for groups of individuals 
according to their willingness to donate living organs. 
Refused, past and non-donors by unknown reasons are removed for the analysis of 
incentives on blood donations. We observe that not agreeing completely with fiscal 
deductions or blood tests decreases the probability of being active donor. More 
precisely, the more the individual disagrees with fiscal deductions the stronger is the 
impact on the probability, with a reduction of the probability of being an active donor of 
0.26 if the individual completely disagrees. Disagreeing completely on the idea of 
offering blood tests decreases the probability of being active donor in 0.25. Complete 
disagreement with monetary incentives increases the probability of being an active 
donor in 0.77. Our estimates show that none of this kind of incentives would be 
effective on crowding-in of potential blood donors, while it can be said that money 
would crowd-out active donors. 
Comparing active and past donors (the difference with the previous model is the 
inclusion of past donors in that model) we observe the following results. Results are 
very similar, with some slightly differences on the magnitude of the marginal effects, 
which are a bit smaller. Doing the difference between the marginal effects of both 
models we get the impact over the probability of being a past donor. For example, 
completely disagreeing with fiscal deductions decreases the probability of being a blood 
donor in 0.231, and in 0.260 of being an active donor. Therefore, by difference, we 
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obtain than disagreement with fiscal deductions increases the probability of being a past 
donor in 0.029.  
The last estimation compares regular and non-regular donors. All the non-donors 
have been removed for the estimation of this model. Results show that disagreeing with 
blood tests and social recognition decrease the probability of being a regular donor in 
0.232 and 0.4 respectively.  
 
Table 3. Probit Model Results I (dy/dx: marginal effects). Incentives for blood donations 
Incentive Active vs Potential All Blood Donors vs Potential Regular vs Non-Regular 
Some Reward dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
Somewhat Agree 0.020 0.012 0.224 
Somewhat Disagree -0.023 -0.037 0.082 
Completely Disagree 0.076 0.035 0.068 
Does not know -0.347* -0.164 (empty) 
Fiscal Deductions 
   
Somewhat Agree -0.122** -0.108** -0.032 
Somewhat Disagree -0.145*** -0.144*** 0.177 
Completely Disagree -0.260*** -0.231*** 0.150 
Does not know -0.051 -0.186 0.157 
Money 
   
Somewhat Agree 0.093 0.085 -0.029 
Somewhat Disagree 0.354*** 0.377*** -0.039 
Completely Disagree 0.771*** 0.774*** -0.078 
Does not know 0.441** 0.429** -0.316 
Priority 
   
Somewhat Agree -0.036 -0.019 -0.051 
Somewhat Disagree -0.014 0.009 -0.085 
Completely Disagree -0.083 -0.030 -0.009 
Does not know 0.002 0.003 -0.223 
Social Recognition 
   
Somewhat Agree 0.011 0.024 -0.144** 
Somewhat Disagree 0.050 0.050 -0.232** 
Completely Disagree 0.026 0.022 -0.001 
Does not know -0.126 0.036 (empty) 
Statistics on Blood 
donations    
Somewhat Agree 0.079* 0.059 -0.015 
Somewhat Disagree 0.054 0.025 -0.187 
Completely Disagree 0.039 0.016 -0.169 
Does not know 0.239*** 0.172** 0.101 
Blood Tests 
   
Somewhat Agree -0.215*** -0.178*** -0.015 
Somewhat Disagree -0.189 -0.130 -0.444** 
Completely Disagree -0.256** -0.253** -0.417** 
Does not know -0.423** -0.226 -0.155 
N 398 443 257 
Log likelihood ratio 166.83 164.17 32.59 
Pseudo R2 0.3508 0.305 0.118 
 
Table 4 shows the result of the estimation of a probit model in which the dependent 
variable takes value 1 if the individual completely agrees on being willing to donate an 
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organ in life and 0 otherwise. We remove all the individuals who did not answer that 
question and estimate the marginal effects of each level of agreement, with each of the 
incentives, over the probability of being completely willing to donate living organs.  
Results show that the more individuals disagree on the idea of offering preference 
in the waiting lists for living organ donors, the more the probability of being willing to 
donate increases. We could therefore say that this kind of incentives would crowd-out 
individuals who declare being willing to donate. Another significant effect is observed 
for priority in health care incentive. In this case, disagreeing with that incentive 
decreases the probability of being willing to donate, and therefore increases the 
probability of being of the group that reports the lowest degree of willingness to donate. 
This could be interpreted as follows: there will be more individuals who would not 
consider appropriate an incentive such as priority in health care than the contrary among 
those who have lower levels of willingness to donate. Therefore, this kind of incentive 
will not be effective, according to our results, for crowding-in individuals with lower 
willingness to donate.   
Table 4. Probit Model Results II. (dy/dx: marginal effects). Incentives for living organ donations 
 
Max WTD vs Mid-Low WTD 
Variable dy/dx 
Some reward 
 Somewhat Agree 0.011 
Somewhat Disagree 0.021 
Completely Disagree 0.049 
Does not know -0.149 
Fiscal deductions 
 Some reward -0.013 
Somewhat Agree -0.059 
Somewhat Disagree -0.082 
Completely Disagree -0.153 
Does not know 
 Money 
 Somewhat Agree 0.154 
Somewhat Disagree 0.082 
Completely Disagree 0.113 
Does not know 0.125 
Preference in Waiting Lists  
 Somewhat Agree 0.166*** 
Somewhat Disagree 0.243*** 
Completely Disagree 0.202*** 
Does not know 0.141 
Priority in health care 
Somewhat Agree -0.112 
Somewhat Disagree -0.222*** 
Completely Disagree -0.166** 
Does not know -0.090 
N 513 
Log Likelihood ratio 25.22 
Pseudo R2 0.038 
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5. Discussion 
 
The economic model for the decision of becoming or not a donor is general for both 
kinds of donations considered in this paper (blood and living organ donations). This 
does not avoid that the values for the arguments in the utility function differ depending 
on the decision context is donating blood or an organ in life: for example, the value for 
the expected costs will be, in general, higher when the individual is thinking about 
donating an organ. We think that the arguments included describe well the decision 
making process in the two contexts: there should be a per-se benefit, an expectation of 
well-being due to the expected improvement in the recipient, unknown in the case of 
blood donations, and possibly very different in magnitude to that of donating an organ 
to a relative, and some expectation of costs (in terms of health, time dedicated to the 
donation process, or other). We consider a specific hypothetical situation in which some 
compensation is offered for donating. Therefore, incentives are also an argument of the 
utility function, influencing individuals’ final decision. Incentives affect the selfish and 
altruistic parts of the utility. The total effect of the incentive over utility depends on the 
weight that the individual gives to the impact of incentives to the degree of altruism and 
self-interest. However, as we said before, incentives are one of many other arguments 
influencing the final decision. Therefore, even the result of introducing incentives is 
negative (a decrease in utility) the individual may decide to become a donor for other 
reasons (high per-se benefit, high expectations of improvement for the recipient…).  
In a previous paper on attitudes towards blood and living organ donations we 
confirmed the influence of expected benefits and costs of blood and living organ 
donations, showing that there are differences in the expectation of costs, per-se and 
other-regarding benefits between groups of blood and living organ donors. In this 
chapter we analyze the difference between groups of donors in the level of agreement 
and disagreement with a list of incentives, some of them monetary and some of them 
non-monetary. The incentives are hypothetical, so that they were not evaluating real 
incentives. Responses, therefore, should be interpreted as how happy an individual 
would be with each of the incentives, if applied.  
Our results are descriptive but could be a clue for policy making. Relating the 
degree of agreement and disagreement with incentives to the fact of being a blood/non-
blood donor, or to the degree of willingness to donate an organ, we observe which 
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incentives could be more attractive for the different groups of blood donors, and for 
individuals with a stronger or weaker willingness to donate. We consider that this 
information should be contrasted (field experiment), but could be a clue of which 
incentives would be more likely to crowd-in new donors and also to identify the 
incentives with higher risk of crowding-out donors. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper explores how individuals' decision may be influenced by external 
interventions. Individuals' preferences may not be stable, but may change, essentially 
depending on the effects of external interventions over individuals’ degree of altruism 
and self-interest. The theoretical model analyzes the effect of introducing incentives into 
the utility function when individuals are impurely altruistic. We show that crowding-out  
of offering incentives occurs when the negative impact of incentives over the degree of 
altruism is stronger than the positive impact of incentives over self-interested utility. 
However, there can also be a crowding-in effect, so that individuals could be attracted 
by incentives when the negative impact over the altruistic part of the utility is weaker 
than the positive impact over the self-interested utility. The difference between these 
two effects determines the total effect for each quantity of the incentive offered. The 
main result, and contribution, of this model is that each individual has a different 
willingness to accept a different compensation, depending on his or her propensity or 
aversion to receive incentives. A limitation is that, in practice, it is impossible to 
individualize the incentives, offering a different compensation for each individual. 
However, having knowledge about the willingness to accept different incentives in a 
certain society, could be helpful for a social planner to decide which incentive would be 
the best incentive in terms of the number of individuals attracted (crowding-in) versus 
the number of individuals dissuaded (crowding-out). 
The questionnaire allows calculating the variation on the probabilities of being of 
different groups for the different levels of agreement/disagreement on each incentive. 
We conclude that donation policies should be focused on non-monetary incentives 
rather than on monetary payments as the later imply a higher risk of losing active 
donors. 
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Abstract 
In France, the supply of blood is rare: each year, only 4-5 % of the population 
donates blood. Yet, according to the French Blood Establishment (EFS), there is no 
shortage, the demand for blood being fully covered. Nevertheless, the stock of donors 
continues fluctuating, some individuals interrupting their donation because of their age, 
health problems or other reasons. The problem then is how to not collect the blood 
beyond the application to not have to destroy. The objective of this article is to analyze 
the determinants of blood donation in the French population in age and ability to make 
this donation distinguishing active donors from potential donors. Data from the Health 
and Social Protection Survey (ESPS) 2012 are used. We test the hypothesis that 
altruism, socioeconomic characteristics, and health, are important determinants of blood 
donation. Our results show that active donors are more altruistic than potential donors, 
declare higher levels of social capital, and are more risk-takers. In addition, the absence 
of a degree seems to be reducing the likelihood of individuals resigning to donate. There 
is also an age effect found among men, the older donors being more likely to be active 
donors than the younger. Given that the 2012 ESPS survey is the primary source of data 
in the general population to combine socio-economic, demographic and health 
characteristics with questions about blood donation we conclude this new information 
on the behavior of donors could be of great interest for the development of public 
policies to promote blood donation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The supply of blood is rare, only 4-5 % of the French population actually give 
blood each year, about 3 million units of blood collected per year according to the latest 
statistics published by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2013). Yet, according to 
the French Blood Transfusion Center (EFS), there is no shortage in France, the demand 
being fully covered thanks to the constant efforts of the EFS one of the main tasks being 
to manage the blood supply according to its demand. 
However, the need for blood is still ongoing. Increasing the supply of blood 
collected remains indispensable. The stock of donors continues fluctuating, some 
interrupting their gift either because of their age (the population in France is aging, 
which could cause problems in the future), health problems or other reasons. Safety 
requirements of institutions responsible for the collection of blood have also 
significantly increased with time, especially after the scandal of contaminated blood in 
the 80s that streaked several countries, including France. During this scandal one over 
two patients with hemophilia had been contaminated by the virus HIV / AIDS (Casteret, 
1992; Chauveau, 2011). The real problem was the failure of the French health system at 
the time, not using existing methods of heating certain blood products, extracted from 
plasma, capable of inactivating the virus in donated and contaminated blood. The 
expansion of this virus among individuals transfused blood from one of these 
contaminated units has resulted in an increasing lack of trust of individuals in the health 
care system, including the system of blood donation. Since then, it can be said that 
blood donation could be perceived by individuals as an activity which involves a certain 
risk. 
The French Blood Establishment (EFS) also reported the problem that for some 
blood types the demand is sometimes difficult to cover. Attracting universal blood 
donors (O
-
 type) has become a priority in order to cover this gap, being this type 
especial as blood type O
-
 transfusion can be made to individuals of any other blood 
types. The EFS considers the total of men who give blood number has not fully reached 
its potential. For this, the EFS seek to increase donors among the men population. The 
main reason is to compensate the temporary loss of women quitting donation after 
childbirth. Blood obtained from postpartum women may be less pure risking of being of 
lower quality, and therefore increasing the proportion of men donating would be a 
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solution to cancel this risk and cover this gap. 
There are reasons to believe that the supply of blood may decrease in the near 
future. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the mechanisms of incentives new donors, 
there is a conflict: on the one hand, the blood collection cannot be performed beyond its 
demand to not having to destroy. We must be vigilant about the incentive mechanisms 
to avoid having a much higher supply and demand of a good that is not easy to 
conserve. On the other hand, we must not neglect incentive mechanisms in order to 
prevent a sudden rationing situation of blood supply. 
The problem is to find a mechanism to effectively manage blood supply. Unlike 
other goods, the blood is a non-pecuniary good, meaning that price mechanisms cannot 
be used to increase the blood collected. According to economic theory, the only way to 
increase the supply of this kind of goods would be to reduce the opportunity costs of the 
suppliers. The problem in France is based on the need to raise awareness of the 
importance of donating blood. Although today there is no actually a rationing problem, 
this optimal situation may not be able to continue in the future. Researchers in 
economics and social sciences in general are seeking mechanisms to increase the supply 
of blood, a good that is rare, and with the special characteristic of impossibility of 
introducing price mechanisms to manage it. Efforts to better know the populations of 
blood and non-blood donors are therefore necessary, in order to be able to design 
policies that would fit populations’ interests and at the same time would be effective on 
encouraging blood donations. 
The objective of this article is to analyze the determinants of blood donation in the 
French population. The analysis focuses on measuring the influence of altruism, socio-
economic characteristics and health factors on different blood donors’ profiles. For the 
analyses, the population is constrained to individuals who are in age of donating and 
who don’t have health restrictions for donating blood.  
Despite the importance of this issue, few studies are concerned in France about the 
research of incentive mechanisms for encouraging blood donation. Some data from 
survey studies to the general population are available (EFS, CREDOC, 2007), but the 
2012 Health and Social Protection Survey (ESPS) 2012 is the primary source of data in 
the general population to combine questions on socio-economic, demographic and 
health conditions with questions about blood donation in France.  
In this paper, the determinants of blood donation are identified among the 
population age give and has no health problems. The influence of the three principal 
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determinants on blood donation is tested among the population in age of giving, 
comparing the population of active donors and potential donors: variables of individual 
behavior (altruism, social capital, and risk aversion), socio-economic characteristics 
(income, occupation, education, occupation), and health factors. Hopefully, this 
additional information could be of great interest for the development of public policies 
on the promotion blood donation. 
 
1.1 Behavioral variables and blood donations 
Blood donation is voluntary and altruistic. According to the first definition of 
altruism, Comte, altruistic individuals are willing to make a personal sacrifice to 
increase the well-being of others. Later, Andreoni (1990) proposed the existence of two 
types of altruism. According to Andreoni, some individuals are altruistic and selfish at 
the same time, having a personal interest to behave altruistically. According to the 
hypothesis of the existence of impure altruism, some individuals do not give only to 
improve the well-being of others, but also because the act of giving makes them happy 
or refers to other image of a generous and selfless person. Today, evidenced by the 
evidence shows the existence of impure altruism (Crumpler, Grosmann, 2008) and the 
personal benefit of the gift is conceptualized under the term "warm-glow". Studies have 
also shown that impure altruism is also a good predictor of blood donation (Evans, 
Ferguson, 2014).  
The literature also shows a relationship between the fact of belonging to 
associations following a collective interest and altruistic behavior. According to Becker 
and Murphy (2000) individual behavior may be dictated by the "tyranny of social 
forces", that is to say that the average behavior of a particular social group acts as a 
standard around which the behavior of the members of the social group complies. The 
authors call this effect "the social multiplier". The individuals’ stock of social would 
have an influence on their behavior and, in particular, on blood donation behaviour. For 
Macinko and Starfield (2001), the central thesis of social capital is that participation in 
community life, such as the decision of individuals of becoming members of social 
groups, induces the creation of a formal identity through the sharing of norms, beliefs 
and priority values. Kawachi and Berkman (1998) analyze the effect of associations at 
district and state levels. They show that neighborhood associations, if they are strong 
(which indicates a high level of social capital) can influence (1) behaviors related to 
health promotion, thus increasing the likelihood that standards are adopted for healthy 
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behaviors and exercise social control over deviant health, and (2) ensuring that budget 
cuts do not affect the provision of local services for that society. The most cohesive 
states would be more effective on the production of more egalitarian models in terms of 
political participation, such as those that ensure the safety of all their members, which 
would have a positive impact on health. Studies show a positive relationship between 
social capital and blood donation. Veenstra (2000) shows that individuals subject to 
social norms as a result of belonging to an association which pursues a specific 
collective interest have a higher probability of donating blood. Similarly, other studies 
(Putnam, 2000; Kolins and Herron, 2003) showed empirical evidence of a decline in 
blood donations in the United States that could be attributed to a decline in the level of 
social capital. Alessandrini (2007) also observed that the proportion of donors (active or 
past) involved in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is higher than that of non-
donors. These results reinforce the argument that blood donation is considered a similar 
voluntary action that it is an altruistic action. 
Concerning the perceived risk of donating blood, it does not seem enough studies 
on the relationship between these variables and blood donation. An additional 
contribution of this work will be to test the idea that there may be. 
 
1.2 Socio-economic characteristics and blood donation 
Studies have been published on the research of socio-economic profile of donors 
and non-donors. Differences have been found in different populations between donors 
and non-donors according to the educational level, income and employment. Greinacher 
et al (2010) found in a study in Germany that the probability of being a non-donor is 
reduced for individuals who reported higher levels of education and income, and who 
live in less urbanized residential areas. The authors also show that men give blood more 
frequently than women, and men who live in urban areas give especially regularly while 
occasional donors would be more concentrated in the less urbanized areas. Veldhuizen 
et al (2009) show in a study population in Holland, how individuals with higher levels 
of income and living in the less urbanized areas have a lower risk of quitting blood 
donation compared to individuals with higher income levels. Alessandrini (2007) also 
shows a positive relationship between education level and the probability of donating 
blood. Specifically, individuals with higher levels of education would be significantly 
more sensitive to this type of behavior. 
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1.3 Health factors and blood donation 
The literature provides studies that show that people who participate in the 
voluntary are more likely to declare a good perception of the level of physical and 
mental health (Borgonovi, 2008). However, feeling healthy is not the same than being 
healthy, and some individuals may be refused to donate their blood because of health 
restrictions. Different countries have different criteria for blood donation, and these 
criteria are more and stricter with the time. However, there is the general feeling that 
individuals have very poor information about the donation criteria. In the case of France 
the decision of exclusion of individuals from blood donation is taken according to the 
2009 EFS decree (« Arrêté du 12 janvier 2009 fixant les critères de sélection des 
donneurs de sang »).  
In the next section we present our data source (the ESPS 2010) as well as 
assumptions regarding the determinants for blood donation considered. The sample and 
data on blood donation are described using descriptive statistics for the variables of 
interest and the explanatory factors of blood donation. The methods for analysis focus 
on identifying the profile of donors and non-donors in the population in age and ability 
to donate. Three groups of donors are identified and described: active donors 
(individuals who have donated blood at least once in their lives and have made at least 
one donation in the last twelve months), potential donors (who have never donated 
blood or who have quitted blood donation in the past twelve months without having, a 
priori and according to their responses to questions on health, health restrictions), and 
refused donors (who cannot give blood because of health problems or other reasons 
considered grounds for permanent exclusion according to the EFS criteria). Finally, we 
present the descriptive and regression results, and conclude. 
 
2. Data source, Hypotheses and Variables description 
2.1 Data source: The ESPS survey
1
 
The ESPS survey interviews ordinary households, that is to say, the occupants of a 
private house. Collective households (institutions, residences...) and homeless people 
are not surveyed. The geographical scope is the metropolitan France. There are three 
samples from the ESPS survey: a sample of households, a sample of individuals and a 
                                                     
1 The official questionnaires of the ESPS 2012 survey can be download from the IRDES website: 
http://www.irdes.fr/recherche/enquetes/esps-enquete-sur-la-sante-et-la-protection-sociale/questionnaires.html 
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sample of individuals who responded to the main questionnaire (only one individual is 
selected per household). To take into account the particularities of sampling and non-
response, a weight is calculated for each of these three samples. It is based on the 
weight of initial surveys weighted by a timing margin to ensure a good representation of 
some key variables of interest (age, gender, household size and health insurance). 
Two modalities of the ESPS survey, telephonic (CATI modality) and face-to-face 
(CAPI modality), were performed. In addition the questionnaire was administered in 
two different contacts. After the first contact in which individuals answered general 
questions on socio-economic and demographic characteristics, all the individuals aged 
over 15 received an additional paper questionnaire, which included in 2012 a module of 
questions on blood donation.  
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Although altruism is assumed a general characteristic of blood donors, the level of 
altruism of each individual is different. In addition, people who do not donate blood can 
also be altruistic. Our hypothesis concerning altruism is that being willing to donate 
organs could be a good measure of pure altruism. When there is no benefit to donate 
organs after death, will make this gift can be considered as a purely altruistic behavior. 
Among individuals who would be ready to donate their organs we can distinguish those 
that have made a step in this direction (having signed the organ donor card or having 
communicated this desire to their relatives: question 54 of the questionnaire "15 and 
over"). The question on having a relative who was transfused (question 51 in the 
questionnaire "15 years and over") is also used as an indirect indicator of altruism. The 
hypothesis to test would be whether the current donors have a positive level of altruism 
and whether there are differences with the level of altruism of potential donors. 
We also test the hypothesis of influence of social capital on blood donation. More 
precisely we assume that belonging to a social group (participation in associations for 
collective interests) could be a good proxy of the level of social capital of individuals, 
and we hypothesize that individuals belonging to associations have actually a higher 
probability of being active donors. The variable used to measure social capital is 
participation in collective activities in associations through the question: "Do you 
participate regularly in group activities (meetings, events,…) in the context of an 
association (volunteer, parents, neighborhoods, parental nursery, union council 
building,... ), a sports club, a religious community, a trade union, or a political party? ". 
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Individuals who answered "yes" must specify in what capacity: as a manager (strong 
implication) or as a member. 
Concerning risk aversion, given that blood donation can be perceived by 
individuals as an activity which involves some risk either for blood donors or recipients, 
our hypothesis is that active donors should be found to be more risk-takers that potential 
donors, who should declare themselves to be more risk averse. In the "Economic and 
social questionnaire module" included in the paper questionnaire for the population 
aged 15 and over, the following question is included as a measure for risk aversion: "In 
terms of attitude towards risk, go with d a cross on a scale of 0 (very conservative) to 10 
(adventurous) in different areas of life". Risk aversion is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, 
where 0 represents "very conservative" and yet more risk averse and 10 for risk-takers, 
that is people "more attracted by the adventure".  
We will test the differences between active and potential donors based on the 
following socioeconomic variables: education, income, occupation and profession. Our 
results will be contrasted with the results shown in the literature, that is to say, a 
positive influence on the probability of donating for individuals according to their levels 
of education, income, occupation, and differences by occupation. The included variables 
are explained below:  
• The educational level is classified into five categories in the questionnaire: No 
diploma, CEP / BEPC / CAP / BEP, Graduate and Other (when the level of education 
said is not classifiable in one of the categories mentioned). All individuals interviewed 
during the first contact responded to this question, which are mandatory to answer. 
• Monthly income per consumption unit is obtained from the decomposition into 
income quintiles (five slices offered to respondents’ income). The first quintile 
corresponds to 20% of the poorest population and the fifth to 20% of the richest 
population. A sixth category is created to integrate non-response. 
• According to their occupation individuals can be classified into four categories: 
active, unemployed, retired and inactive. 
• According to their profession individuals can be classified into 8 categories: 
Farmers, Artisans, Shopkeepers, Managers & associate professionals, administrative 
/clerical employees, employees of trade, skilled workers, and unskilled workers. Two 
categories are added for those who report having never worked (Inactive, never worked) 
and those who refuse to answer this question or with a declared profession is not 
classifiable in one of the categories described above will be considered into the category 
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“Unknown / Refused”. 
Finally, concerning health factors, we hypothesize that there should be a difference 
in the perception of health status between active and potential donors. The literature 
shows that donors, and generally, people who actively contribute to volunteering will 
report higher levels of perceived health. We will test whether this hypothesis can be 
verified in our population. To do this, first we need first to control by blood donation 
exclusion criteria and select those individuals reporting health problems which are a 
permanent exclusion pattern for blood donation (according to the EFS criteria). Once 
we have well selected the individuals who would never be able to donate, we compare 
active and potential donors according to their answers to two health related questions. 
Our health variables are: 
• A variable of subjective health: The individuals’ perception of health at the 
moment they answered to the ESPS questionnaire. The individual must choose the level 
of perceived health among four response categories: very good, good, poor, very poor.  
• A variable of objective health, whether the individual has experienced in his life a 
chronic or long-term disease, without the disease being specified. The answer is again 
categorical: yes, no, do not know. 
 
The age, sex and residential area are control variables essential to be included in all 
the analysis. We will check if there is a different behavior on blood donation for 
different age groups, gender and residential area. Age, between 18 and 70 years, that is 
to say, the age population give blood, is classified into age ranges as follows: 18-29, 30-
39, 40-49, 50-59 years, 60-70 years. Data on the residential area are context data. There 
are 4 residential areas: multi-polarized, rural, suburban ring, and urban cluster. 
 
2.3 Construction of dependent variable: Blood donor profiles 
 
Figure 1 shows the questions about blood donation included in the ESPS 
questionnaire. Figure 2 shows how we construct the different blood donor groups or 
profiles according to individuals’ answers to the module on blood donation and some 
relevant health questions in the paper questionnaire for the population aged 15 and over.  
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Figure 1 : The Blood donation module 
 
 
Three types of donors are identified. From now on we will distinguish between 
Active donors, Potential donors and Refused donors. According to individuals’ 
responses, Active donors are individuals who have donated blood in the past twelve 
months. Potential donors are individuals who do not give blood but who could do so as 
they have no health problems restricting them from donation. Refused donors are 
individuals who do not give blood because of health problems that are reason for 
permanent exclusion for blood donation.  
This category of refused donors includes: 
• Individuals who have never donated blood because of a health reason (Question 
49.2 in the module on blood donation checked). 
• Individuals who have already donated ("yes" in question 49 of the blood donation 
module) but not in the last twelve months (specified "0 times / year " in question 50 ) 
for health reasons (Question 50.1 checked, and health reasons identified from responses 
to the open question 50.8). 
• Individuals who declare having been transfused (identified in the open question 
for those who say they have received a transfusion) and those exceeding the age of 
donation. 
• All individuals who report being in disorders of long duration (ALD), supported 
at 100% by the National Health Insurance are considered also disqualified for blood 
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donation. 
• All individuals who reported over the last twelve months having experienced one 
of the following diseases: bronchitis, myocardial infarction, coronary artery disease, 
hypertension, stroke, diabetes and liver cirrhosis (question 8 of the questionnaire " 15 
years and over"). These diseases are considered by the EFS as a permanent exclusion 
pattern for blood donation. 
The identification of groups of donors is performed taking into account the reasons 
for exclusion imposed by the EFS. However, as some people may not be aware of these 
exclusion criteria and the ESPS survey on blood donation is self-administered and not 
filled by a physician, reporting bias may occur. In fact, among individuals who declare 
not to donate blood for reasons different than health reasons, the analysis of the open 
question finds health reasons that would be a reason for permanent exclusion from 
blood donation. Thanks to the open questions ( 49.3 Q and Q 50.8 , Figure 1), a large 
part of these individuals has been identified and switched to the group of refused 
donors, while according to their initial response they would have been part of the group 
of potential donors. A small part of the individuals choosing other reasons different 
from health did not specify the reason for not donating. These individuals will be 
therefore considered as potential donors, under the impossibility of knowing if their 
reason would be a reason for permanent exclusion. In the working sample however, 
among the 2,841 people who reported not to donate blood for a reason different from 
health problems, 2,535 responded to the open question. The answer to this question 
could not therefore be checked for only 306 individuals (7% of the respondents to 
question 49.3 did not specify the reason when requested). Similarly, the among the 
1,306 people who declare having stopped donating blood in the last 12 months, 1,023 
specify their reasons in the open question (Q 50.8, Figure 1). We can also identify 
individuals who report having quitted blood donation in the last twelve months due to 
permanent health reasons (switched to the group of refused donors), temporary health 
reasons (switched to the group of potential donors) and other reasons different from 
health (also switched to the group of potential donors). 
A dozen of reasons have been identified among individuals’ responses to the open 
questions about the reasons for not donating or for quitting donation: age, health 
reasons, permanent, temporary, have been transfused, supply problems (cf. Table 1), 
fear / discomfort you do not have confidence in the system of gift, do not wish to give 
justification / lack of motivation, lack of availability / time, and Others. Among these 
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reasons, some correspond to existing items of the initial questions (such as permanent 
and temporary health problems, not being willing to donate). Others may be new items 
to offer answers in future versions of the ESPS questionnaire. These responses are not 
exclusive, meaning that one individual can be classified into several categories if from 
the response of that individual many different reasons are identified. The following 
table presents the answers to open questions 49.3 and 50.8 of the paper questionnaire 
regarding reasons for not donating blood. 
 
Table 1: Other reasons for not donating blood or for having quitted donating it 
 
Reason Examples of Responses  
Blood Donor 
classification 
Has never 
donated 
Has stopped 
donating blood in 
the last 12 months 
Age 
Have exceed the age for 
donating blood 
Refused 104 (3.97) 195 (17.60%) 
Health reasons (for 
permanent exclusión) 
Serious illness and blood 
diseases (hepatitis, 
leukemia,…)  
Refused 227 (8.67%) 114 (10.29%) 
Having been 
transfused 
Ce n’est pas possible quand on 
a été transfusés 
Refused 32 (1.22%) 16 (1.44%) 
Health reasons (for 
temporary exclusión) 
Weight <50 kgs, pregnancy, 
tatoos/piercings, trips to foreign 
countries, being in temporary 
medical treatment 
Potential 172 (6.57%) 71 (6.41%) 
Supply problems 
Not enough information 
concerning blood donation, 
Extraction times are not 
convenient or incompatible 
with work time, impossibility 
of donating at the working 
place, Night workers 
Potential 412 (15.74%) 156 (14.08%) 
Fear/Discomfort 
Has fear  of needles or has had 
a bad experience donating 
blood in the past 
Potential 501 (19.14%) 87 (7.85%) 
Lack of trust in the 
Health Care System 
Does not trust in the Health 
Care System 
Potential 36 (1.38%) 9 (0.81%) 
Does not wish to 
donate 
I don’t want to donate,  this 
doesn’t mean nothing to me 
Potential 198 (7.57%) 12 (1.08%) 
Excuses / Lack of 
motivation 
Not motivated enough, Has not 
thought about it, Is not a 
regular habit of my daily life  
Potential 425 (16.24%) 143 (12.91%) 
Availability/Lack of 
time 
Lack of time due to work, or 
just lack of time without 
specifying the time constraints 
Potential 281 (10.74%) 263 (23.74%) 
Other reasons 
Reasons impossible to classify 
into one of the categories above 
Potential 229 (8.75%) 42 (2.79%) 
Total    2617 (100%) 1108 (100%) 
Total Responses   2535 1023 
 
Individuals who indicate a reason of age, permanent health or have been transfused 
donors are considered refused for blood donation. Individuals reporting any other 
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reason which is not a ground for permanent exclusion are considered to be potential 
donors. The most common responses made to these open questions are for people who 
have never given: "Fear / discomfort", "lack of motivation" and the "supply problems”. 
For past donors, the main reasons to have quitted donation in the last twelve months are: 
"The lack of availability / lack of time", "Age" and "supply problems". Finally, the 
following diagram shows how the classification of donors made: 
 
Figure 2. Diagram explaining the classification of blood donors into Active, 
Potential and refused. 
 
This classification will be the one used for the descriptive and regression analyses 
presented below. 
 
3. Descriptive Analysis 
 
The ESPS 2012 sample consists of 23,048 individuals residents in France. In 2012, 
additional information was collected on the residential area of the interviewee and also 
on blood donation. Among them 69% of the individuals filled and give the paper 
questionnaire back (that is the questionnaire for the populations aged 15 and over). 
More questionnaires were lost in proportion for the telephone modality than for the 
face-to-face modality, the presence of the investigator therefore seems to have been 
crucial. Among respondents, 15,640 individuals are in age of donating (that is over 18 
and under 70 years). Among individuals in age of donating, In the end 10,826 returned 
the paper questionnaire in which the module on blood donation was included, and 10 
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492 responded to questions about blood donation (67%), slightly more women (69%) 
than men (65%), fewer younger (61%) than older (74%). Three regions are significantly 
under-represented in the questionnaire "blood donation", the Ile de France (62.08%), 
Alsace (64.26%), and Alpes Méditérranées (64.18%).  
The study population corresponds to people who responded to the paper 
questionnaire and missing responses are suppressed for the regression analysis. The 
sample used in the econometric model includes those individuals who responded to all 
the explanatory variables considered (behavioral variables, socio-economic 
characteristics and health conditions) in addition to the module on blood donation.  
 
Table 2: Percentage of Delivered and Returned paper questionnaires for the population aged 15 
and over. Initial and Working Samples 
 
  
Population Totale   
N= 23,048  
Population aged 18-70 
N= 15,640  
Working Sample 
N= 10,492  
Questionnaire 
Modality 
Delivered Returned Delivered Returned 
Questions in the Blood 
donation Module 
answered 
Telephone  11,787 6,584 (55.85%)  8,740 5,021 (57.44%)  4,898 (46,68 %) 
Face-to-face 11,261 9,274 (82.25%)  6,900 5,805 (84.13%)  5,594 (53,31 %) 
 
 
In the end, in our working sample the responses from CAPI and CATI modalities 
are balanced. Descriptive statistics are weighted to ensure the representativeness of the 
sample. This allows crossing variables from the blood donation module with the 
previously mentioned variables to better understand the population of interest and 
compare active donors with potential donors.  
 
 
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
To ensure an accurate description of the different blood donors’ profiles, 
representative of the French population, statistics from the 2012 ESPS survey are 
weighted.  
In Table 3, we notice that there are no significant differences between categories of 
donors in the sample, the ESPS data are weighted or not. Among the working sample of 
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10,492 individuals in age of donating blood who respond to the questions on blood 
donation, 6.48% are active donors, 40.28% are refused from donation and 53.24% are 
potential donors. These proportions are used for descriptive statistics that follow.  
 
Table 3 : Working sample description. Effectives and Percentage of donors by groups 
 
 Working Sample 
for descriptive statistics  
Working sample 
for regression analysis  
Donor groups 
ESPS Sample  
(weighted) 
ESPS Sample 
(unweighted) 
Active Donors 680.25 (6,48%) 706 (6.73%) 
Refused Donors 4,226.01 (40,28%) 4,118 (39.25%) 
Potential Donors 5,585.73 (53,24%) 5,668 (54.02%) 
Total 10,492 (100%) 10,492 (100%) 
 
The proportion of active donors has been validated by the EFS, concluding that the 
difference in percentage of active donors in the French population (about 5% of the 
population donates in France) may be justified by the difficulties for respondents to 
remember with precision the last time they donate, so that the notion of “having donated 
in the last 12 months” may be an expandable concept for some individuals. In fact, the 
percentage of active donors in France in a time horizon of 18-24 months (instead of 12) 
approaches to 7%, much more similar to the percentage found in the ESPS 
questionnaire.  
 
The EFS having validated our percentage of active donors, means that the 
assumption that individuals who have donated in the last 18 months consider 
themselves active donors, as if they have donated in the last twelve months is 
acceptable. 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of donor by groups according to control variables 
(age, sex) and the context variable "residential area". The results show that among 
active donors men outnumber women, the later being more frequently refused due to 
health reasons. Active donors are rather in the age group 30-49 years while refused 
donors generally belong to the elder categories. Most people responding in our working 
sample live in an urban area. 
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Table 4: Repartition of blood donors by groups according to age, sex and residential area 
Variables N % Active % Refused 
% Potential 
All 
Potential 
Has not 
temporary health 
problems 
Has temporary 
health 
problems 
Sex       
Male 5063 7.05 36.08 56.87 55.79 1.07 
Female 5429 5.98 43.98 50.04 48.54 1.50 
Age       
[18-29] 2149 8.71 23.09 68.20 66.94 1.26 
[30-39] 1789 7.08 24.95 67.98 65.89 2.09 
[40-49] 2313 8.40 33.74 57.86 56.73 1.13 
[50-59] 2187 5.98 51.33 42.69 41.47 1.23 
[60-70] 2054 2.60 65.89 31.51 30.71 0.80 
Residential Area       
Rural 2170 6.16 43.82 50.02 48.66 1.36 
Suburban ring 2124 7.25 37.88 54.88 53.57 1.31 
Multipolarized 600 8.59 37.89 53.52 52.39 1.13 
Urban 5598 6.10 40.06 53.84 52.55 1.29 
Total 10492 6.48 40.28 53.24 51.94 1.30 
Source : ESPS 2012. Note: Statistics are weighted. 
 
Table 5 shows the distribution of donors by groups according to behavioral 
variables (altruism, social capital and risk aversion are considered).  
According to the results, 57.7% of the final working sample would be willing to 
donate their organs upon death. However, 30.4% did not know if they would be willing 
to do so, and 11.56% would definitely not be willing to do so. Active donors are more 
often inclined to agree than refused donors, the later being more in percentage not 
willing to donate their organs, and the proportion of potential who has doubts is found 
to be important.  
The table also shows the percentage distribution of individuals of each group of 
donors, participating in group activities as part of an association of public interest. For 
active donors the percentage of participation is the highest compared to the other two 
donor groups, as well as they have highest percentage of participation as leaders of an 
association. Non-active donors (but not refused for health reasons) in the last twelve 
months are the second largest group in terms of participation. Refused donors who have 
never given due to health reasons, are those whose participation rate is the lowest 
among all the groups of donors. It can be seen that there is a relationship between being 
actively participate in group activities and blood donation.  
Also differences are observed between donor groups for the highest levels of risk 
aversion (where potential donors with health problems are more likely than others, and 
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active donors are the least in percentage), for average levels (where potential donors 
with health problems are lesser in proportion and active and refused donors reach their 
maximum, without differences between them) and also for the lowest levels (where 
active donors are more in percentage than the rest of groups). 
 
Table 5 : Indicateurs d’altruisme, capital social et aversion au risque 
Variables N % Active % Refused 
% Potential 
All 
Potential 
Has no 
temporary 
health problems 
Has temporary 
health 
problems 
Willing to donate organs       
Yes 5783 8.33 39.64 52.03 50.24 1.78 
No 1275 3.54 45.92 50.54 49.99 0.55 
Don’t know + Missing 3434 4.15 39.43 56.42 55.74 0.68 
Has the organ donor card       
Yes 1869 11.37 36.90 51.73 48.60 3.14 
No 3867 6.93 40.78 52.29 51.16 1.13 
Missing 4756 3.95 41.32 54.74 54.10 0.64 
Somebody close transfused       
Yes 1820 7.72 42.81 49.47 47.74 1.73 
No 6241 7.25 35.25 57.50 56.04 1.46 
Don’t know + Missing 2431 3.74 50.62 45.64 45.04 0.60 
Participates in associations      
Yes 3594 8.65 39.60 51.76 50.11 1.65 
No 6703 5.39 40.34 54.27 53.14 1.13 
Don’t know + Missing 195 2.82 51.34 45.84 45.29 0.55 
If « Yes»…       
Manager 1433 9.39 39.07 51.54 49.44 2.10 
Member 2029 7.89 40.54 51.57 50.45 1.13 
Missing 7030 5.46 40.45 54.09 52.91 1.19 
Risk aversión level      
0 (Risk averse) 1030 3.92 49.55 46.53 46.32 0.22 
1 636 5.33 46.10 48.57 47.11 1.45 
2 1121 4.51 42.99 52.50 50.51 1.99 
3 1249 6.28 39.96 53.76 52.52 1.23 
4 990 6.37 39.61 54.02 52.34 1.68 
5 
2379 
6.49 
 37.56 55.95 54.98 0.97 
6 1017 8,67 38.61 52.72 51.06 1.66 
7 935 7,37 33.07 59.56 57.23 2.33 
8 558 9,45 35.71 54.85 53.65 1.19 
9 154 13,15 27.61 59.24 58.91 0.33 
10 (Risk taker) 133 11,71 43.31 44.98 44.98 0.00 
Missing 290 5,71 52.33 41.96 41.59 0.37 
Total 10492 6.48 40.28 53.24 51.94 1.30 
Source : ESPS 2012. Note : Statistics are weighted 
 
Table 6 shows the descriptive results according to socio-economic variables. Active 
donors have in general a higher level of education and higher incomes (mostly 
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represented in the fifth quintile). For the majority of refused donors we found they have 
no diploma and their income is equal or lower than the second quintile, being in general 
retired or inactive. Potential donors, meanwhile, tend to have a higher level of 
education, income above the third quintile, and are instead concentrated among the 
category of individuals who are employed. 
 
Table 6: Distribution by groups of donors according to socio-economic variables 
Variables N %  Active % Refused 
% Potential 
All 
Potential 
Has no 
temporary health 
problems 
Has temporary 
health problems 
Education       
No diploma 1164 3.18 52.34 44.48 44.27 0.21 
CEP/BEPC/CAP/BEP 3982 5.46 46.79 47.75 47.03 0.72 
Bac 2741 6.47 34.69 58.84 57.36 1.48 
Graduate 1559 9.10 31.74 59.15 56.00 3.16 
Other 272 5.48 44.26 50.26 49.65 0.61 
Students without diploma 
obtained 774 12.99 22.83 64.18 62.95 1.23 
Income       
1
st
 quintile 1592 5.23 44.98 49.79 49.37 0.42 
2
nd
 quintile 1638 6.64 42.95 50.41 49.56 0.85 
3
rd
 quintile 1747 5.69 40.55 53.76 52.32 1.44 
4
th
 quintile 1963 6.46 39.57 53.97 52.58 1.39 
5
th
 quintile 2094 8.26 36.23 55.51 53.50 2.01 
Unknown/Missing 1458 5.85 39.38 54.77 53.50 1.27 
Occupation       
Active  6167 7.88 31.41 60.70 59.13 1.58 
Retired 1714 2.48 66.21 31.31 30.48 0.83 
Unemployed 973 4.62 40.82 54.56 53.73 0.83 
Inactive 1630 6.69 46.18 47.13 46.19 0.95 
Other 8 0.00 50.24 49.76 49.76 0.00 
Profession       
Farmers 1338 8.75 32.55 58.70 57.79 0.91 
Artisans 501 3.95 41.27 54.78 54.30 0.47 
Intellectual Profesion 1379 7.46 35.55 56.99 54.69 2.30 
Intermediate Profesion 1885 7.39 39.27 53.34 51.24 2.09 
Clerical 1501 5.90 44.45 49.65 47.93 1.72 
Traders 1388 5.05 44.67 50.28 49.64 0.64 
Qualified workers 1625 6.88 42.75 50.38 49.87 0.51 
Unqualified workers 864 4.17 39.08 56.74 56.31 0.43 
Inactive (never worked) 1 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 
Unknown/Refuses to 
answer 10 6.47 40.61 52.93 52.93 0.00 
Total 10492 6.48 40.28 53.24 51.94 1.30 
Source : ESPS 2012. Note : Statistics are weighted 
 
Table 7 shows how most individuals declare to be in very good or good health. 
Among those who report poor/very poor health, we can emphasize the small percentage 
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of active donors, while most of the people in poor health are refused and potential 
donors who have declared having a temporary health problem. Concerning the variable 
of objective health about 30% of respondents report having experienced a chronic 
illness or long-term disease. Among these individuals, active donors are the lowest 
group in percentage observed, and the largest percentage is for refused donors. In 
contrast, the percentage of active donors and potential donors is higher among those 
respondents who do not have a chronic illness. 
 
Table 7. Distribution by groups of donors according to health variables 
Variables N % Active % Refused 
% Potential 
All 
potential 
Has no 
temporary health 
problems 
Has temporary 
health 
problems 
Subjective Health       
Very good/good 9865  6.86  37.34  55.80  54.43  1.36  
Bad/Very bad  566 0.78 88.66 10.55 10.37 0.19 
Missing 61  1.03  43.26  55.71  54.08  1.63  
Has experienced 
a chronic illness  
      
Yes  3312  3.09  72.63  24.28  23.45  0.83  
No/Do not know  7080  8.24  24.16  67.60  66.05  1.55  
Missing 100  1.03  46.69  52.28  52.28  0.00  
Total 10492 6.48 40.28 53.24 51.94 1.30 
Source : ESPS 2012. Note : Statistics are weighted. 
 
 
4. Methods: Probit and Heckman selection models 
 
A standard probit model and a Heckman selection probit model are estimated. The 
general expression for the probit model is: 
 )(xY        (1)  
Where Φ is the inverse of the distribution function (cumulative density function), Y 
is the outcome of interest that we want to explain and x the set of explanatory variables. 
In our particular analysis, Y is a binary variable, taking two possible values {0, 1}, 
the 0 representing all the potential donors and 1 the active donors. We assume that this 
variable can be explained in part by the function Φ(x), where x are the determinants for 
blood donation considered in this paper and some control variables. Like any 
econometric model, there is an estimation error εi that is smaller the more we are able to 
explain Y. 
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The probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981) assumes 
that there is an underlying relationship such that: 
iii XY 1*     (2) 
Where (2) is the latent equation so that the outcome Y* is not always observed. 
Instead, the dependent variable for observation "i" is observed if:  
iii ZY 2   > 0   (3) 
Where (3) is the selection equation. The Heckman selection model assumes that the 
errors of the latent and selection equations follow a normal distribution such that u1 ~ N 
(0, 1) and u2 ~ N (0, 1), but also that there is a positive correlation between the two error 
terms, such that corr (u1, u2) = ρ. If the hypothesis of null correlation between the errors 
is rejected (ρ ≠ 0), estimation using a standard probit will lead to biased results. The 
probit Heckman selection provides consistent estimates in the presence of positive 
correlation between the errors, asymptotically efficient for all parameters of the model. 
For the model to be well identified, the selection equation must have at least one 
variable that is not in the equation of the standard probit model. Otherwise, the model 
would be identified only by the functional form, and the coefficients will not have the 
correct structural interpretation. 
The dependent variable of the selection model (Yi in equation 3) is a binary 
variable. It takes value 1 if the individual is not a refused donor and 0 if it is a refused 
donor. We can see that actually the dependent variable of the latent equation (Yi*) which 
only considers active donors and potential donors, is observed only when the selection 
variable is equal to 1 (Yi = 1 if the individual is an active or potential donor), and it is 
not observed when Yi = 0 (if the individual is a refused donor). The additional required 
explanatory variables chosen for our model selection are health variables, to see that the 
selection of the population of refused donors is correct. 
 
5. Regression results 
The standard probit model provides an estimate of the profiles of active donors 
(dependent variable = 1) and potential (0). In this model, refused donors are excluded in 
order two populations a priory in equality of health conditions for donating blood. 
Neither active donors nor potential donors included in the model have health problems 
according the grounds for permanent exclusion for blood donation. The population is 
6,374 people once excluding refused donors (4,118 refused individuals are identified) 
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and our model considers a number of observations equal to 4,039 individuals once 
removed missing data. We now interpret the results of the estimation of the probit 
model that includes all variables (Model 2 in Table 8). 
Individuals who report being willing to donate their organs have a higher 
probability (+0.062) of being active donors compared to those who are not willing to do 
so. Having made a step forward in this direction (such as signing the organ donors’ 
card) increases even more this probability in 0.005, so the total marginal effect on the 
probability of being active donor for those who say they are willing to donate their 
organs and that have the organ donor card is 0.067 probability points higher than for the 
rest of individuals not being willing to donate their organs. Regarding the variable of 
social capital we find that belonging to an association increases the probability of being 
an active donor (0.048) compared to those who reported not participating in 
associations. The more an individual is a risk taker, the higher the probability of being 
an active donor, with a positive difference of 0.086 probability points with respect to 
individuals who declare to be more risk averse. 
Concerning the socio-economic variables included in the model, the only 
significant effect was found for the level of education. Being a student but have not yet 
graduated, compared to those who say they have "no diploma", is also a factor that 
positively influences the probability of being active donor (+0.132). One could insight 
that students have a lower opportunity cost to give their blood, compared to other 
groups, for example, given the easiness for donating blood when the mobile units move 
into university. 
We find no significant effect for health variables, which means that the two groups 
of donors are equal in terms of perceived health and chronic diseases. 
Model 3 shows how, among men (women are excluded for this model), the 
marginal effects of behavioral variables are stronger compared to the effects found in 
the estimation of models 1 and 2, where all men and women were included. So when 
the average effect for the entire population is lesser for some of the variables than the 
effect found for the population of men only, we can derive that the marginal effects of 
these variables for the population of women are lower. Two main differences are 
observed between men and women. The effect of not having yet finished studies 
disappears when the population of men is analyzed separately. In addition, men aged 
50-59 have a higher probability (+0.080) of being active donors compared to younger 
men aged 18-29. 
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Table 8. Results for the Standard Probit Model (Marginal Effects) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (Men only) 
Active Donor = 1 
Marginal 
Effect 
S.E P>z 
Marginal 
Effect 
S. E. P>z 
Marginal 
Effect 
S.E P>z 
Behavioural Variables 
         Willing to donate organs 0,062*** 0,064 0,000 0,062*** 0,064 0,000 0,063*** 0,087 0,000 
Has the organ donor card 0,066*** 0,066 0,000 0,067*** 0,067 0,000 0,058*** 0,103 0,002 
Somebody close transfused 0,015 0,069 0,258 0,016 0,070 0,211 0,006 0,101 0,732 
Participates in associations 0,049*** 0,056 0,000 0,048*** 0,056 0,000 0,061*** 0,079 0,000 
Risk taker 0,083*** 0,136 0,001 0,086*** 0,138 0,001 0,039 0,177 0,239 
Socio-economic variables 
         CEP/BEPC/CAP/BEP 0,010 0,122 0,667 0,010 0,123 0,669 0,009 0,160 0,761 
Bac 0,001 0,128 0,983 0,006 0,130 0,819 0,006 0,172 0,846 
Graduate 0,010 0,145 0,721 0,020 0,147 0,475 0,019 0,203 0,613 
Other -0,013 0,227 0,757 -0,013 0,228 0,759 -0,134 0,432 0,094 
Student without diploma 0,123*** 0,230 0,005 0,132*** 0,241 0,003 0,101 0,447 0,223 
Retired -0,040 0,112 0,059 -0,001 0,178 0,971 -0,013 0,241 0,774 
Unemployed -0,034 0,110 0,102 -0,030 0,112 0,157 -0,051 0,168 0,103 
Inactive -0,036 0,147 0,190 -0,035 0,150 0,209 0,013 0,342 0,842 
Artisans -0,019 0,212 0,628 -0,025 0,213 0,532 -0,038 0,275 0,460 
Intelectual profession 0,015 0,178 0,657 0,006 0,180 0,860 -0,008 0,247 0,861 
Intermediate Profession 0,026 0,168 0,411 0,020 0,169 0,520 0,016 0,231 0,707 
Clerical 0,048 0,168 0,128 0,044 0,170 0,167 0,018 0,258 0,702 
Traders 0,000 0,173 0,988 -0,003 0,175 0,935 -0,020 0,322 0,743 
Qualified workers 0,047 0,169 0,139 0,040 0,171 0,209 0,031 0,227 0,465 
Non-Qualified workers 0,016 0,184 0,637 0,013 0,185 0,713 0,030 0,244 0,511 
Income p.u.c (2nd quintile) 0,014 0,098 0,467 0,011 0,099 0,568 0,023 0,145 0,392 
Income p.u.c (3rd quintile) -0,010 0,101 0,609 -0,011 0,102 0,563 -0,014 0,149 0,623 
Income p.u.c (4th quintile) -0,006 0,099 0,750 -0,008 0,100 0,666 0,002 0,146 0,950 
Income p.u.c (5th quintile) 0,001 0,102 0,967 -0,003 0,104 0,888 -0,014 0,154 0,616 
Health variables 
         Poor/ very poor health -0,101 0,348 0,122 -0,107 0,353 0,106 -0,058 0,387 0,419 
Has experienced a chronic 
illness 
0,012 0,074 0,392 0,012 0,075 0,391 -0,015 0,113 0,491 
Control Variables 
         Female 
   
-0,005 0,061 0,692 NA - - 
Âge 30-39 
   
-0,011 0,093 0,522 0,018 0,139 0,482 
Âge 40-49 
   
0,029 0,091 0,090 0,044 0,136 0,078 
Âge 50-59 
   
0,030 0,099 0,108 0,080*** 0,142 0,003 
Âge 60-70 
   
-0,033 0,184 0,345 0,023 0,250 0,620 
Rural area 
   
0,002 0,072 0,895 -0,004 0,102 0,851 
Suburban ring 
   
0,000 0,069 0,997 -0,006 0,099 0,728 
Multipolarized 
   
0,028 0,115 0,199 0,038 0,158 0,201 
N 
 
4039 
  
4039 
  
2027 
 Log Likelihood 
 
-1397,2 
  
-1389,7 
  
-688,6 
 Pseudo R2 
 
0,0638 
  
0,0689 
  
0,071 
 Prob > chi2 
 
0,000 
  
0,000 
  
0,000 
 
 
Estimating the Heckman selection model (including the refused donors in the 
selection equation) gives similar results then those obtained through the standard probit 
estimation. However, the main difference is that in the Heckman selection model the 
health variables are not included in the latent equation, but these are the additional 
variables for the selection equation. The results show that there is a significant 
difference in terms of perceived health and chronicity between refused and non-refused 
donors, the later encompassing active and potential donors. The null hypothesis of non-
correlation of errors cannot be rejected with a confidence level of 95% (ρ = 0.032, λmills 
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= 0.01 and the p-value ( λmills ) = 0.729). The results found in the standard probit model 
can therefore be used in this case to give the comparison between the active donors and 
potential donors, not having a problem of sample selection. 
 
Table 9. Heckman Selection Model Results 
 
Dependent variable of the latent equation: Active Donor =1 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Behavioural Variables         
Willing to donate organs 0,056*** 0,011 5,000 0,000 
Has the organ donor card 0,082*** 0,014 5,980 0,000 
Somebody close transfused 0,010 0,012 0,810 0,419 
Participates in associations 0,049*** 0,011 4,550 0,000 
Risk taker 0,093*** 0,030 3,110 0,002 
Socio-economic variables         
CEP/BEPC/CAP/BEP 0,011 0,019 0,610 0,541 
Bac 0,003 0,020 0,130 0,900 
Graduate 0,022 0,024 0,930 0,350 
Other -0,012 0,037 -0,320 0,751 
Student without diploma 0,136*** 0,035 3,880 0,000 
Retired -0,012 0,031 -0,380 0,703 
Unemployed -0,018 0,018 -1,000 0,316 
Inactive -0,023 0,024 -0,960 0,335 
Artisans -0,021 0,033 -0,630 0,527 
Intelectual profession 0,009 0,029 0,310 0,755 
Intermediate Profession 0,028 0,026 1,090 0,277 
Clerical 0,049 0,026 1,870 0,062 
Traders 0,004 0,026 0,140 0,893 
Qualified workers 0,040 0,026 1,570 0,116 
Non-Qualified workers 0,015 0,027 0,560 0,572 
Income p.u.c (2nd quintile) 0,018 0,018 1,010 0,314 
Income p.u.c (3rd quintile) -0,010 0,018 -0,530 0,593 
Income p.u.c (4th quintile) -0,010 0,018 -0,580 0,564 
Income p.u.c (5th quintile) -0,002 0,019 -0,080 0,933 
Control Variables         
Female -0,007 0,011 -0,610 0,543 
Âge 30-39 -0,011 0,016 -0,670 0,504 
Âge 40-49 0,028 0,016 1,740 0,082 
Âge 50-59 0,029 0,018 1,620 0,105 
Âge 60-70 -0,016 0,031 -0,530 0,596 
Rural area 0,006 0,013 0,490 0,622 
Suburban ring 0,001 0,013 0,080 0,934 
Multipolarized 0,032 0,022 1,470 0,140 
Dependent variable of Selection Equation: No refused donor=1         
Health variables         
Poor/ very poor health -0,590*** 0,087 -6,790 0,000 
Has experienced a chronic illness -0,438*** 0,031 -14,290 0,000 
lambda (mills) 0,010 0,029 0,350 0,728 
rho 0,032       
sigma 0,319       
 
Our assumptions concerning individuals’ behavior according to altruism, social 
capital and risk aversion effects on blood donation are confirmed by these models. 
Concerning socio-economic characteristics, we do not find differences in the economic 
situation of individuals, which may indicate that economic differences are not an 
influencing factor for blood donation. Some differences are found for the population of 
men with respect to the general population. Specifically, men aged 50-59 years have a 
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younger donate blood actively probability significantly higher than men. Finally, the 
failure to find differences in perceived health and chronicity between active and 
potential donors suggests that we have well controlled our population of refused donors, 
so that the two populations of active and potential donors are comparable with all 
potential donors having the opportunity to be active donors one day (it is not possible 
for donors objected, removed from the analysis for this reason).  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This work was produced using data from the ESPS 2012 questionnaire, which for 
the first time in 2012 integrates some questions about blood donation among questions 
on socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the general French population. 
This is the first time in France that the different blood donor populations, active, 
potential and refused, are going to be described in terms of a set of variables never 
analyzed together before in France.  
The results show that active donors are generally more altruistic individuals 
(compared to potential donors), with higher levels of social capital, and more risk-
takers. The assumptions higher levels of altruism and social capital for active donors are 
confirmed for the population analyzed, reinforcing previous literature results. We also 
found that active donors are more risk takers than potential donors, confirming our 
hypothesis. Concerning socio-economic characteristics of the blood donor groups, being 
a student without having yet obtained the diploma, seems to be a characteristic that also 
increases the probability of being an active donor compared to those who reported not 
having education. 
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Encouraging blood donations through advertising campaigns 
María Errea 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of new advertising campaigns for blood donation 
that the blood donors’ association of Navarra (ADONA) started implementing in 2010. 
The aim is to compare these campaigns that ADONA implemented since 2010 with 
previous ADONA campaigns and other events for encouraging blood donation 
implemented in the past in the same region. To analyze the impact of pro-donation 
campaigns we propose three indicators: 1st. the difference in the days between two 
consecutive donations for each individual, as a measure for variation in the frequency of 
blood donations when there is a campaign active and where no campaign is active; 2
nd
. 
the incremental days between consecutive donations as a measure for variation in 
regularity on blood donation behavior when there is a campaign active; 3
rd
. the 
proportion of new donors with and without campaigns active. Controlling for 
individuals' characteristics and identifying other events than could be taking place at the 
same time than the donation campaigns we reduce the estimation bias, and propose a 
model to better isolate the effect of campaigns. Results show a positive effect of 
campaigns according to the three measures considered. We conclude that the new 
campaigns are more effective on the attraction of new donors, and also that there is a 
learning process of individuals and complementarity/reinforcement effects between 
campaigns, so that when the campaigns become more frequent, donations become more 
frequent and also more regular.  
 
Keywords: Blood donation, Policy Evaluation, Panel data 
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1. Introduction 
It is a fact that blood cannot be artificially created, and therefore the only way for 
obtaining blood is through voluntary donations. The World Health Organization (WHO,  
2013) reports that only 1% of the world population donates blood, which is considered 
the minimum percentage necessary to cover the demand for blood. However, the aging 
of the population in addition to the lack of new donors to substitute those who retire, 
increases the risk of the demand for blood not being covered, even at its minimum 
(Ditto et al, 2003; Greinacher, Fendrich and Hoffman, 2010). 
The problem is to find the best mechanism for encouraging blood donations. 
Donating blood is an altruistic action (Wildman, Hollingsworth, 2009), at least in most 
countries. While some individuals may be attracted to blood donation by offering a 
reward (Lacetera, Macis, 2010), we also risk of having deterrent or non-desired effects 
(Bowles, Polanía, 2012). Related to this argument there is a lot of research done, 
starting with Titmuss (1972) who specifically analyzed this context and concluded that 
incentives may undermine intrinsic motivation of blood donors, and even reduce supply 
of blood. This effect is known as Crowding-Out (Frey, Jegen, 2011). The idea of this 
theory of crowding-effects is that the introduction of external interventions, such as 
economic incentives or external rewards, can modify individual's preferences and 
behavior. A good example for a change in behavior induced by an external intervention 
is the one explained in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). In that paper the authors explore 
the effects of introducing a fine for punishing those parents who collect their children 
late at school at the end of the day. The result was that those parents who were used to 
arrive late before the introduction of the fine, arrived even later with the fine, and also 
when the fine stopped. The authors provide a good illustration about the way external 
interventions may modify individuals' preferences and obtain undesired results.  
In the context of blood donations, the situation can be even more delicate. First, 
social values, such as altruism, are clearly determining the decision of donating, and 
therefore introducing incentives may undermine these social values (Bowles, Polanía, 
2012). Even if there is a strong interest to see how blood donors would react to 
incentives, this may be very negative for the activity, changing individuals' perception 
of the action of donating blood. However, there are other methods to encourage pro-
social activities. This paper analyzes the effect of non-economic incentives, specifically, 
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of a set of blood donations campaigns and events that have been implemented in the last 
years with the objective of encouraging blood donations. 
Although there is a highly developed literature to estimate the cause of campaigns 
or promotion events, there is little consensus on the best way to study the consequences 
of such promotion events (Allison, 1994). In the context of blood donations, few data 
have been published on the evaluation of blood donation campaigns (Wakefield, Loken 
and Hornik, 2010), joining the effort of blood donors associations and mass media 
campaigns. One is a study of a campaign implemented to promote blood donation in 
China, which used celebrities and patriotic messages to increase the number of 
voluntary blood donors. Another study in Ghana, a low-cost radio campaign, showed an 
increase in the number of young male donors, who suddenly changed their donation 
behavior and started attending to repeated blood donation as a consequence of the 
campaign (Allain et al., 2008).  
In general, for campaigns which target is to promote healthy habits, results show 
success in the short-term, but difficulties to hold on these effects to longer-terms. Many 
studies conclude that sustained effects of campaigns for healthy habits are difficult to 
maintain once the campaign has ended (Pomerleau et al, 2005; Sanigorski et al, 2008; 
Cavill, Bauman, 2004; Marcus et al, 2006; Finlay, Faulkner, 2005; Norman et al, 2007). 
Therefore, the topic of sufficient exposure of the population to campaign messages is a 
concern (Emery et al, 2007). Isolating the effects of campaigns, and especially when 
multiple campaigns are being implemented in short time periods to the same population 
is, however, a difficult task (Rocella, 2002; Cavill, Bauman, 2004; Kahn, Ramsey, 
Brownson, 2002).  
The purpose of this paper is to explore both existing gaps according the literature. 
On the one hand, to explore and try to isolate as much as possible the impact of blood 
donation campaigns that a Blood Donors Association implemented in a given 
population. On the other hand, we explore the impact of campaigns when considering 
different lifetimes of campaigns, and also we will show that there is a complementarity 
effect between campaigns.  
In particular, we explore the impact of campaigns through the measure of the 
following outcomes: the “individuals number of days since last donation” (as a measure 
of individuals’ frequency of donation when campaigns are active), the “mean change in 
the days since last donations” for individuals (as a measure for regularity), and the 
proportion of new donors. Comparing each of these measures in the periods when a 
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campaign is active with respect when no campaign is active we give an estimation of 
the impact of the campaigns. Given that there is a period of three months minimum 
between two donations for any individual, a sensitivity analysis is made, considering 
different life-times for the campaigns. First, we will consider that campaigns are active 
during fifteen days and estimate the mean days between donations, the incremental 
mean days between donations, and the proportion of new donors at the periods where a 
campaign is active. Then, we increase the life-time of the campaigns to one and three 
months. We hypothesize that the effect of the campaigns may be stronger the first days 
but continue having an impact after some time, some individuals having probably 
donated just a few days before the starting date of the campaign.  
We consider that the mere provision of extra information through blood donations' 
campaigns could be effective on increasing blood donations by increasing the blood 
donors’ frequency or regularity of donations, and attracting new donors.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the data and the 
regression methods for analysis. Section 3 presents descriptive and regression results. 
We show that there is a positive impact of campaigns, and that this impact is stronger in 
the first days of life of a campaign, but the effect is maintained when we increase its 
life-time. We also show that there is a dominant effect for the first and the last 
campaign, among all the campaigns analyzed in the time horizon considered. The study 
limitations and further research are discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Population and Data description 
 
Navarra is the first Spanish region in the ranking of donations, having the highest 
proportion of donors per thousand inhabitants, around 50 in the last years, a number 
which is very far from the Spanish mean, 38 blood donors per thousand inhabitants 
(FIODS, 2013). However, the need for blood in Navarra is higher than in other regions, 
in order to cover the needs for the hospital to carry on all the transfusions made for 
multiple surgery and other treatments.  
Data for this study has been provided by the Blood Donors Association in Navarra 
(ADONA). According to these data, there are about 55,000 registered donors in the 
region of Navarra. This is near the 10% of the total population of this Spanish region. 
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Among them, about 27,000 individuals donate each year (5% of the population), and 
19,000 of them are active donors (ADONA considers active donors to individuals who 
have donated at least once in the last three years).  
We have daily registers from 25,188 blood donors since 2008 and a total of 
159,318 registered donations between January 2008 and April 2013. For each day we 
have information about who donated and also some individual characteristics such as 
gender, age, blood type, the date of first and last donation, the type of donation made 
(blood donation, aphaeresis, and auto-transfusion). The total number of donations for 
each individual is not given but it can be calculated as we have the number of donations 
for each individual before 2008 (our starting year recording donations) and each time an 
individual donates after 2008 is also recorded. Individuals are identified by an ID 
number generated to preserve their anonymity. 
An increasing effort of ADONA on advertising has been observed since January 
2010. Much more campaigns have been implemented in the last two years (2010-2013) 
than in the previous period (2008-2010). This paper focuses on estimating the impact of 
these new pro-donation campaigns, and comparing them with the previous years, where 
campaigns or pro-donation events were scarce. We consider blood donation campaigns 
but also other donation campaigns that the same Blood Donors Association 
implemented (i.e campaigns for encouraging bone marrow donations) under the 
hypothesis that any campaign that is launched by the Blood Donors’ Association may 
have an impact on blood donation. 
The following table shows a list, in chronological order, of the pro-donation 
campaigns or other events, that have took place during the last five years.  
We distinguish between pro-donation campaigns, pro-donation events, and 
permanent changes. The main difference between the first two is that a campaign is a 
call for donation, while events are organized in recognition to the population of blood 
donors. In addition, we assume that the minimum life-time for a campaign, that is the 
time that a campaign should be considered being active, is 15 days, while we consider 
events as shocks which have a duration of one day (for example, the World blood 
donors’ day, celebrated every year the 14th of June). A permanent change is an event 
that occurred during the time we are analyzing that has not ended and that could be 
affecting the outcome of interest. We include one unique permanent change, which is 
the extension of the extraction and donor care times the 13
th
 of December 2010.  
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The following table shows the different campaigns, events and permanent changes 
that can be localized in the time we are analyzing. We separate the table in two periods: 
January 2008-December 2009 and January 2010- April 2013. The number of campaigns 
implemented in the period 2008-2010 was smaller in than the number of campaigns 
after January 2010. Before 2010 the only campaign implemented was for encouraging 
bone marrow donation.  
Table 1. History of pro-donation campaigns since 2010 
Date of start Campaign Description 
January 2008-End December 2009 
14-06-2008 Event #1: The world blood donors’ day 2008 
04-04-2009 Campaign #0: Bone Marrow donation campaign 
01-06-2009 Event #2: Recognition to donors  having achieved 50, 100 and 150 donations in 2008) 
14-06-2009 Event #3: World Blood Donors’ day 2009 
24-06-2009 Event #4: Tribute to blood donors in Navarra 
11-09-2009 
Event #5: ADONA published a study in the local press about the necessity of generational 
change 
January 2010- End April 2013 
18/01/2010 Campaign #1: 1st phase of the blood donation campaign "¿Y tú, qué eres?" 
01/02/2010 Campaign #2: 2nd phase of the blood donation campaign "Y tú, qué eres?" 
14/06/2010 Event #1: World Blood Donors’ day 2010 
13/12/2010 Permanent Change: The extraction and donor care times are extended 
11/06/2011 Campaign #3: One day campaign: ADONA in the streets of Pamplona 
14/06/2011 Event #2: World Blood Donors’ day 2011 
23/08/2011 Campaign #4: Summer campaign of the National Red Cross and ADONA 
23/09/2011 Campaign #5: Campaign for blood donations: "Yo doy la cara, ¿y tú?" 
01/06/2012 Campaign #6: The regional soccer team dedicates the month to blood donors 
14/06/2012 Event #3: World Blood Donors’ day 2012 
21/09/2012 
Campaign #7: The extraction mobile unit for blood donation went to the University of 
Navarra 
05/11/2012 Event #4: A tribute to senior donors (50, 100, and 150 donations made) 
 
Undeniable is that the Blood Donors Association in Navarra has invested a strong 
effort and economic resources for these advertising campaigns in the last two years, 
using visual advertising campaigns, shocking messages and posters in the bus stops and 
in the street walls. However, nobody has made yet the effort of evaluating the impact of 
these campaigns. We start by briefly describe each of the campaigns and other pro-
donation events. To better understanding of the objectives of each of the pro-donation 
campaigns and events, a brief description of the campaigns is provided in the table 
below (see the annex at the end of this paper for a more detailed description of each of 
the campaigns and events). 
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Table 2. Description, slogan and target of ADONA pro-donation campaigns and events 
in the period 2008-2013 
Campaign Description Date start Message/Slogan Target of campaign 
Campaign #0 
Bone Marrow Donation 
campaign 
04/04/2009 
Your other half 
is there 
To encourage individuals 
to donate bone marrow 
Campaign #1 
Y tú, ¿qué eres?  
(1st phase) 
18/01/2010 Y tú, ¿qué eres? 
To approach the concept 
of blood donation to the 
young population 
Campaign #2 
Y tú, ¿qué eres?  
(2nd phase) 
01/02/2010 
Positive or 
negative. We 
want you as you 
are 
To show the importance 
of having blood donors of 
all types 
Campaign #3 
ADONA in the streets of 
Pamplona 
11/06/2011 
Give your face 
for blood 
donation 
To inform  to all the 
population about blood 
donation and how to 
become a donor 
Campaign #4 
Summer Campaign  
(ADONA + Red Cross) 
23/08/2011 
This summer 
love yourself 
and think of 
others 
To prevent the scarcity of 
blood donations usually 
observe during the 
summer 
Campaign #5 Da la cara 23/09/2011 
Yo doy la cara, 
¿y tú? 
To create identity  of 
being a blood donor and 
increase blood donations 
Campaign #6 
OSASUNA dedicates the 
month to blood donors 
01/06/2011 
We are 12 with 
you 
To show the importance 
of blood donation and 
publicly recognize this 
action 
Campaign #7 
The Mobile Unit is installed at 
university 
21/09/2012 
Be passionate 
for the red 
To promote blood 
donation among the 
University population 
Event  Description Date  Message/Slogan Target of campaign 
The World Blood 
Donors’ Day 
Event to celebrate the date of 
birth of Dr. Karl Landsteiner, 
the discoverer of blood groups 
Every 14
th
 
of June 
Paint the world 
in red (year 
2011) 
To recognize the figure of 
the blood donor voluntary 
and altruistic all around 
the world 
Tribute to senior 
blood donors 
Golden bandages are 
distributed to blood donors 
having reached 50, 100 and 
150 donations 
01/06/2009 
24/06/2009 
05/11/2012 
No slogan 
To socially and officially 
thank and recognize the 
action of blood donors 
The times for 
extraction of 
blood and donor 
care are extended 
The time for blood donation 
and donor care is extended to 
Friday Mornings, and Monday 
to Thursday there are no 
interruptions between 8am and 
8pm 
13/12/2010 No slogan 
To facilitate blood 
donation for individuals 
who have more 
incompatibilities with 
daily schedule 
 
2.3 Regression Methods. Panel Data 
 
We want to estimate the impact of each of the campaigns implemented by the 
Blood Donors’ Association of Navarra, on the frequency and regularity of blood 
donations, as well as on the capability of attraction of new blood donors. 
  
115 
 
Consider a linear panel-data model (Wooldridge, 2010) on the form: 
tiipijtiktitti zxcy ,,,,       
},...,1{},0,1{ Kkt  , p = },...,1{ P           (1) 
Where tiy ,  is the vector of outcomes of interest. As we are going to estimate three 
different outcomes ),,(
)3(
,
)2(
,
)1(
,, titititi yyyy  . A separate model is estimated for each of 
the outcomes. ci,t is a vector of the K campaigns, a binary variable for each 
campaign/event, with value 1 when the campaign is active and value 0 for the periods 
without campaign; xi,t is a vector of individuals’ characteristics which vary across 
individuals and across time (such as age or the number of total donations); zi is a vector 
of p individual time invariant characteristics (gender and blood type). The constant term 
( t) represents the mean of the outcome of interest at t=0, that is similar to the mean 
outcome when no campaign is active, and ppk  ,,,  are the parameters to be 
estimated. This model assumes there is an error in the estimation due to individual 
characteristics which are time invariant ( i ) or time variant ( ti , ) that we are omitting 
in the model and could be relevant for the estimation. 
In our case we analyze the impact of campaigns over three outcomes of interest: 1. 
The difference in the mean of the days since last donation for each individual in t=1 and 
t=0; and 2. The mean variation in the days since last donation in t=1 and t=0. 3. The 
difference in the proportion of new donors in both periods. 
For k=1 and t={0, 1}, that is if there is only one campaign and two periods, the 
estimated effect of a campaign would be, for each of the measures, the difference in the 
outcomes in the two periods, t=1 and t=0, conditioned to the individuals time variant 
and time invariant characteristics observed in the population. That is:  
     ZXyEZXyEyE tititi ,|,| 0,1,,        (2) 
Given the lack of similar previous studies analyzing the impact of blood donation 
campaigns, there is no agreement on the life-time that should be considered for a 
campaign. Thus, we will consider three different campaign life-times: 15 days, one 
month and three months. 
The problem of this simple model is that we are omitting variables in the model, 
other than pro-donation campaigns or events, which could affect to the outcome of 
interest. For example, it is known that an individual who is near (under) 50, 100 and 150 
donations receives a medal when arriving to that number of donations, as a 
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compensation for his contribution. Therefore, identifying this individuals and their 
weight over the whole sample, may be important. If there is an effect of these medals, 
the behavior of these individuals should be an increase in regularity until they arrive to 
50, 100 or 150, and then decrease their regularity. With a simple test based on following 
individuals along the time we can identify if the omission of this variable would be 
introducing (or not) a bias in our estimation.  
We need to estimate a model of differences such that we explain as much as 
possible what is in the error term of the previous model (equation 1). The estimator 
should be the difference between the outcome variable in different time periods, but 
now we consider daily data, and control for those events that we hypothesize that 
omitting them would lead into a bias of our estimation of the effect of the campaigns. 
The model we estimate includes dummy variables that take value 1 if a campaign (ci,t), 
event (ei,t), or permanent change (pci,t) was occurring at the moment of donation t ϵ T. 
This model is written as follows: 
    tiiriqtimtiltipijtiktiti DzDxpcezxcy ,,,,,,,  
  
},...,1{},,...,1{},,...,1{},,...1{},,...,1{},,...,1{},,...,1{},,...,1{ RrQqPpJjmmLlKkTt   (3) 
 
 
Where i={1,…,n} represent the individuals and t represent the time measure (daily 
data), k={1,…K) represent the K campaigns, l={1,…,L} represent the L additional pro-
donation events, m={1,…M} represent M permanent changes that occur at any t ϵ T. The 
individual-level effect is represented by i , and tiu ,  is the idiosyncratic error (error of 
the estimation due to the omission of variables that either change for individuals or with 
time, that would be relevant for explaining the outcome of interest). ci,t and ei,t are 
vectors of dummy variables, where each variable equals 1 if a campaign or pro-donation 
event was active when the individual i went to make a donation at time t ϵ T, and 0 
otherwise; tipc ,  is a vector of the permanent changes that could affect our outcome 
measure, each of these permanent changes being a dummy variable that takes value 1 
since the change is implemented and 0 before the change is implemented. In our case 
there is only one permanent change during the time period we are analyzing. Therefore 
it tipc ,  is a vector of one unique variable (m=1 in the model). To better estimate the 
impact of the campaigns, pro-donation events, and permanent changes on the outcome 
of interest, we introduce some control variables that are variant with time (xj,t, j 
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representing characteristics, such as the age or the total number of donations when they 
approach to the thresholds of 50, 100 and 150, as an indicator of individuals being close 
to receiving the gold bandages), as well as individual characteristics that are time 
invariant ( iz ), such as gender or the blood type, and interaction effects between some of 
the control variables and individual characteristics with a dummy variable D that takes 
value 1 if the donation time is any date after the date of start of the new pro-donation 
campaigns (January 18
th
 2010) and value 0 otherwise. Interactions (time variant, Xj,t D, 
and time invariant, Zi D) are included to evaluate the behavioral changes among 
individuals of different age groups, gender, being close to a medal in the moment of 
donation, and having received a medal before and after the date of the start of the new 
campaigns. Again i  is the error term at the individual-level and tiu ,  is the idiosyncratic 
error (error at the individual and time levels).  
We estimate this model using Generalized Least Square estimation, that means that 
we assume that the correlation between tiu ,  and the independent variables that vary with 
the time is zero (the random effects model).   
In the first estimation the dependent model of is the days between consecutive 
donations for each individual who went donating at time t.  
We create this variable as follows:  
First, we calculate the distance between two donations, in days, for each individual. 
That is our first outcome of interest (
)1(
,tiy ):  
   
1
)1(
, 

tititi
donationdatedonationdatey  
For an individual who donates blood at times t and t-1, 
1
,tiy  is the distance in days 
between these two dates of donation. 
Once we have done so for all the individuals in the data set, we can compute the 
mean of tiy , , that is to say, at each time period we compute the sum of the days since last 
donation for all the n individuals donating at time t, and divide this sum by the total 
number of donations registered that day, which is equal to divide by the number of 
donors registered that day (nt):  
   
t
n
i
titi
t
n
i
ti
n
donationdatedonationdate
n
y 




 1
1
1
)1(
,
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In the second model the dependent variable is the individuals’ incremental days 
between donations at time t. That is, following individuals along the time, each time an 
individual makes a donation, we do the difference between the days since last donation 
at that time and the days between donations at t-1. 
         
211
)2(
,
)1(
1,
)1(
,
)1(
,
)2(
,




tititititi
titititi
donationdatedonationdatedonationdatedonationdatey
yyyy
 
Then, we can compute, for each day in the data set, what is the daily mean of the 
incremental days since last donation as the sum of all the individual variations divided 
by the total number of donors at that time t ( ty ): 
 
},...,1{1
)1(
1,
)1(
,
)2(
Tt
n
yy
y
t
n
i
titi
t 





 
Finally the dependent variable of the third model is the proportion of new donors at 
time t. This proportion of new donors is calculated as the ratio between the number of 
new donors at time t and the total number of donations at that time t.  
},...,1{
)3(
, Tt
n
newdonor
y
t
ti 

 
},...,1{,)1,0(
)3(
, Tty tti    
So, a value of  =1 would mean that from the total of individuals donating at time 
t, the 100% are new donors. Any value in the (0, 1) for   represents the proportion of 
new donors at time t. 
To better understand the two first measures we show and example with one 
individual in the data set. We follow an individual (identified with an ID number in the 
data set) along time and compare him/her with the population average for each of the 
dates this individual made a donation.  
We observe how this individual behaves along time, that is, the distance between 
each pair of donations and the variations in the frequency of donation for this 
individual. We also compute the daily mean for each of the measures in order to see the 
evolution of the individual and how the individual behaves with respect to the average 
of the population.  
We observe that for our individual, between the first and the second donation there 
is a distance of a hundred days, and 450 days between the second and the third 
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donation. After the third donation, and for the next donations in time, this distance 
between donations decreases for this individual. So, this individual has strong 
fluctuations in donation behavior the first periods, and then this fluctuations decrease as 
the distance between donations decrease and donations became more regular too. The 
figures also show the daily mean, which is, for each day, the sum of yi,t  or tiy ,  divided 
but the total number of donors at that day. 
 
Figure 1. Example of the days between donations and its fluctuations along time for an 
individual  
 
 
For the first outcome measure, the days since the last donation for each individual 
at each donations moment, we fixed a minimum value of 90 days for men and 120 for 
women for a standard blood donation according to the regional blood bank criteria. This 
means that if we have a woman for whom the days since the last donation are less than 
120 days this observation is removed for the analysis. We also removed observations 
for those whose days between donations are higher than 1553 days (1945 is the total 
number of days in the period of analysis 1st of January 2008 and 30th of April 2013). 
We have to suppress the days where donation was not possible (240 in total in the time 
analyzed, coming from 48 weekends per year plus Fridays, that is 96 days per year 
between 2008 and 2010 plus 48 Fridays, and 96 days per year after the extraction time 
was extended to Fridays). Individuals whose days between donations exceed 1705 days 
are excluded from the analysis. In fact, the proportion of individuals reporting a distance 
between donations higher than 1000 days is really small; the maximum distance 
observed is 8125 days, so that including these individuals would lead into a strong bias 
in our estimations. 
In all the three models the independent variables represent the dates where donation 
was registered, either at the moment where a campaign was active (Ci,t=1) or an event 
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was taking place (Ei,t=1) or after the permanent change was implemented (PCi,t=1). We 
also include the following control variables: are the age of the individual at each 
donation time (age categories are included instead of the continuous variable, in order to 
compare between individuals of different age classes), the gender, blood type O
-
 (the 
reference group being AB), the fact of being close to receiving a medal (that is being in 
the following intervals of number of total donations: [47, 50) , [97, 100) and [147, 150)) 
or having just received a medal (in that case being in the following intervals of total 
number of donations: [50, 53], [100, 103] and [150, 153]). This variable allows to see if 
the individuals’ behavior towards donation changes during the year previous receiving 
the medal and after having being rewarded.  
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Descriptive Results 
 
We have an unbalanced panel data set, with a total of 25188 different donors 
registered since January 2008, and 159318 donations registered until end of April 2013.  
Among blood donors, the 29.26% of the donations are made by women and 70.74% 
by men. The most frequent blood groups are the O (50.83%) and A (41.91%). The other 
groups are less frequents (AB and B with 2.23% and 4.97% respectively). Almost all 
donations, the 97.26%, are normal donations, with a small percentage of auto-
transfusions (2.37%) and negligible for Aferesis (0.36%). We first show descriptive 
results of the three outcomes of interest evaluated in this paper as measures for the 
impact of pro-donation campaigns.  
The figure below shows the evolution along time, by age class, of these three 
measures. We also represent a third measure, which is the proportion of new donors. 
For these three outcomes, we represent daily and monthly evolution. The graphs show 
the daily (up) and monthly (down) evolution of the three measures considered. It is 
observed that the mean days between donations (left graphs) decreases with age. 
Individuals aged 50 to 59 let, on average, pass less days (in mean) since last donation 
than the youngest individuals, those aged 18-29, whose the mean days between two 
consecutive donations is in mean close to a hundred days. 
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Figure 2. Daily and Monthly evolution, by age class, for the Mean days between donations 
(left), Incremental mean days between donations (middle) and proportion of new donors (right). 
 
 
3.2 Regression Results  
 
The following tables show the results of the estimation of the impact of pro-
donation campaigns on the three outcomes of interest: the days between consecutive 
donations (Table 3), the incremental days between consecutive donations (Table 4), and 
the proportion of new donors (Table 5). We estimate both models considering three 
different life-times for the campaigns: 15 days, one month, and three months.  
The intercept of the models measures the mean days between consecutive donations 
during the periods where there was no campaign active (Ck=0). The coefficients for 
each of the campaigns measure the variation (positive or negative) in the mean days 
between consecutive donations for the different life-times considered (15 days, one 
month and three months), with respect to the periods without campaigns. We observe 
that results are very similar independently of the life-times considered, either for the 
coefficients for the campaigns or for the control variables. Therefore, below we interpret 
results for the case where campaigns have a life-time of 15 days. The mean days since 
last donation for individuals is about 295,457 days during the periods when no 
campaign or event is implemented (248.715 if we include control variables, individual-
level effects and interaction terms). During the days that the first campaign was being 
implemented (C0) the mean days since last donation were 5.483 days more than when 
no campaign was implemented. The first campaign in which a positive and significant 
effect (reduction in the mean days since last donation) is observed is the Campaign #1. 
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During the days this campaign was active the mean outcome decreased in 8.743 days 
(14.281 when we include the control and interaction variables). We observe that 
between C1 and C6 no significant effects are found. We have to wait until the last 
campaign, C7, to observe a reduction in the days since last donation of 14.042 days with 
respect to when no campaign was implemented. We do not find significant effects for 
the additional pro-donation events (the world blood donors’ days and tribute to blood 
donors). The extension of the extraction and donor care times are not significant, and 
therefore we cannot reject the hypothesis of null impact of this change over the outcome 
of interest. However, we do for control variables included. There is a significant 
difference between men and women, women having in mean 108.276 days more 
between donations than men, and individuals of the universal blood type O- in mean 
donate more regularly (with 6.904 days of difference with respect to individuals of 
group A). Being close to receiving a medal also makes individual donate, in mean, 17.9 
days before than those individual who are not close to receiving such a recognition. 
However, once individuals have received that medal, they continue donating less 
regularly. Therefore, the medal is a significant factor influencing the regularity of 
donors. Concerning the interaction variables we see that both, men and women are 
donating less frequently in the last two years (after 2010) with respect to their donation 
behavior between 2008 and 2010. Men donate 9.3 days later in mean, and women 18.47 
days later. The difference is, however, not statistically significant between both sexes. 
The younger individuals donate also less frequently after 2010 than before, 12.938 days 
later after 2010, while those aged 40 to 50 years donate more frequently, 7.802 days 
before with respect to the period 2008-2010. Finally, those individuals who donate and 
are close to receiving the medal after 2010 donate less frequently than those individuals 
being close to receiving the medal in the period 2008-2010. Therefore, having show that 
the effect of the medal is positive increasing frequency of donations, we can say that its 
effect is lower in the last years, when more campaigns are being implemented. For the 
three campaign life-times we obtain similar results in terms of significance of the 
variables. However, it can be seen that the coefficients for the campaigns are higher for 
the first life-time of 15 days, meaning that the first days of a campaign being active are 
those in which the impact of that campaign is stronger. The fact that increasing the life-
time the coefficient is still negative and significant suggests that the campaign continues 
having a positive impact even after three months.  
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Table 3. Results from GLS estimation (random effects assumed) 
Impact of campaigns on the days between two consecutive donations 
Days between donations 
Campaign life = 15 
days 
Campaign life = 30 days  
Campaign life = 90 
days 
 
Variable Model 1.1 Model 1.2 
 
Model 1.3 Model 1.4 
 
Model 1.5 Model 1.6 
intercept 295.457*** 248.715*** 
 
295.634*** 248.674*** 
 
295.125*** 248.471*** 
C0 5.483 12.828** 
 
-0.167 7.192 
 
-2.988 4.065* 
C1 -8.743** -14.281*** 
      C12 
   
-2.249 -9.212*** 
 
-0.804 -10.021*** 
C2 11.769** 7.061 
      C3 3.169 -0.930 
 
-0.002 -4.452 
 
2.842 -1.339 
C4 2.320 -2.086 
 
2.839 -1.600 
   C45 
      
4.770*** -0.101 
C5 1.442 -2.836 
 
-2.030 -6.752* 
   C6 1.335 -2.482 
 
1.089 -3.164 
 
4.024* -1.023 
C7 -9.997** -14.042*** 
 
-8.960*** -13.253*** 
 
-4.276** -9.176*** 
Event 
 
-3.854 
  
-3.304 
  
-3.796 
Permanent change 
 
-0.965 
  
-1.133 
  
-2.997* 
Female 
 
108.276*** 
  
108.263*** 
  
108.291*** 
Group O- 
 
-6.904** 
  
-6.916** 
  
-6.941** 
Number of donations close to Medal 
 
-17.922*** 
  
-17.905*** 
  
-17.820*** 
Has received a medal and done máximum 3 donations more 
 
-14.050*** 
  
-14.075*** 
  
-14.007*** 
Female*After2010 
 
18.470*** 
  
19.262*** 
  
21.556*** 
Male*After2010 
 
9.300*** 
  
10.091*** 
  
12.381*** 
age18-30*After2010 
 
12.938*** 
  
12.929*** 
  
12.928*** 
age30-40*After2010 
 
3.179 
  
3.147 
  
3.153 
age40-50*After2010 
 
-7.802*** 
  
-7.866*** 
  
-7.819*** 
age50-60*After2010 
 
-4.751 
  
-4.795 
  
-4.653 
age60-70*After2010 
 
(omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
groupO*After2010 
 
-2.190 
  
-2.190 
  
-2,171 
medal*After2010 
 
11.022* 
  
10.974* 
  
11,100* 
aftermedal*After2010 
 
9.830 
  
9.930 
  
9,819 
σμ i 210.634 199.968 
 
210.551 200.013 
 
209.986 199.905 
σεi,t 147.483 147.289 
 
147.485 147.287 
 
147.467 147.275 
Fraction of variance due to μi 0.671 0.648 
 
0.671 0.648 
 
0.669 0.648 
Number of observations (donations) 124734 124734 
 
124734 124734 
 
124734 124734 
Groups (individuals) 21967 21967 
 
21967 21967 
 
21967 21967 
R2 (overall) 0.0001 0.061 
 
0.0001 0.0611 
 
0.000 0.0609 
 
 
Results of the second model (outcome measure is the incremental days between 
donations at time t) show that the incremental days between donations is, in mean, 
48.087 days lower when no campaign or event is active and no permanent change has 
occurred (the coefficient for the intercept) than when a campaign, event or permanent 
change occurs. For some of the campaigns there is also a positive effect (a negative 
coefficient meaning a reduction in the incremental days between donations) over the 
outcome. These two results confirm the hypothesis that campaigns may have a positive 
effect reducing the fluctuation on donors’ frequency of donation, but the effect of 
campaigns may be observed later in time, and not necessarily during the campaigns’ 
life. Concerning the control variables we observe that women have less fluctuation in 
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their donation behavior. They donate less frequent than men but they have more stable 
behavior, especially after 2010. 
 
Table 4. Results from GLS estimation (random effects assumed) 
The impact of campaigns on the incremental days between two consecutive donations 
Incremental Days  
between donations 
Campaign life = 15 days Campaign life = 30 days  Campaign life = 90 days 
 
Variable Model 2.1 Model 2.2 
 
Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
 
Model 2.5 Model 2.6 
intercept -49.837*** -48.087*** 
 
-49.679*** -48.116*** 
 
-51.875*** -48.421*** 
C0 6.087 24.953* 
 
-6.647 12.205 
 
-11.378** 5.036 
C1 
        C12 
   
-18.473*** -23.324*** 
 
-10.374** -20.886*** 
C2 -0.168 -2.503 
      
C3 -6.681 -24.377** 
 
-5.735 -23.298*** 
 
-0.058 -14.411*** 
C4 0.972 -15.273 
 
2.096 -13.734* 
   C45 
      
9.975*** -5.560 
C5 -9.575 -25.598** 
 
0.739 -15.117* 
   
C6 -1.352 -17.520** 
 
-1.408 -18.346** 
 
12.797*** -4.733 
C7 10.580 -5.585 
 
8.600 -7.919 
 
26.926*** 9.429* 
Event 
 
15.241 
  
14.604 
  
7.933 
Permanent change 
 
13.460*** 
  
12.849*** 
  
8.419** 
Female 
 
-49.579*** 
  
-49.605*** 
  
-49.564** 
Group O- 
 
-10.569 
  
-10.578 
  
-10.625 
Number of donations close to Medal 
 
19.452* 
  
19.440* 
  
19.506* 
Has received a medal and done máximum 3 donations more 
 
25.525** 
  
25.464** 
  
25.539** 
Female*After2010 
 
44.367*** 
  
45.733*** 
  
49.156*** 
Male*After2010 
 
23.402*** 
  
24.771*** 
  
28.164*** 
age18-30*After2010 
 
-4.662 
  
-4.574 
  
-4.000 
age30-40*After2010 
 
-0.609 
  
-0.565 
  
0.022 
age40-50*After2010 
 
-3.694 
  
-3.698 
  
-3.217 
age50-60*After2010 
 
-8.235 
  
-8.403 
  
-8.103 
age60-70*After2010 
 
(omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
  
(omitted) 
groupO*After2010 
 
-4.369 
  
-4.342 
  
-4.265 
medal*After2010 
 
-22.668* 
  
-22.761* 
  
-23.139* 
aftermedal*After2010 
 
-23.616 
  
-23.534 
  
-23.894 
σμ i 464.931 456.592 
 
464.745 456.474 
 
462.674 456.739 
σεi,t 339.713 338.994 
 
339.705 338.982 
 
339.558 338.964 
Fraction of variance due to μi 0.651 0.644 
 
0.651 0.644 
 
0.649 0.644 
Number of observations (donations) 118884 118884 
 
118884 118884 
 
118884 118884 
Groups (individuals) 20403 20403 
 
20403 20403 
 
20403 20403 
R2 (overall) 0.000 0.0003 
 
0.000 0.0003 
 
0.000 0.0003 
 
The last measure is the proportion of new donors. Regression results from GLS 
estimation show that the new campaigns are more effective than the reference campaign 
C0. In fact, during the period the reference campaign was active, the proportion of new 
donors decreased (-0.011). At the time the new campaigns were active (C1 to C7), the 
proportion of new donors in general increased with respect to the periods where no 
campaign was active. We only observe that during campaign #5 there is a decrease in 
the proportion of new donors. The results are similar for the three different campaign 
life-times of 15 days, one month and three months. Concerning the control variables and 
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interaction terms, we observe that the extension of the time for blood extraction and 
donor care has also a significant influence on increasing the proportion of new donors 
(+0.001). The proportion of men and women who donate for the first time after 2010 
has also increased, slightly more for women (+0.006) than for men (+0.005).  
 
Table 5. Results from GLS estimation (random effects assumed) 
The impact of campaigns on the Daily proportion of New donors 
 
Campaign life  
 15 days 
 Campaign life  
30 days 
 Campaign life 
90 days 
Proportion of New Donors Model 3.1 Model 3.2  Model 3.3 Model 3.4  Model 3.5 Model 3.6 
intercept 0.059*** 0.055***  0.058*** 0.055***  0.059*** 0.055*** 
C0 -0.011*** -0.007***  -0.009*** -0.006***  -0.007*** -0.003*** 
C1 0.004*** 0.003**  
  
 
  
C12 
  
 0.013*** 0.012***  0.009*** 0.010*** 
C2 0.020*** 0.019***  
  
 
  
C3 0.011*** 0.008***  0.002* -0.001  0.003*** -0.001 
C4 0.009*** 0.006***  0.008*** 0.005***  
  
C45 
  
 
  
 0.001*** -0.003*** 
C5 -0.001 -0.004***  0.013*** 0.011***  
  
C6 0.002** -0.001  0.002** -0.001  0.005*** -0.000 
C7 0.024*** 0.021***  0.017*** 0.014***  -0.001 -0.006*** 
Event 
 
-0.002  
 
0.000  
 
0.001 
Permanent change 
 
0.001***  
 
0.002***  
 
0.006*** 
Female 
 
-0.000  
 
-0.000  
 
-0.000 
Group O- 
 
-0.000  
 
-0.000  
 
-0.000 
Female*After2010 
 
0.006***  
 
0.005***  
 
0.004*** 
Male*After2010 
 
0.005***  
 
0.004***  
 
0.002*** 
age18-30*After2010 
 
0.001  
 
0.001  
 
0.001 
age30-40*After2010 
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.000 
age40-50*After2010 
 
-0.000  
 
-0.000  
 
-0.000 
age50-60*After2010 
 
-0.001  
 
-0.001  
 
-0.001 
age60-70*After2010 
 
(omitted)  
 
(omitted)  
 
(omitted) 
groupO*After2010 
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.000 
σμ i 0.003 0.0028  0.003 0.0028  0.003 0.003 
σεi,t 0.045 0.0457  0.045 0.045  0.045 0.045 
Fraction of variance due to μi 0.004 0.0039  0.004 0.0039  0.005 0.004 
Number of observations 
(donations) 
124734 124734 
 
124734 124734 
 
124734 124734 
Groups (individuals) 21967 21967  21967 21967  21967 21967 
R2 (overall) 0.0053 0.0101  0.0064 0.01  0.004 0.0087 
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4. Discussion 
 
In this paper we considered a period of five years for analysis (2008-2013), but the 
time period could be extended as information about blood donations is available from 
1990. However, between 1990 and 2010 the number of pro-donation campaigns has 
been very scarce. It is in fact after 2010 that the Blood Donors Association starts to 
actively implement blood donation and related campaigns. For this reason, we have 
restricted the time period for analysis to the last five years, having two time periods of 
similar size and therefore comparable, and being sure that the first half of the period 
analyzed we have complete information to localize all the campaigns that ADONA 
implemented. Comparing the periods 1990-2010 with 2010-2013 is therefore unfeasible 
by now, we have not been able to locate all the possible events and pro-donation events 
that occurred since 1990. As we cannot say that no campaign was implemented between 
1990 and 2008, we cannot consider this period in our analysis. Therefore, we decided to 
cut the period for analysis at 2008, as by now we have been able to locate all the events 
and campaigns that took place between 2008 and 2013, but not before 2008. 
Concerning the other events that could have an impact over the outcomes of interest 
analyzed, we have considered the events such as the World Blood Donors’ Day (which 
is celebrated every year the 14
th
 of June), the tributes to senior blood donors (organized 
every year but without a fixed date to reward with a golden bandage to individuals who 
have reached a total number of 50, 100 and 150 blood donations), and the changes in 
the blood donation system, such as the extension of the extraction and donor care times. 
However, one could think about other events that could have an impact on blood 
donors’ behavior, such as world catastrophes in which a world call for blood donation is 
made by other organizations such as the Red Cross or similar. However, this study had 
the purpose of evaluating the impact of ADONA pro-donation campaigns on blood 
donors’ behavior in the population of Navarra, and therefore we will assume for this 
paper that campaigns of other organizations have no impact over blood donations in our 
population. Further research will therefore focus on identifying every event, campaign 
or changes in the blood donation system, reducing the probability of having omitted 
variables that would be relevant for the analysis.  
Another topic for research could be doing cost-effectiveness of the campaigns. 
However, we do not have accurate information about the costs of campaigns, and that is 
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the reason why this paper focuses only on effectiveness of the campaigns, ignoring how 
much they cost.  
  
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we use the days between consecutive blood donations as a measure for 
the impact of pro-donation campaigns, that is, the time that has passed for individuals 
since their last donation. Our data consists of all the registered donors in the population 
of Navarra during the period January 2008 to April 2013. Several pro-donation 
campaigns and events were implemented for encouraging blood donations in this 
region, especially since 2010.  
This paper explores if these new campaigns were better on increasing individuals’ 
frequency and regularity of donations as well as the proportion of new donors, than 
previous campaigns, and also than the periods were no campaigns were active. Our 
regression analyses show that the days during the first pro-donation campaign after 
2010 the days between donations were lower than when no campaign was active. 
Between this campaign and the last in time no significant effect is observed. It is during 
the days of life of the last campaign that the days between donations decrease for 
individuals donating those days. These results suggest that the effect of the campaigns 
may is not be observed during the campaigns’ own life-time. Therefore, the last 
campaign would be gathering the effect of all the previous campaigns implemented 
before. In addition, the models show that part of the variation in the outcomes of interest 
(the days between donations and incremental days between donations) may be due to 
individuals’ characteristics, women and younger individuals being more irregular in 
donation behavior. Finally we find that the fact of being close to receiving a medal in 
recognition for the total number of donations increases frequency of donations but also 
makes individuals donate less regularly once received that recognition. Finally, we 
observe that the proportion of new donors increased when the new pro-donation 
campaigns were implemented.  
Increasing the time period for analysis is desirable, but for the moment this paper 
aims to propose a model that serves to estimate the impact of pro-donation campaigns, 
controlling by individuals characteristics and other pro-donation events and changes 
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that omitting them from the analysis would result in an inaccurate estimation of the 
impact of blood donation campaigns.  
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Annex 
 
In this annex we provide some additional information concerning the pro-donation 
campaigns and events that took place during the period 2008-2013, and that were 
implemented by the Blood Donors’ Association 
 
Campaign #0: Bone Marrow pro-donation Campaign 2009. This campaign was the 
unique campaign implemented between 2008 and end 2009. The date of start was the 4
th
 
of April 2009. The slogan of the campaign was “Your other half is there”. The 
objective of this campaign was to encourage individuals to donate bone marrow.  
 
Campaigns #1 and #2:  “Y tú, ¿qué eres?” (1st and 2nd phases). The main objective 
of these campaigns was to increase the number of donations, and also to approach the 
concept of Blood Donation to the young population.  
The campaign was divided into two phases, began with an initial expectation on 
January 18
th
 2010. The slogan ("y tú, qué eres?") invaded shelters, city buses of 
Pamplona and Tudela and also televisions. Everyday images such as the town hall, the 
monument to the charters, and beloved characters for the population, made or answered 
that question. Anonymous people in the city answered: "I am shy", "I am hard-
working", "I'm confused", "I'm a machine", "I am a night owl", "I'm a Pepper", "I am 
nerd", "I'm guess I'm dreamy"... The campaign also had an internet presence 
(www.ytuqueeres.com), today linked to the website of ADONA (www.adona.es). 
The second phase of the campaign begins Monday 1
st
 of February 2010. Thanks to 
the collaboration of the Commonwealth of Pamplona and the local urban transport 
company. The campaign also featured hangers which provided information posted 
inside the city buses. This time a total of nine people, popular and related somehow to 
Navarra, define themselves as "I am ordered", "I am a fake", I am competitive", and 
reveal their blood type “I’m O-“, “I’m A+”. At the end of this campaign, probably the 
most important in the history of this association (ADONA), the solution is given and 
posted everywhere: "Positive or Negative. We want you as you are". The objective of 
this second phase was to attract donors of all the blood types, leaving the message that 
all the blood types are useful and necessary. 
 
132 
 
Campaign #3: One day campaign. ADONA in the street. In June 11th 2011, 
ADONA goes to the street with the objective of informing to the population about blood 
donation and how to become a donor. The campaign took place in a popular square in 
the city of Pamplona during the morning (from 10:30 to 14:30 in the afternoon) to 
provide information and do special activities such as children's workshops and a 3D 
video with all the matters related to the donation process. The lemma of this campaign 
was "Give your face for donation". Members of the association and collaborators from 
the media took two pictures of the face of everyone who was willing to participate. The 
images were used in the future for the advertising campaign “Yo doy la cara, y tu?”.  
 
Campaign #4: 2011 Summer campaign: ADONA + Red Cross. In August 2011 
ADONA together with the Red Cross, start a summer campaign with the lemma "This 
summer, love yourself and think of others". The aim was to increase the number of 
donations, which are known to be scarcer during the summer months. 
 
Campaign #5: “Yo doy la cara, ¿y tú?”. In September 2011 ADONA started this new 
campaign. The lemma is different, but the central message is similar, create identity, the 
identity of being a donor. The objective is to increase the number of donors. The 
campaign used the pictures that were taken in the one day street campaign (campaign #3 
in this paper) in June 2011.  
 
Campaign #6: The regional football team dedicates de month to blood donors. The 
OSASUNA foundation (the regional soccer team) collaborated with ADONA in June 
2011. With the lemma "We are 12 with you" they dedicated the month to the blood 
donors. 
 
Campaign #7: The Extraction Mobile Unit is installed at the University Campus (2 
days campaign, previous advertising). The 21
st
 of September 2012 the extraction 
mobile unit was installed in the University Campus, during two consecutive mornings. 
The main objective was to attract young donors to blood donation.  
 
The other events and the permanent changes that occur during the same period 
analyzed, are also described below. 
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The World Blood Donors’ day. Every June 14, the date of birth of Dr. Karl 
Landsteiner, the discoverer of blood groups and human Rh., the World Blood Donors' 
day is celebrated. This international event is supported by the World Health 
Organization, the International Federation of Blood Donor, The Red Cross and Red 
Crescent which aim to recognize the figure of the blood donor voluntary and altruistic 
all around the world. Each year a different message is given. For example, the slogan 
chosen for 2011 in Navarra was "Paint the world in red in 2011" and "More blood, 
more life". The objective of this event: to invite people to join blood donation. In 2012 
ADONA celebrated this event with two acts. The first took place the day before, 
Wednesday, June the 13th, at the headquarters of the Parliament of Navarra and 
consisted of an emotional recognition of Provincial Parliament for the work of all the 
ADONA delegates.  
 
Tribute and social recognition events to senior blood donors. The 1
st
 of June 2009 in 
an act for recognition to blood donors, Golden badges were delivered to blood donors 
who achieved in 2011 a total of 50, 100 and 150 blood donations. The 24
th
 of June 2009 
and the 5
th
 of November 2012 blood donors of Navarra celebrated the traditional tribute 
to blood donors.  
 
A permanent change: The Extraction and donor care times are extended. In 
December 13th 2010, the Blood Transfusion Center of Navarre, extended the extraction 
time and care for blood donors. The new hours are Monday to Thursday, uninterrupted, 
8:00 h. to 20:00 h. and Friday from 8:00h. to 14:30h. The main objective is to facilitate 
the donation, making it easier for more people and attract new donors.  
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General Conclusions 
 
In this thesis we have explored the factors influencing the decision of individuals 
for becoming or not blood and living organ donors.  
The first important result has been the development of a theoretical model that 
helps to disentangle the psychology behind the specific decision of individuals of 
becoming or not blood or living organ donors. This model has been developed for two 
different contexts. The first is the traditional context that considers that blood donation 
is purely voluntary and altruistic. The second context deals with the case when 
incentives are offered to individuals who donate. We show how the introduction of 
incentives could affect to individuals’ decision, modifying behavior and introducing the 
risk of losing the more altruistic individuals at the same time that some individuals 
could be attracted by the fact that donation is rewarded. As individuals would have 
different expectations of the benefits and costs from blood and living organ donations, 
as well as they have different levels of aversion or propensity to incentives, the main 
result of this model is that there should be an incentive socially efficient, such that the 
probability of attracting new donors is higher than the probability of losing active 
donors. However, the problem of impossibility of individualized incentives suggests 
that empirical research is desirable before introducing incentives. That could be having 
evidence of the preference on a society towards different incentive mechanisms for 
example, in order to first have empirical evidence of which incentive would be more 
efficient (crowding-in new donors) and which incentive would be inefficient (crowd-out 
active donors).  
To this end we have illustrated these important facts with a questionnaire to the 
university population in Navarra. The questionnaire on attitudes towards blood and 
living organ donations shows that there are differences between groups of donors 
(groups of blood and living organ donors are identified and analyzed separately) on the 
perception of benefits and costs of donations, potential blood donors being more 
concerned by the costs of blood donations than active donors. This result suggests that 
experience in blood donation may reduce the expectation of costs. Those individuals 
who are not completely agree with the perception of other-regarding benefits are more 
likely to not being willing to donate an organ in life, so other-regarding benefits seem to 
be a significant factor determining the willingness to donate, at least to our respondents. 
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To analyze individuals’ preferences towards incentives, we included a question where a 
list of incentives is proposed for individuals to evaluate their agreement/disagreement. 
The main conclusion is that none of the incentives proposed would be efficient on 
crowding-in blood donors, while monetary incentives would be very likely to crowd-out 
active blood donors. In the case of living organ donations we have one incentive that 
would be likely to crowd-in individuals, that is offering priority in health care to living 
organ donors. On the contrary, there is a risk of crowding-out associated to offering 
preference in the waiting lists for a transplant to living organ donors. 
The thesis also explores the specific case of France, in which the sample is 
representative of the general population (ESPS questionnaire 2012) and the first source 
in general population in France to combine socio-economic and health information with 
information on blood donations. In this paper we explore the importance of behavioral 
variables, socio-economic and health characteristics, for the different profiles of blood 
donors. This article concludes that active donors are generally more altruistic 
individuals, with higher levels of social capital, and more risk-takers. The assumptions 
higher levels of altruism and social capital for active donors are confirmed for the 
population analyzed, reinforcing previous literature results. We also found that active 
donors are more risk takers than potential donors, confirming our hypothesis. 
Concerning socio-economic characteristics of the blood donor groups, being a student 
without having yet obtained the diploma, seems to be a characteristic that also increases 
the probability of being an active donor compared to those who reported not having 
education. 
The last paper explores the population of blood donors in Navarra. We followed 
blood donors in the last five and a half years (2008-2013) with the objective of 
estimating the impact of the new pro-donation campaigns starting in 2010. The paper 
concludes that during the periods a campaign was active, donations became not only 
more frequent but regularity also increased. In addition, the proportion of new blood 
donors was higher during that periods. Finally, increasing the life-time of campaigns we 
observe that the stronger impact of a campaign is in the first two weeks of life of that 
campaign, but the campaigns continue being effective three months after its starting 
date, and also results show that for the new campaigns, the first and the last one being 
implemented appear to be the more efficient according to our measures considered, 
indicating this result that when reinforce campaigns are implemented, the hypothesis of 
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individuals suffering a learning process can be confirmed, the last campaign absorbing 
therefore the effect of previous campaigns.  
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ANNEX 
 
 
 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS BLOOD AND 
LIVING ORGAN DONATIONS 
 
  
141 
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BLOQUE I: INFORMACIÓN GENERAL 
Marque con una X o escriba la respuesta cuando se le indique 
  
P.1 ¿Es o ha sido usted donante de sangre? (tenga en cuenta que se considera donante regular si en dos años 
ha donado/solía donar al menos 2 veces cada año) 
(1) 
Sí, soy donante de sangre regular 1  
Sí, soy donante de sangre pero no regular 2  
Sí, fui donante de sangre pero ya no lo soy 3  
No, no soy donante de sangre ni lo he sido nunca 4  
P.2 ¿Es usted donante de órganos?  (2) 
Sí, tengo carné de donante de órganos 1  
No 2  
P.3 En su familia, ¿hay antecedentes de donantes? (3) 
Sí, de sangre 1  
Sí, de órganos 2  
Sí, tanto de sangre como de órganos 3  
No 4  
NS/NC 5  
 
 
Gracias por contestar a este primer Bloque. Ahora, pase a contestar al BLOQUE II si es Ud. 
Donante de sangre regular o, en caso contrario, pase directamente al BLOQUE III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENCUESTA SOBRE LAS ACTITUDES HACIA LA DONACIÓN DE SANGRE Y ÓRGANOS EN VIDA 
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BLOQUE II: Responda a este bloque SÓLO SI ES usted donante de sangre 
Marque con una X o escriba la respuesta cuando se le indique 
 
 
P.4 ¿Por qué decidió ser donante de sangre? Señale sólo uno de los siguientes motivos  
Por recibir información de una campaña de donaciones   
Por conocer a alguien que necesitaba una transfusión   
Por tradición familiar   
Porque surgió en conversaciones con mi familia o amigos   
Por ser consciente de la necesidad de donantes para cubrir la demanda de sangre   
Si se le ocurren otros motivos, puede especificarlos a continuación  
 
 
 
P.5 Si es Usted donante regular, ¿Por qué sigue siéndolo?   
RAZONES 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC  
Porque considero que es una obligación cívica  1 2 3 4 5  
Porque no se me ocurriría dejarlo 1 2 3 4 5  
Porque ser donante de sangre hace que me sienta 
bien conmigo mismo 
1 2 3 4 5  
Porque es una oportunidad de devolver a la 
sociedad parte de lo que recibo de ella 
1 2 3 4 5  
Porque soy consciente de la necesidad de 
donantes para cubrir la demanda de sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
Si se le ocurren otros motivos, puede especificarlos  a continuación 
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P.6 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre los 
EFECTOS DE LA DONACIÓN DE SANGRE 
 
EFECTOS DE LA DONACIÓN DE SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC  
Donar sangre me supone un coste material y/o 
intangible 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
El mero hecho de donar sangre en sí mismo me 
produce satisfacción 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Donar sangre me produce satisfacción porque 
alguien mejorará su vida al recibirla 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
La satisfacción de donar sangre es superior a 
cualquier pérdida de salud o coste como 
consecuencia de la donación 
1 2 3 4 5  
La sensación de buena imagen/reputación me 
produce satisfacción 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Donar sangre puede servir de ejemplo a los que 
no donan estando en condiciones de hacerlo 
1 2 3 4 5  
P.7 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre 
POSIBLES RECOMPENSAS A LOS DONANTES DE SANGRE 
 
POSIBLES RECOMPENSAS A LOS DONANTES DE 
SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los donantes de 
sangre con la posibilidad de obtener deducciones 
fiscales 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los estudiantes 
universitarios que donen sangre con créditos de 
libre elección 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los donantes de 
sangre con dinero 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de reconocer la contribución de los 
donantes dándoles prioridad en caso de necesidad 
de una transfusión en el futuro 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor del reconocimiento social de 
donantes (medallas, publicación de listas de 
donantes…) 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de mantener informados a los 
donantes con estadísticas sobre las donaciones 
(total recibidas, total útiles, total desechadas…) 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de enviar a los donantes, tras cada 
donación, un informe médico completo de su 
sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy en contra de cualquier tipo de recompensa 
por donar sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
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P.8 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre 
OTROS ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LA DONACIÓN DE SANGRE 
 
OTROS ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LAS 
DONACIONES DE SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
La información sobre las donaciones de sangre es 
suficiente 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
El sistema sanitario público y sus instituciones 
sanitarias, en el ámbito de las donaciones de 
sangre, me transmiten confianza 
1 2 3 4 5  
La información provista por los medios de 
comunicación es suficiente 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
La información provista por los servicios 
sanitarios es suficiente 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Me gustaría saber a quién va a parar mi sangre 
una vez donada 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
P.9  A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre su 
LOS LUGARES DESTINADOS A LA DONACIÓN DE SANGRE 
 
SOBRE LOS LUGARES DESTINADOS A LA 
DONACIÓN DE SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC  
La calidad del servicio (personal e instalaciones) 
es buena 
1 2 3 4 5  
Los lugares destinados a la donación son 
adecuados 
1 2 3 4 5  
P.10 Por último, con respecto a las personas que no donan, ¿Por qué cree que no donan? A continuación, 
seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con los siguientes motivos 
 
MOTIVOS 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
Por miedo 1 2 3 4 5  
Porque no se recibe nada a cambio 1 2 3 4 5  
Porque no se lo han planteado 1 2 3 4 5  
Por desconfianza en el sistema sanitario 1 2 3 4 5  
Por falta de consciencia sobre la necesidad de 
donantes de sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
Porque ya lo hacen otros 1 2 3 4 5  
Porque no pueden por motivos de salud 1 2 3 4 5  
Si se le ocurren otros motivos, puede indicarlos a continuación  
 
 
Gracias por responder a este bloque. Ahora, por favor, pase a responder al BLOQUE III de esta encuesta 
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BLOQUE III: Responda a este bloque si NO es usted donante de sangre 
Marque con una X o escriba la respuesta cuando se le indique 
 
P.11 ¿Ha pensado alguna vez en ser donante de sangre?  
Sí 1  
No 2  
P.12 ¿Por qué no es usted donante? A continuación, seleccione sólo uno de los siguientes motivos 
 
Por miedo   
Porque no se recibe ninguna recompensa a cambio   
Porque no me lo he planteado   
Por desconfianza en el sistema sanitario   
Por falta de consciencia sobre las necesidad de donantes de sangre   
Porque ya lo hacen otros   
Porque no puedo por motivos de salud   
Si se le ocurren otros motivos, puede especificarlos a continuación 
 
 
 
 
P.13  A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre los 
EFECTOS DE DONAR SANGRE 
 
EFECTOS DE DONAR SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC  
Donar sangre supone un coste material y/o 
intangible 
1 2 3 4 5  
El mero hecho de donar sangre en sí mismo debe 
producir satisfacción, aunque no llegue a utilizarse 
1 2 3 4 5  
Donar sangre provoca satisfacción porque alguien 
mejorará su vida al recibirla 
1 2 3 4 5  
La satisfacción de donar sangre debe ser superior a 
cualquier pérdida de salud o coste como 
consecuencia de la donación 
1 2 3 4 5  
La sensación de buena imagen/reputación por 
donar provoca satisfacción 
1 2 3 4 5  
Donar sangre puede servir de ejemplo a los que no 
donan y están en condiciones de hacerlo 
1 2 3 4 5  
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P.14 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre 
POSIBLES RECOMPENSAS A LOS DONANTES DE SANGRE 
 
POSIBLES RECOMPENSAS A LOS DONANTES DE 
SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los donantes de 
sangre con la posibilidad de obtener deducciones 
fiscales 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los donantes de 
sangre con dinero 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de reconocer la contribución de los 
donantes dándoles prioridad en caso de necesidad 
de una transfusión en el futuro 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor del reconocimiento social de 
donantes (medallas, publicación de listas de 
donantes…) 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de que mantener informados a los 
donantes con estadísticas sobre las donaciones 
(total recibidas, total útiles, total desechadas…) 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de enviar a los donantes, tras cada 
donación, un informe médico completo de su 
sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy en contra de cualquier tipo de recompensa 
por donar sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
P.15 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre 
OTROS ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LAS DONACIONES DE SANGRE 
 
OTROS ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LAS 
DONACIONES DE SANGRE 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
La información sobre las donaciones de sangre es 
suficiente 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy informado sobre los requisitos necesarios 
para poder ser donante de sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
El sistema sanitario público y sus instituciones 
sanitarias, en el ámbito de las donaciones de 
sangre, me transmiten confianza 
1 2 3 4 5  
La información provista por los medios de 
comunicación es suficiente 
1 2 3 4 5  
La información provista por los servicios sanitarios 
es suficiente 
1 2 3 4 5  
Me gustaría saber a quién va a parar mi sangre una 
vez donada 
1 2 3 4 5  
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P.16 Y con respecto al resto de personas que donan sangre, ¿Por qué cree usted que decidieron ser donantes? 
A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con los siguientes motivos 
 
MOTIVOS 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC  
Por recibir información de una campaña de 
donaciones 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Para sentirse una persona mejor 1 2 3 4 5  
Por conocer a alguien que necesitaba una 
transfusión 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Para dar una buena imagen de sí mismos 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Por tradición familiar 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Porque lo consideran una obligación cívica  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Porque sí, simplemente surgió la ocasión  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Por  pensar que es la oportunidad de devolver a la 
sociedad parte de lo que reciben de ella 
1 2 3 4 5  
Por ser conscientes de la necesidad de donantes 
para cubrir la demanda de sangre 
1 2 3 4 5  
Si se le ocurren otros motivos, por favor, especifíquelos a continuación 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gracias por responder a este bloque. Ahora, pase a responder el BLOQUE IV  de esta encuesta 
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BLOQUE IV: Preguntas sobre las donaciones de órganos en vida 
Marque con una X o escriba la pregunta cuando se le indique 
 
P.18 A continuación seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con la siguiente pregunta: 
En el hipotético caso en que un familiar suyo necesitase un riñón/hígado, ¿estaría usted dispuesto a donar el 
suyo en vida a esta persona?  
 
Muy de acuerdo 1  
De acuerdo débilmente  2  
En desacuerdo 3  
Muy en desacuerdo 4  
NS/NC 5  
P.19 ¿Qué aspectos le preocupan o importan de éste tipo de donaciones?  
 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
Me preocupan que tenga efectos negativos sobre 
mi salud 
1 2 3 4 5  
Me preocupa que la información sobre este tipo de 
donaciones sea incompleta 
1 2 3 4 5  
Es importante tener en cuenta las posibles pérdidas 
de salud antes de decidir donar un órgano en vida 
1 2 3 4 5  
Me importa que mi órgano donado no tuviera éxito 
esperado sobre el receptor 
1 2 3 4 5  
P.20 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre los 
EFECTOS ESPERADOS DE LA DONACIÓN DE ÓRGANOS EN VIDA 
 
EFECTOS ESPERADOS DE DONAR UN ÓRGANO EN 
VIDA 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
El simple hecho de donar un órgano en vida tiene 
que dar satisfacción 
1 2 3 4 5  
Donar un órgano en vida es de algún modo 
contribuir al bienestar de toda la sociedad 
1 2 3 4 5  
La satisfacción de donar un órgano en vida debe 
superar todos sus costes 
1 2 3 4 5  
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P.21 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre 
POSIBLES RECOMPENSAS A LOS DONANTES DE ÓRGANOS EN VIDA 
 
POSIBLES RECOMPENSAS A LOS DONANTES DE 
ÓRGANOS EN VIDA 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
Estoy a favor de ofrecer algún tipo de 
reconocimiento a los donantes de órganos en vida 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los donantes de 
órganos en vida con dinero 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de recompensar a los donantes de 
órganos en vida con deducciones fiscales 
1 2 3 4 5  
Si donase un órgano en vida, me gustaría que en un 
futuro, si lo necesito, se me considerase paciente 
preferente 
1 2 3 4 5  
Estoy a favor de dar prioridad en asistencia 
sanitaria a quienes tengan carné de donante de 
órganos 
1 2 3 4 5  
P.22 A continuación, seleccione su grado de acuerdo o desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones sobre 
OTROS ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LAS DONACIONES DE ÓRGANOS EN VIDA 
 
OTROS ASPECTOS RELACIONADOS CON LAS 
DONACIONES DE ÓRGANOS EN VIDA 
Muy de 
Acuerdo 
De 
acuerdo 
débilmente 
En 
desacuerdo 
Muy en 
desacuerdo 
NS/NC 
 
Me considero una persona lo suficientemente sana 
como para poder ser donante  
1 2 3 4 5  
El sistema sanitario público y sus médicos, en el 
ámbito de los trasplantes de órganos, me transmiten 
confianza 
1 2 3 4 5  
Conozco el procedimiento a seguir (pruebas 
médicas de compatibilidad necesarias, etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5  
 
Gracias por responder a este bloque. A continuación, pase a responder al último Bloque de esta encuesta 
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BLOQUE IV: Preguntas Personales 
Marque con una X o escriba la pregunta cuando se le indique 
 
P.23 Sexo  
Hombre 1  
Mujer 2  
P.24 Escriba su edad  
……………..        Años  
P.25 Máximo nivel de estudios alcanzado  
 Sin estudios 1  
 Estudios Primarios (EGB o similar) 2  
 Estudios Secundarios (Formación Profesional, Bachillerato/BUP y COU o similares) 3  
 Estudios Superiores (Universitarios de Grado Medio y Superior) 4  
 
Muchas gracias por su colaboración al responder a esta encuesta. A continuación, si lo desea, 
dispone de espacio para hacer comentarios sobre la encuesta. 
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